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Foreword
Natural resource endowments such as oil, gas, and minerals can serve as 
potent drivers of development. Global demand for scarce natural 
resources is mounting rapidly. Industry experts argue that we are in the 
midst of a “super cycle” of commodity prices, driven by demand from 
fast-growing emerging economies. Natural resource extraction is capital-
intensive, with annual global investments approaching $1 trillion, hence 
offering the potential for rapid infrastructure development and struc-
tural transformation in developing economies. Riches from the sector 
promise to be massive, with resource rents, that is, the difference between 
revenues and extraction cost, estimated at about $4 trillion annually, or 
7 percent of global GDP. More than 50 World Bank client countries—
representing more than 1.5 billion people and such diverse settings 
as Afghanistan, Brazil, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, and Mongolia—are 
 currently characterized as “resource-dependent.” Nonrenewable natural 
resources are disproportionately important to poor and fragile countries, 
as typically they are their main endowment and revenue source.
But a “paradox of plenty” exists in resource-rich poor countries, 
where recent history has demonstrated that extractive endowments, if 
not well managed, can disappoint. Common problems include  lopsided, 
poorly diversifi ed economic structures; disruptions to local economies 
and communities; environmental hazards; weakened accountability of 
the state to society; and even the risk of violent confl ict. Political upheav-
als like the recent ones in the Middle East and North Africa can render 
resource- producing and -consuming countries vulnerable to extreme 
commodity price volatility and supply uncertainty. As  representatives of 
the World Bank Group and the broader community of development 
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policy practitioners, we know much about the challenges of effective 
natural resource–led development strategies and technical options for 
mitigating some of the worst economic outcomes. A consensus is 
emerging that policies will be effective in leveraging natural  resource–led 
development only when they are compatible with the level of institu-
tional quality and the political economy context of the country in ques-
tion. Consequently, the key challenge is to identify national resource 
management strategies that promise to benefi t a country’s present and 
future generations, including strategies for attracting the requisite 
investment and technology to develop the resource sector effectively in 
the long term.
This book provides a much-needed framework for approaching nat-
ural resource management more systematically, focusing attention on 
the governance and political economy dimensions of the quest to trans-
form natural resource rents into sustainable development riches. The 
volume synthesizes theoretical perspectives and operational consider-
ations by drawing on the distinguished and growing scholarship on 
natural resources and incorporating rich new empirical material from a 
series of country case studies commissioned for this work from Africa 
(Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria), 
East Asia and Pacifi c (Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia, and 
Timor-Leste), and Latin America and the Caribbean (Bolivia, Chile, 
Ecuador, Mexico, and  Trinidad and Tobago). Thus, the volume develops 
incentive-compatible operational insights for stakeholders inside and 
outside of government in natural resource–endowed countries, as well 
as for their international development partners.
The book serves as an important tool for policy makers and develop-
ment practitioners to promote natural resource–led development. It 
provides insights for improving sector governance by building on the 
notion that the entire natural resource “value chain” must be considered. 
Simply getting resources out of the ground does not translate into devel-
opment. Natural resource rents must be collected by government insti-
tutions and channeled through the budgetary process so that they can be 
transformed into productive public assets and sustainable development. 
Proposed options across the various steps of the extractive industry 
value chain must be both technically sound and yet incentive- compatible, 
representing “good fi t” rather than “best practice.” Equally, policy makers 
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must pay attention to the linkages across the value chain in understand-
ing natural resource–led development as a dynamic process. These mes-
sages will resonate with developing-country policy makers seeking to 
craft their own path from “rents to riches.”
Successful natural resource–led development increasingly involves 
multiple stakeholders across society. Past analytical and practitioner 
engagement has focused too narrowly on the bargaining dynamics 
between developing-country governments and transnational extractive 
companies. But governments in developing countries are by no means 
monolithic; rather, different government actors across the value chain 
often have varying interests and expectations with regard to natural 
resource–led development. Many developing countries, in striving to 
capture suffi cient benefi ts from the natural resource sector, have empha-
sized the role of state-owned resource companies. At the same time, a 
global consensus is growing that regards citizens as the ultimate owners 
of natural resource endowments. 
Quite simply, governments have not always been the best stewards of 
these resources, increasing the clamor for better governance and social 
accountability for natural resource use. Major international companies 
are increasingly moving beyond narrow corporate social responsibility 
concerns to recognize their collective stake in promoting broad-based 
and sustained development in the extractive industry. Emerging inter-
national norms and standards play an equally signifi cant role in sector 
governance. An important vehicle for collaborative engagement in the 
 sector, the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative alone has led to 
creation of more than 30 multi-stakeholder groups. International agen-
cies such as the World Bank have an important role to play in convening 
stakeholders to consider concerted approaches in the sector.
Aid agencies face a number of challenges to engaging effectively in 
resource-rich settings. Countries with abundant resource rents are not 
necessarily seeking fi nancial assistance. Instead, international donors are 
asked to support resource-dependent countries in a variety of ways: to 
assist with adjustments in the wake of poorly managed fi scal booms and 
busts, to aid in producing complementary institutional and physical 
infrastructure for natural resource extraction, and to provide technical 
assistance for improving the management of the natural resource sec-
tors. This volume demonstrates that deploying detailed country-level 
xii Foreword
political economy analysis is essential in helping domestic reformers 
and development partners engage more smartly in channeling natural 
resources for development. 
Otaviano Canuto
Vice President and Head of Network
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[The business of mining] is perhaps the most disadvantageous lottery in 
the world, or the one in which the gain of those who draw the prizes bears 
the least proportion to the loss of those who draw the blanks. 
— Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776)
Subsoil natural resource endowments and their associated rents—if well 
harnessed and managed—can be a boon to developing countries. Yet, 
too often the extractive industries of oil, gas, and mining have instead 
been associated with the “resource curse.” Although the extent and inev-
itability of this curse continue to be debated, it remains that nations that 
are more dependent on natural resource wealth tend to grow more slowly 
than those that are resource-poor, and they often suffer from weak 
accountability and institutions, poor social capital, and increased likeli-
hood of confl ict.1 In many developing countries, natural resources are 
the proverbial main game in town, and the extractive industries sector is 
both shaped by and in turn has an infl uence on political, economic, soci-
etal, and institutional dynamics writ large. Understanding the political 
economy surrounding resource rents is therefore crucial to achieving 
sustainable development built on resource riches. 
From the public interest perspective, many resource-dependent devel-
oping countries pursue short-sighted, suboptimal policies for extracting 
resources and capturing rents, and they subsequently allocate those rents 
in ways that often privilege elite private consumption rather than public 
investments that enhance growth and collective social welfare. Scholars 
and practitioners alike have searched in vain for workable solutions to 
Introduction: Beyond the 
Resource Curse
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the resource curse in developing countries. In documenting and explain-
ing the policy failures associated with it, the social science literature pres-
ents a grim sketch of the syndrome and tends to be pessimistic about 
what can be done to mitigate it. Policy advisors and industry experts, on 
the other hand, have generally focused on assisting the extractive process 
in poorly governed environments in order to generate larger resource 
rent streams, while paying less attention to how the rents are captured 
and employed by governments. 
Objectives of This Volume 
The goal of this volume is to develop a better understanding of the 
political economy dynamics resource-dependent governments are fac-
ing in order to assist them in achieving welfare-enhancing policy 
 making and governance in the natural resource sectors. The authors 
seek to systematically understand the patterns through which resource-
dependent governments interact with their societies and extractive 
industry developers in making decisions about natural resource extrac-
tion and the use of natural resource rents. This is accomplished, 
uniquely and for the fi rst time, by bringing together broad insights from 
the scholarship on the political economy of natural resource manage-
ment with practitioners’ granular understanding of how the sector oper-
ates, through the lens of the natural resource value chain. The analysis 
identifi es how political economy dynamics present obstacles to wel-
fare-maximizing decisions at each of the discrete steps from resource 
extraction to rent allocation. With this focus on the details of the sec-
tor, the volume then points to feasible improvements in natural resource 
management, particularly for the weak institutional environments 
most vulnerable to the resource curse. 
Greater recognition of the political economy dynamics prevalent in 
developing countries dependent on oil, gas, and mining will enable inter-
national development partners to better calibrate engagement and 
enhance the prospects of success in these settings.2 Paying attention to 
and being able to identify the various incentives of relevant political actors 
can help inform dialogue aimed toward changing these incentives in ways 
that promise to be better aligned to promoting a resource-dependent 
country’s development prospects. This volume identifi es a series of incen-
tive-compatible policies and capacity-building interventions to achieve 
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welfare-enhancing goals in three key areas of natural resource manage-
ment: extraction, taxation, and investment of resource rents. For example, 
countries can attempt to establish more farsighted, fair, and credible con-
tracts for resource extraction by disclosing the terms of contracts and 
building intertemporal fl exibility into them. Revenues can be effectively 
mobilized if the fi scal regime of the extractive industries is better cali-
brated to administrative capacity. And public spending can be targeted to 
society’s long-term benefi t through careful prioritization of public invest-
ment management that fi rst focuses on building the infrastructure neces-
sary to attract future investment. 
A Political Economy Approach 
Much has been learned about the economics and associated policy 
options of natural resource–led growth. The commodity boom and bust 
cycle of the 1970s triggered concerted attention to these issues in the 
international development community (see Gelb and Associates 1988 for 
a foundational statement).
Today, historically high commodity prices and the growing impor-
tance of resource extraction in many developing countries underlie a 
renewed surge of interest in policy issues around natural resource–led 
development, and a number of measured policy options for natural 
resource–led growth have been advanced.3 Yet, for the most part, schol-
ars and practitioners have fallen short of translating broad agreement on 
“good practice” policies into concrete steps to navigate and address the 
institutional and political obstacles that are associated with extracting 
and allocating resource rents for developmental purposes. 
This volume emphasizes instead the notion of “good fi t,” taking the 
position that welfare-promoting policies, institutions, and governance 
must be tailored, at least in part, to a country’s specifi c context. Adopting 
an approach to institutional arrangements that emphasizes local varia-
tion and innovation as much as best international practice will be cen-
tral to the ability of governments and development partners to achieve 
salutary developmental outcomes.4 In this vein, the volume presents an 
analytical framework for assessing a country’s political economy and 
institutional environment as it relates to natural resource management 
and, on that basis, it offers a substantial set of targeted prescriptions 
across the natural resource value chain that are technically sound and 
compatible with the identifi ed underlying incentives. 
4 Rents to Riches?
In other words, the objective of this book is to help development 
practitioners unravel the political economy dynamics surrounding nat-
ural resource management in order to complement their technically 
grounded engagement. To this end, the analytical approach has been 
two-pronged. First, case studies were conducted on the political econ-
omy of the hydrocarbon and mineral value chains in 13 countries in the 
Africa, East Asia and Pacifi c, and Latin America and the Caribbean 
regions. Second, in light of this empirical material, the book highlights 
the current frontier of applied political economy analysis on resource 
dependence. This volume synthesizes the empirical and the theoretical 
with an emphasis on illuminating the implications for operational 
engagement in resource-dependent settings.
The Natural Resource Management Value Chain 
The World Bank mandate establishes poverty reduction as its primary 
objective in engaging with client countries. Long-term poverty reduction 
is achieved through growth, diversifi cation, effective public spending and 
saving, and peace and stability. It is widely recognized that higher quality 
institutions help to achieve better and more  far-sighted policies in pur-
suit of these objectives and help underpin their successful implementa-
tion.5 A legitimate and equitable compact between the state and society, 
however it may be constituted, is an integral part of this trajectory. The 
hydrocarbon and minerals sectors are no exception: institutional quality 
is a crucial factor for resource-dependent countries to achieve sustain-
able, development-oriented policies and sector governance. Mitigating 
the resource curse is inherently a governance challenge: the credibility, 
quality, transparency, and accountability of policy-making processes, 
public institutions, the legal and regulatory climate, and sector gover-
nance are major determinants of how successfully countries can channel 
their resource wealth into sustainable development. 
Natural resource management spans a great many specifi c and inter-
related decisions on the part of government in interaction with resource 
developers (private and state-owned) and society. The World Bank has 
adopted a “value chain approach” to understanding natural resource 
management (NRM), with the primary objective of prescribing an inte-
grated set of feasible policy interventions to transform natural resource 
potential into sustainable development outcomes. The value chain 
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(see fi gure 1.1), encompasses the institutional arrangements across 
fi ve key dimensions of NRM: (1) sector organization and the award of 
contracts and licenses; (2) regulation and monitoring of operations; 
(3) collection of taxes and royalties; (4) revenue distribution and pub-
lic investment management; and (5) implementation of sustainable 
development policies.6 





















The NRM value chain spans the key sequence of steps that a resource-
dependent country must undertake in transforming its natural resource 
rents into developmental riches. When embedded in a political economy 
context, the value chain also offers the potential for a comprehensive 
assessment of the governance and political economy parameters that 
affect a resource-dependent country’s ability to transform rents into 
riches. The framework is not strictly sequential; downstream decisions 
made on public investment management in any given time period will 
inevitably have an impact back on upstream decisions on extraction in 
the next time period. Understanding the dynamic feedback loops across 
the steps in the value chain in any given country is crucial to character-
izing its domestic political economy and natural resource policy making 
and management. 
The global study underlying this volume uses the NRM value chain as 
a diagnostic framework to analyze the political economy of rent extrac-
tion and allocation in a sample of resource-dependent developing coun-
tries. A standardized set of terms of reference was used to complete eight 
full country case studies in Africa (Angola, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria) and East Asia and Pacifi c (Lao Peo-
ple’s Democratic Republic [Lao PDR], Mongolia, and Timor-Leste), 
6 Rents to Riches?
along with a comparative synthesis of fi ve smaller case studies in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and 
 Trinidad and Tobago). The framework was designed to systematically 
assess and identify key political economy dynamics and institutional 
arrangements with regard to natural resource management in each 
country in which it was applied and to ensure the analytical leverage that 
comes with a consistent methodology (World Bank 2008a).7 
The cases covered were not sampled through a rigorous research 
design for the purposes of making claims about causality or generalized 
conclusions about a broader universe of cases. They were largely initi-
ated at the request of World Bank country teams grappling with these 
issues on the ground. Nevertheless, the range of cases in the global study 
includes countries with both oil and other mineral deposits that are at 
various stages in terms of both their natural resource extraction and 
their level of development. They thus illustrate how natural resources 
and political economies interact in producing outcomes with a view to 
articulating good-fi t, sustainable interventions for resource-dependent 
developing countries. 
Development Assistance and Targets for Intervention 
Their access to signifi cant natural resource rents makes resource-
dependent countries less likely to depend on aid than their non-
resource-dependent peers. Some observers of international develop-
ment argue that this is a positive thing.8 Nonetheless, the traditional 
donor community, as well as emerging global players, will have pro-
nounced interest in countries with proven and perceived resource 
endowments. In settings that start out with weak capacity and institu-
tional endowments, these relationships can be asymmetric and not 
always in the long-term interest of the developing country. The World 
Bank Group’s own direct engagement in the extractive industry (EI) 
sector has not been without controversy: the Bank announced in 2000 
that it would conduct a review of its engagement in extractive indus-
tries, in large part as a response to environmental and human rights 
groups. The initial review group, led by a former Indonesian minister 
of the environment, suggested that the Bank distance itself from 
engagement in this sector; the fi nal management response, however, 
argued that there was a continuing role for the Bank in supporting EI 
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“provided its involvement supports poverty reduction and sustainable 
development” (World Bank 2004a, iii).  
Skeptics may argue that international actors will have limited leverage 
in shaping the behavior of policy makers in resource-dependent coun-
tries. This challenge, as always, is likely to be especially acute in settings 
characterized by poor quality governance. The World Bank’s experience 
with the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project serves as a cautionary tale. 
Beginning in 2000, the World Bank sought to tie the Chadian govern-
ment to earmarking future oil spending to poverty reduction as part of 
a package to help the landlocked country develop its oil industry. Once 
the oil started fl owing, however, the Chadian government reneged upon 
the agreement. More broadly, recent examples of signifi cant debt relief 
(through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries [HIPC] Debt Initiative) 
in such resource-dependent countries as the Republic of Congo and 
Nigeria raise the question of whether such measures do indeed start 
these countries off on a clean slate as promised, or merely set them up 
for another bout of resource-backed borrowing.
Nevertheless, there are crucial windows of opportunity for engage-
ment by international development partners in resource-dependent 
settings. First, although the magnitude of resource rents generally far 
outweighs the potential fi nancial fl ows from aid, absolute amounts of 
aid may increase in countries that have newly discovered natural 
resources as these countries attempt to get that sector off the ground. 
Second, resource-dependent countries have tended to seek support 
from the international community in times of adverse shocks, and 
development partners must be prepared to seize these opportunities for 
assistance and reform. Finally, domestic reformers often look to the 
international community to buttress their own positions; good ideas 
and technical support may fi nd strong resonance under these condi-
tions, rather than being perceived as supply-driven reform packages.
An oft-leveled critique regarding development assistance in resource-
dependent countries is that leaving the resources in the ground is some-
times the best choice in poorly governed settings with weak institutional 
capacity. Using the NRM value chain as the analytical lens for this work 
assumes that the decision to extract has already been made—and the 
objective is to understand the political economy surrounding policy and 
governance in the sector in order to enhance associated developmental 
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interventions. Choosing not to extract certainly ought to be considered, 
but in many developing countries the tempting fl ow of resource rents for 
immediate spending and the promise, albeit elusive, of developmental 
benefi ts through public investment are diffi cult to handle with restraint. 
Rarely is the decision at all like that facing Saudi Arabia—whether to 
simply pump more oil or less. Extractive industries operate in even the 
most unstable and fraught environments, often with a signifi cant risk 
premium (Haber, Maurer, and Razo 2003). In the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), for example, elites operating in a confl ict environ-
ment cut short-term deals for resource extraction and used the rents to 
fi nance arms purchases. These are obviously not the conditions for 
transforming resource rents into sustained development riches. Yet 
there are signifi cant lags in moving from discovery to extraction of 
resources, sometimes over one or even two decades. With this in mind, 
it is not unreasonable for most countries and their donors and produc-
tion partners to embark down the path of extraction, with the hope 
that the conditions for welfare-enhancing use of rents will improve 
over time. 
The authors’ engagement with numerous country counterparts in 
government and otherwise has underscored the existence of a real 
appetite for innovative and, most importantly, tractable responses to 
observed weaknesses in the management of extractive resource wealth. 
In some cases, to be sure, elite capture of natural resource rents sub-
verts the achievement of sustainable development outcomes. But even 
well-intentioned leaders often confront daunting challenges in imple-
menting welfare-enhancing policies. While a leader today may be inter-
ested in saving resources for the future, for example, she may simply 
not trust her successors to later spend them well, given weak institu-
tional checks and balances. Or, new reform-minded governments may 
fi nd that vested interests and corrupt practices in the resource sector 
are too pervasive to be easily overcome with policy directives. 
This book emphasizes actions that committed domestic agents, 
international development partners, and responsible stakeholders in 
the global extractive industries can take to enhance the prospects of a 
resource-dependent developing country by grounding interventions 
in a granular understanding of the common political economy dynam-
ics surrounding natural resources. Dependence on natural resources 
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shapes state institutions and the decision-making framework and cal-
culus facing political and economic elites, which affects the possibility 
of achieving the higher-order objectives that can aid in overcoming 
adverse outcomes, such as the need to deepen institutionalization, to 
bolster credibility, and to extend time horizons. Tailored operational 
recommendations are needed to achieve such goals, for example, mea-
sures to increase transparency in contract negotiations, enhance tax 
administration capacity, or improve the prioritization of public invest-
ment. And the targets of these specifi c forms of intervention are natu-
ral resource sector policies, institutions, and governance. Brief defi ni-
tions of these concepts as used in this volume are as follows.
•  Policies are decisions made by government offi cials on a specifi c 
course of action. A policy may be enacted in legislation or underpin-
ning regulation; natural resource policies are often made explicit in a 
minerals law, for example. A policy may also be adopted through bud-
get plans or pursued more informally through a government agency’s 
day-to-day operations. 
•  Institutions are the “rules of the game” that structure political, eco-
nomic, and social interactions.9 Formal institutions include a coun-
try’s constitutional framework and the checks and balances in place 
among different branches of government. With respect to natural 
resources, formal institutions could include legislation on the natural 
resource sectors or a fi scal equalization formula for transfers from 
resource-rich provinces to those that are resource-poor. Informal 
institutions encompass the unwritten rules structuring behavior; for 
example, there may be implicit social obligations being acted upon. 
•  Governance is the exercise of public authority with regard to society 
through the agencies of government—executive, legislature, judiciary—
in the context of the institutional and policy framework in place. It is 
about the processes by which bargains between state and society are 
made (including policies and institutions) and how they are subse-
quently implemented and monitored (by organizations). 
•  State capacity, or the ability of the state to implement policy through 
its agencies, is an important aspect of governance. With particular 
relevance for governance of the natural resource sector, Karl defi nes 
state capacity as “the sum total of a state’s material ability to control, 
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extract, and allocate resources as well as its symbolic or political 
ability to create, implement, and enforce collective decisions.” (Karl 
1997, 45). 
Weak institutions and low-capacity public sector agencies in resource-
dependent developing countries mean that the ability of the state to 
make policy decisions to mitigate the resource curse will be equally 
weak.10 Causality runs in both directions: a weak governance environ-
ment can lead to resource dependence, and high natural resource 
dependence can contribute to governance failures. Understanding how 
natural resource extraction interacts with institutions and governance 
to cumulate into broader political economy trajectories is crucial for 
elaborating potential developmental assistance. First, a country’s polit-
ical economy setting must be understood in order to contextualize 
interventions and ensure that they are incentive-compatible so that 
perverse outcomes do not result instead. Furthermore, development 
partners may, in collaboration with reformist clients, adopt an even 
more transformative stance regarding institutions; again, success will 
hinge on a fi rm grasp of the political economy of natural resource 
dependence.
Transforming Rents into Riches 
Natural resources yield “rents,” or extraordinary profi ts from their pro-
duction, which are crucial to the political economy of resource-led 
development. Chapter 2 reviews the scholarship on the “rentier state” 
and how resource rents interact with institutions and political economy 
dynamics, then develops a core political economy framework for this 
volume that rests on understanding how rents fl ow through the system. 
Provided here is a brief overview of the analytical logic that animates 
this work.
The Analytical Framework 
Viewed through the disaggregated lens of the NRM value chain, two key 
issues emerge in characterizing how a government manages its natural 
resources: (1) How effectively does a government generate and capture 
rents from the extractive industries? (2) How does the government spend 
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resource wealth and to what extent is it invested in a sustainable, 
 pro-development manner? In essence, outcomes across the NRM value 
chain can be reduced to two core rent arenas: generating rents through 
extraction and taxation and distributing rents through spending and 
investment (fi gure 1.2). Many different domestic and international 
stakeholders are involved in natural resource policy making and extrac-
tion, and the relationships among these actors are constantly shifting 
across the value chain.
Figure 1.2. The Two Key “Rent Arenas” in the Natural Resource Value Chain
Source: Authors’ compilation, based on Webb (2010).











Political economy scholarship often relies on regime typologies to 
distinguish why certain types of country settings yield certain outcomes. 
In order to help country counterparts and development practitioners 
diagnose the political economy trajectory a resource-dependent country 
is embarked upon, this volume advances a simple typology that is struc-
tured around two crucial dimensions:
•  The credibility of intertemporal commitment—or the degree to which 
policy stability and bargains over time can be enforced and deviations 
from such agreements are subject to sanction; and 
•  The overall political inclusiveness of the prevailing state-society 
 compact—or the extent to which diverse social, economic, and polit-
ical viewpoints are incorporated into decision-making, and a sense of 
either collectivist or clientelist welfare is privileged over purely elite 
interests. 
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Although these dimensions are interdependent to some extent, posi-
tioning them against each other yields a typology of four distinct country 
settings (table 1.1). Characterizations of each setting, as well as unbun-
dled components underlying each dimension, can be found in chapter 2. 
Development interventions to mitigate the resource curse are aimed 
at assisting reform in countries such that their policy making and 
institutional framework across the natural resource value chain 
approximate those found in countries squarely within the ideal bot-
tom-right quadrant of programmatic pluralism. In other words, natu-
ral resource rents are most reliably transformed into sustainable 
development riches when a government can make credible intertem-
poral commitments to both extractive companies and its own citizens, 
and when the political regime is inclusive such that the government 
faces incentives to use resource rents to provide public goods that 
enhance the collective welfare.
This typology may be used to characterize a country at a specifi c time, 
but countries also evolve dynamically, sometimes transforming from 
one political economy setting to another. In order to be successful, devel-
opment initiatives must fi nd mechanisms to resonate with, and eventu-
ally transform, the underlying political and institutional dynamics of 
resource-dependence. An assessment of a country’s political economy 
Table 1.1. Typology of Natural Resource–Dependent Settings
Political inclusiveness









Individualized political authority 
built on a hierarchy of cronyism; 
emphasis on private (elite) goods; 
exploitation of public resources 
for private gain
Hegemonic government
Institutionalized one-party regime; 
either predatory or benevolent; 
emphasis on private (elite) goods with 





Political competition based on 
extensive use of clientelism; 
provision of particularist goods; 
low horizontal accountability
Programmatic pluralism 
Electoral competition based on 
programs geared toward collective 
welfare enhancement; provision of 
public goods; horizontal and vertical 
democratic accountability
Source: Adapted from Barma and Viñuela (2010).
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using this typology indicates the shape of the feasible political space 
within which good-fi t interventions must be elaborated if they are to be 
tractable and sustainable. The unbundled components underlying the 
two dimensions of intertemporal credibility and political inclusiveness 
(see chapter 2) offer traction in terms of developing principles for 
intervention. 
As development practitioners and country counterparts move toward 
articulating good-fi t interventions that are compatible with underly-
ing incentives, the typology suggests three paths for designing these 
initiatives:
•  Interventions primarily aimed at extending time horizons, thereby 
enhancing intertemporal credibility; for example, emphasizing a sim-
ple, rule-based process for granting resource concessions that mini-
mizes investor uncertainty and enhances predictability.
•  Reforms that emphasize mobilizing stakeholders to cooperate on natu-
ral resource management, thereby broadening political inclusiveness; 
for example, easing information asymmetries by using model con-
tract and fi scal regimes or at least disclosing contract terms in order 
to empower third-party audit and oversight.
•  Interventions that enclave institutions and capacity in natural resource 
management so that some, albeit limited, functionality is possible 
even when the wider political economy dynamics are perverse. 
Intelligently designed interventions along these lines can both 
strengthen salutary dynamics by tapping into incentives that push in 
the right direction and work with counterparts on transformative inter-
ventions that could alter the underlying political economy dynamics 
for the better. 
The thematic chapters of this volume—chapter 3 on sector orga-
nization, chapter 4 on taxation, and chapter 5 on public investment—
describe the political economy incentives and dynamics at each 
 respective point of the value chain, comparing them against the four 
political economy settings sketched in the typology and showing how 
they contribute to typical natural resource management outcomes in 
low-income, resource-dependent countries. Each chapter then out-
lines specifi c potential good-fi t interventions that make sense within 
those political opportunities and constraints, describing how different 
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mechanisms might be incentive-compatible and, ultimately, perhaps 
transformative. 
Distinctive Characteristics of the Extractive Industries 
Practitioners in resource-dependent countries face many of the chal-
lenges of poor policy making, limited capacity, and weak institutions 
that are characteristic of developing countries in general. Yet, signifi cant 
distinctive factors of resource-dependent settings tend to shape political 
economy context and condition the overall development process in spe-
cifi c ways: in particular, the fi nite nature of hydrocarbons and minerals; 
the super-normal profi ts yielded by extraction of these resources and the 
state’s sovereign right to some portion of those rents; the fact that com-
modity prices are extremely volatile and, from the perspective of most 
developing countries, are set exogenously; and the long timeframe of the 
extraction or production cycle along with the uniqueness of ownership 
structures in the resource sectors. As discussed further in chapter 2, these 
distinctive qualities together make resource rents central to the political 
economy of resource-dependent countries and make the extractive 
industries particularly susceptible to short time horizons and the pursuit 
of private enrichment over public welfare.
Exhaustible, or nonrenewable, natural resources include energy 
sources such as oil, natural gas, coal, and uranium, and other minerals 
like gold, silver, copper, iron, and zinc. The amount of these resources in 
the ground is fi nite because they are formed by extended geological pro-
cesses and cannot be easily replenished. Yet, what constitutes “ore” is not 
a given: it is a function of commodity price, technology, extraction costs, 
and government policy. An increase in commodity prices, improvements 
in exploration or processing technology, reduction in unit costs, or taxes 
on inputs can induce fi rms to lower the cutoff grades for ore, whereas 
lower prices would lead fi rms to raise the cutoff grades. Natural resources 
must be extracted in order to be assets; if the costs of extraction are so 
high that developers walk away, would-be ore is simply waste. Conversely, 
extraction entails the depletion of a country’s assets; thus, resource rents 
are not, as they are sometimes mischaracterized, manna from heaven. 
When they are extracted, oil, gas, and mineral resources often provide 
for super-normal profi ts; particularly for oil, the cost of extraction can be 
signifi cantly lower than what the resource might fetch on the market at 
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any given point in time. In Saudi Arabia, for example, lifting costs are just 
over US$2 to extract a barrel of oil valued at about US$90 on the global 
market in 2011.11 The extent of rents that can be captured from extraction 
depends on the country’s geological conditions as well as on the business 
environment for investors. Complicating matters, extraction often occurs 
in remote areas, meaning in turn that the actual value of the extracted 
resources is less easily knowable, both to the public and to disparate gov-
ernment entities, than that for other economic activities.12 This relative 
lack of transparency grants a great deal of power to the entity handling the 
resource extraction process, which can control the amount of rent reported 
and can hide the true amount of rent collected. Revenues from natural 
resources will fi rst accrue to the state on behalf of its citizens, bringing 
sovereignty and property rights concerns to the fore. Because of the cus-
tomary right of the state and society to some portion of resource rents, it 
is common for noneconomic rationales to be invoked when making deci-
sions about resource exploitation and the use of rents. Resource national-
ism is a growing phenomenon globally—pledges concerning natural 
resource rents are made by politicians of all stripes, from  Bolivarian 
 populists in Latin America to centrist political parties in Mongolia.
Revenue streams from extractive industries are greatly affected by 
mineral price cycles, which are characterized by volatility, uncertainty, 
and production changeability. The valuation of particular resources 
depends on international demand and varies a great deal across resource 
types.13 Since producing countries for the most part must accept com-
modity prices set on the global market, they are vulnerable to exogenous 
price and production shocks, which can potentially trigger distributional 
issues between governments and resource extraction and production 
companies. And—as we have witnessed viscerally in recent years—
resource revenues are highly volatile because resource prices can fl uctu-
ate dramatically. Volatility translates into large, pro-cyclical fl uctuations 
in public spending, since few developing countries are able to smooth 
spending across price cycles. Figure 1.3 illustrates both the upward trend 
in global commodity prices over the past century and the heightened 
volatility over the past decade. 
Revenue volatility resulting from commodity price fl uctuations is in 
and of itself one of the major political economy challenges that resource-
dependent governments face. Some observers have noted that there are 
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Figure 1.3. International Oil and Mineral Prices, 1960–2010 (current and constant 2000$) 
Source: Global Economic Monitor Commodity Prices (World Bank 2011a).
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two quite different political economy modes in these countries: one that 
occurs during boom years, where stakeholders are focused on rent-
seeking and the main political economy challenges are establishing 
medium-term planning, mustering the discipline to place money in sta-
bilization funds, and adhering to fi scal rules; and a second mode that 
occurs during bust years, where the political economy is dominated by 
competition among public programs and their constituencies to avoid 
cutbacks in spending.14 Many resource-dependent developing countries 
are relatively new producers and, given the  historically high commodity 
prices of the past decade, have only experienced the political economy of 
a boom period. Policy makers and citizens in more seasoned resource-
producing countries know all too well how different the political econ-
omy landscape looks when prices collapse for a sustained period. 
Another distinctive feature of the extractive sectors is that engage-
ment requires careful intertemporal planning over the life cycle of a 
project by both the government and developers. From the state’s per-
spective, moreover, sound management of the sector requires inter-
temporal planning in a broader, strategic sense of how the government 
wishes to see the national resource extraction portfolio evolve over 
time—an especially core challenge facing new producers, such as Lao 
PDR. In addition, ownership in the sector is often highly concentrated. 
Extracting mineral resources requires high frontloading of invest-
ments, which are irreversible and highly specifi c to the industry and to 
the particular extraction site. Extraction is also characterized by a high 
level of economic and technological complexity and associated eco-
nomic and geological risks for investors and governments that cannot 
be fully foreseen while contracts are being negotiated. Signifi cant 
exploration expenses are incurred long before a decision to extract 
minerals or produce oil can be made, and much longer before taxation 
of resource rents is possible. Moreover, since producers are price tak-
ers, they must take on signifi cant risk in the context of volatile global 
commodity prices.15
An investor must determine not only how to combine the variable 
factors of production (such as labor, capital, and materials), but also the 
rate at which extraction should take place, that is, how quickly to run 
down the fi xed stock of ore reserves. Quite simply, if more is extracted 
today, less is available tomorrow. The optimal rate of extraction will 
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generally be a function of the size of the resource reserves, the cost of 
extraction, market commodity prices, and the fi scal regime in place. 
Given all those factors, in other words, there exists a unique extraction 
profi le that maximizes the net present value of the natural resource 
wealth, necessitating intertemporal decisions about the quantity to be 
extracted in each time period. The overall timeframe of exploitation 
plays an important role because the size of resource stock remaining in 
the ground changes as exploitation progresses. Increasing the rate of 
extraction in the present reduces the size of the ore body in the future, a 
cost associated with extraction known as the “user cost.” While a devel-
oper may not incur the user cost, and therefore ignores it, government 
and society bear this cost and can recapture part of it, along with natural 
resource rent streams, by imposing a tax on developers.
The countries examined in this study produce both hydrocarbons, 
that is, oil and gas, and also minerals, some of them producing both 
types. The two types of resource are different in important ways, notably 
as follows:16 
1.  Oil typically has higher rent share by gross value and it is easier to tax; 
relatedly, oil-rich countries tend to exhibit a higher fi scal depen-
dence; 
2.  Oil production typically has a smaller physical footprint and is often 
wholly offshore, while mining is more likely to physically affect local 
communities; 
3.  Mining is typically associated with very high upfront investments, 
including those for related infrastructure, although specifi c extractive 
technology and impacts differ according to the nature of the mineral; 
and 
4.  It is more challenging to accurately measure the quantity and quality 
of mineral ore in comparison to petroleum. 
Such differences notwithstanding, the two extractive sectors share the 
distinctive characteristics noted above, albeit in differing degrees. Most 
important for the purposes of this study, the political economy associ-
ated with both sectors is shaped by how resource rents fl ow through the 
system (as discussed in chapter 2) and the challenges associated with 
intertemporal credibility and political inclusiveness, which means that 
stakeholders face similar incentives in both sectors.
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Resource Endowments, Dependence, and Rent Flows 
The terms “resource-rich” and “resource-dependent” are frequently used 
loosely and interchangeably, to the detriment of cumulative understand-
ing of the resource curse. This study’s interest is whether economically 
and technologically accessible subsoil resources can be translated into 
greater sustained prosperity for the present and future citizens of a coun-
try. The resource endowments of concern here refer to available deposits of 
oil, gas, and minerals below the ground, which are fi nite and can be 
exhausted. Endowment potential depends on a country’s geology and 
what is known about it, as well as on available technology. Brazil’s much 
touted, recent offshore oil fi nds are located in ultra-deep waters (5,000–
7,000 meters) and underneath a 2,000-meter layer of salt; thus, extraction 
is likely to be both costly and demanding in technological terms. Drawing 
on World Bank data on the known value of subsoil assets in 2000, Collier 
(2010a) fi nds that per square kilometer resource endowments in the 
OECD are worth US$114,000 versus US$23,000 for Africa. Since OECD 
countries have been extracting minerals resources for a longer period, 
these fi gures suggest that Africa, as well as Asia and Latin America, could 
be characterized by signifi cant under-discovery to date, and would thus 
hold the potential for signifi cant future fi nds, especially as world demand 
for energy and minerals increasingly pushes exploration into frontier 
regions.17 Growing resource endowments are endogenous in the sense 
that successful discovery and extraction begets more of the same. 
The concept of resource dependence captures the extent to which a 
country’s economy relies on resource rents. It is usually measured in 
proportion to gross domestic product (GDP), exports, or government 
revenues; hence, it is a function of absolute levels of resource extraction 
and rent capture in the context of other economic activity and sources 
of state revenue. The resource dependence observed in many developing 
countries is driven mainly by the fact that there are relatively few alter-
native forms of economic activity, as evidenced by a per capita gap in 
GDP, or a low level of other exports. The state’s fi scal reliance on reve-
nues from the extractive industries also depends on the size of other 
revenue streams, including aid. Map 1.1 presents EI rent levels for 2008 
by country; map 1.2 depicts the EI share of exports in oil- and mineral-
dependent countries. The two fi gures together suggest that many leaders 
in gross resource production are also fi scally dependent, with some 
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Map 1.1. Extractive Industry Rents, 2008 
per capita, US$
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Map 1.2. Extractive Industries Exports, 2006–08 
% of total exports
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notable exceptions (Australia, Canada, China, and the United States); by 
contrast, many developing countries that are resource-dependent are 
not major producers in an absolute sense. Greater success in revenue 
taxation, perversely, may make countries more dependent, because the 
extent to which the state is able to capture rents from the sector depends 
on the design of the prevailing fi scal regime and administrative capacity 
for its implementation. The design of Ghana’s and Zambia’s fi scal 
regimes meant that they were able to capture only a small share of addi-
tional resource rents when international commodity prices recently 
increased. 
Measures of resource dependence capture the overall magnitude of 
rents in the context of other economic activity, but these rents are then 
dissipated in various ways. They are shared between resource companies 
and governments in the fi rst instance, and from then on are distributed 
in the form of side payments to powerful elites, as subsidies to a wider 
swath of society, and so on; they then fi nally enter the public coffers to 
be transformed into government saving, consumption, and investment 
for the public good. 
The analysis in this volume emphasizes the centrality of the state’s 
role in the management of natural resources and the associated political 
economy dynamics; hence, discussion will focus, in particular, on the 
share of resource revenues in the total revenues accruing to government. 
Recent data as summarized in the appendix to this volume indicate that 
about 50 countries are resource-dependent, with the share of resource 
revenues in total revenue intakes averaging over 25 percent during the 
period 2006–08.18 A particular caveat here is that this statistic depends 
crucially on the share of resource rents that actually enter state coffers; in 
some cases, the fi gure can be misleadingly low as a result of either weak 
design and implementation of the fi scal regime or the extent to which 
resource rents are captured and diverted elsewhere. This volume describes 
the various factors across the natural resource management value chain 
that shape this observable measure of resource-dependence.
As global demand for natural resources grows—and in response to 
historically high commodity prices—the push for new discovery and 
intensifi ed extraction has increasingly moved into frontier areas in the 
developing world. Figure 1.4 illustrates that, although the bulk of 
resource rents are currently generated in higher-income settings, more 
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than a quarter of global extractive industry rents accrue to low-income 
and lower-middle-income countries. A breakdown of rent fl ows by 
region (fi gure 1.5) shows clearly the increasing signifi cance of the devel-
oping world’s participation in the extractive industries. Although the 
Middle East has maintained its leading position in terms of rents 
derived from petroleum, its share of global rents has decreased since 
2000. Conversely, East Asia and Pacifi c’s share grew from 9 to 17 percent 
of total natural resource rents, with the greatest gains made in mining. 
In addition, between 2000 and 2008, Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural 
resources rents increased sixfold, with oil rents representing over two-
thirds of the total. 
In short, rents from natural resources are becoming increasingly 
important in the developing world, and their impact on political econ-
omy and the prospects for sustainable development will take on at least 
proportionate signifi cance.19 These newly resource-dependent countries 
tend to suffer from poor governance and weak institutional capacity, 
which exposes them in turn to a heightened vulnerability to the resource 
curse. The core objective of this volume is to provide country counter-
parts and their development partners with a political economy lens that 
aids them in articulating tractable natural resource management and 
Figure 1.4. Extractive Industry Rents by Income Level, 2008 (% of total rents by 
country category)










24 Rents to Riches?
governance interventions for transforming resource rents into sustain-
able development riches.
Experiencing and Addressing the Resource Paradox 
The Pacifi c Republic of Nauru vividly illustrates the “rags to riches 
and back again” story that can beset winners of the natural resource 
lottery (McDaniel and Gowdy 2000; Marks 2008; ADB 2007). Cover-
ing just 21 square kilometers, Nauru became independent in 1968. 
Phosphates were fi rst extracted in 1907, but the country experienced a 
boom in extraction post-independence, during which it transitioned 
from being one of the world’s richest countries in per capita terms to 
falling back on hard times. A century of mining has stripped and dev-
astated about 80 percent of the land mass, formerly known as Pleasant 
Island, leaving behind an uninhabitable moonscape. Although a share 
Figure 1.5. Extractive Industry Rents by Region, 2000–08 (US$ billions)
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of the  fi nancial returns was placed in the Nauru Phosphate Royalties 
Trust, the value of the trust is estimated to have shrunk by a factor of 
ten, from 1,300 million Australian dollars in 1991 to 138 million in 
2002. A string of poor investments and fi nancial swindles have been at 
the source of this impoverishment.
Client counterparts often ask whether their country is heading down 
the resource curse road, or what needs to be done to avoid the curse and 
ensure that rents translate into longer-term prosperity. While nuanced 
defi nitions and questions of causality are important, they are secondary 
for a practitioner audience. More immediately observable is a range of 
apparently suboptimal policies across the natural resource manage-
ment value chain. Some policy makers may be focused upstream, notic-
ing that a country is simply not attracting enough investments into 
exploration and exploitation of resources. Others will point to a coun-
try not receiving a fair share of rents or failing to deploy the proceeds 
well. Most observers will agree that stronger institutional endowments 
typically promote more farsighted, stable policies that promise to be in 
the collective best interest. 
Resource-Dependent Trajectories  
All countries that currently extract signifi cant natural resource rents or 
have the potential to do so can be characterized as being on one of 
several developmental trajectories (fi gure 1.6). The fortunate among 
them, such as Botswana and Chile, appear to have worked out a path to 
relative prosperity. Others, such as DRC or Niger, have suffered from 
decades of poor governance, confl ict, and impoverishment and appear 
to be on the downward spiral that typifi es the conventional under-
standing of the resource curse. Countries like Nigeria have extracted 
vast quantities of their natural resources but are trapped in a subopti-
mal equilibrium and have very little developmental impact to show for 
this natural resource depletion. 
The trajectory a country is positioned on depends on the upstream 
(discovery, extraction, and rent mobilization) and downstream (fi nan-
cial savings, consumption, and investment) management of its natural 
resource endowments. In low-governance environments, the challenges 
of sound intertemporal policy making are manifold, even as the pros-
pect of rents coming on stream puts additional pressure on institutions. 
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In turn, specifi c natural resource management outcomes across the 
value chain depend on the precise micro-political economy dynamics 
in play at each step. And the trajectory is clearly infl uenced by where in 
the cycle of resource extraction (early, mature, depleted) a country is 
and its vulnerability to the international price cycle, because these fac-
tors interact with the county’s political economy and its institutional 
endowments.
This project’s case studies and the theoretical literature together 
 suggest that a variety of narratives are relevant in explaining these tra-
jectories and thinking about how to move countries onto the path to 
prosperity.20 Providing this more historical and context-specifi c per-
spective to natural resource–led development is a signifi cant advance 
from the abstract knowledge that institutional quality matters in deter-
mining the developmental outcomes associated with resource depen-
dence. The typical country counterpart, however, wants more than 
simply an elucidation of the political economy dynamics that seem to 
put their country on one trajectory or another. The key real-time con-
cern of counterparts and development practitioners will be whether 
proposed actions promise to nudge a country onto a better trajectory, 
and promise to enhance the sustainability of apparently good manage-
ment and trends. The subsequent thematic chapters seek to identify 
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typical challenges that emerge across the value chain, their apparent 
causes from a political economy perspective, and how these challenges 
could be addressed.
Typical Paradoxes in Natural Resource Management 
A rich literature, as highlighted in chapter 2, identifi es the various eco-
nomic, political, and institutional mechanisms underlying and associ-
ated with the resource curse. The aim here is not to join in the debates 
central to this rigorous and sophisticated scholarship. Rather, we seek 
to demonstrate how the frontiers of this literature are relevant to stake-
holders who hope to enhance the probability of greater overall and 
sustained prosperity from natural resource sectors in their respective 
countries by examining this scholarship through the lens of the empir-
ical experiences of low-income, resource-dependent countries in man-
aging their resource wealth. With this objective in mind, it is more 
 useful in both analytical and practical terms to speak of a set of resource 
paradoxes rather than a resource curse. 
A core concern of this volume is how resource rents interact with 
domestic political economy, in terms of both formal capture and distri-
bution of rents through government as well as various leakages and 
informal uses of rent. Signifi cant theoretical attention has been devoted 
to the overall rent-take by developing economies from their resources, 
often in the face of highly capacitated multinational fi rms. Equally, the 
ways in which a sitting regime uses resource rents to retain power with 
regard to its population and potential opponents, and the extent to 
which resource rents are diverted for private gain, often perverting the 
provision of public goods, remain central challenges for developing 
economies with a variety of institutional weaknesses. 
From an operational perspective, the generation, taxation, and dis-
tribution of rent are conditioned by key choices made by governments 
about policies and institutions: What models of ownership are used in 
the sector and how are extraction rights allocated? How should tax pol-
icy be designed and what administrative instruments should be used to 
collect revenue? How should resource revenues be distributed to the 
citizenry and transformed into productive economic assets? Often, 
developmental advice regarding these issues is delivered on the basis of 
fi rst principles designating the form and content of such policies and 
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institutions. The premise of this volume, building on the “good-enough 
governance” perspective that has gained currency in recent years, is that 
functionality of outcome is more important than policy or institutional 
form per se.21 Indeed, the empirical evidence from the case studies indi-
cates that a number of resource-dependent developing countries have 
achieved signifi cant functionality with policy and institutional forms 
that do not necessarily match technical fi rst principles. 
In using the NRM value chain as a micro-political economy lens—
and having particularly emphasized an understanding of how resource 
rents fl ow through the value chain from extraction to taxation to public 
investment—this book has identifi ed a series of typical natural resource 
management paradoxes that beset resource-dependent developing coun-
tries. These paradoxes are listed in box 1.1 to provide an overview of the 
specifi c types of challenges the volume identifi es and addresses. The the-
matic chapters delve into more detail on each of these paradoxes, but 
cumulatively they provide a picture of the formidable tribulations that 
low-income countries face as they attempt to transform resource rents 
into sustainable development riches. 
Emerging Interventions for Addressing the Resource Paradox 
A political economy lens emphasizes the importance of context in 
determining good-fi t interventions for any country. At the same time, 
however, a systematic approach to political economy illuminates clear 
patterns in terms of the way institutional frameworks shape and condi-
tion incentives and combine with stakeholder preferences to lead to 
fairly predictable outcomes. The case studies underpinning this work 
have served this dual purpose. They have grounded political economy 
analysis in fi nely grained, country-specifi c detail about NRM practices 
across the value chain in articulating operational implications in each 
case. At the same time, through the shared methodological prism of the 
value chain, they have led to more generalized emerging conclusions 
about the political economy of the resource paradox in developing 
countries as a group. 
This volume focuses on the analysis and implications that carry across 
this group of countries. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 delve into the specifi cs of 
NRM practices, highlighting how institutions, incentives, and stakehold-
ers combine and interact in resource extraction, taxation, and spending, 
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Box 1.1 Typical Paradoxes in Natural Resource Management 
Extracting Resource Wealth 
The paradoxes involved in devising models of ownership and allocation of extraction rights in the 
natural resource sector include the following:
•  The predictability of policy and the regulatory framework surrounding the natural resource sec-
tor is essential to salutary developmental outcomes, yet it is common for governments to seek 
to retain discretion to change the rules of the game. 
•  Contract negotiations in the hydrocarbon and mineral sectors are characterized by asymmetric 
capacity and information between the parties, but the relative bargaining power between gov-
ernments and investors shifts over the lifecycle of extractive industry projects. 
•  Resource rents have the potential to allow governments to expand the amount of public goods 
they provide without imposing additional taxes; but there is tension in decision making because 
private and public preferences regarding resource ownership must be balanced, and this tension 
is intensifi ed because of the stakes involved.
Taxing Resource Wealth 
The paradoxes involved in designing tax policy and the administrative instruments used for natural 
resource revenue collection include the following:
•  Despite having weak revenue administration governance and capacity, many low-income 
resource-rich countries resort, in practice, to overly complex, multirate fi scal regimes. 
•  Developing countries use generous tax incentives to compensate investors for high levels of risk 
and to attract resources to develop extractive industries; nevertheless, their inability to sustain 
such commitments over time further deteriorates their credibility and discourages investment 
in the sector.
•  Mineral resources provide countries with considerable rents and relative administrative ease—
since taxing these resources requires less effort than taxing other economic activities—but 
many resource-dependent countries neglect basic investments in revenue administration 
capacity that could increase public revenue and allow for more a progressive and fl exible fi scal 
regime, precisely as a result of the incentives generated by the sector.
Investing Resource Wealth 
The paradoxes involved in deciding how natural resource revenues should be distributed to the 
citizenry and transformed into productive economic assets include the following:
•  Resource rents offer the prospect of investing heavily in physical infrastructure that would 
generate high returns in capital-scarce countries, but such countries often fail to invest proac-
tively in the processes and systems needed to yield the very best projects as a result of political 
incentives and the features of the sector.
•  Investment in public infrastructure is one of the policy tools that resource-dependent coun-
tries can use as the basis for economic diversifi cation and reduced cyclicality; nonetheless, 
public investment tends to be highly pro-cyclical, thus unsustainable. Failure to maintain 
projects generates repeated “build, neglect, rebuild” episodes.
•  A benevolent national planner would ideally allocate resource rents to fi nance the highest-
return public investment projects, regardless of their geographic location; but political economy 
dynamics often militate toward earmarking investments to the location of resource extraction 
or fragmenting them across various narrower political constituencies.
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and presenting options for development interventions. Some of the 
emerging key principles carry across the value chain as follows:
•  Separating decision-making authority across government bodies, that 
is, building in checks and balances in government’s role, will enhance 
consistency and predictability at all stages of the generation and 
spending of rents.
•  A simple, nondiscretionary legal and sector regulatory framework is 
crucial in ensuring that bargains (between the state and developers) 
and policy compacts (between the state and society) are adhered to 
and enforced. 
•  More transparency in sector regulations and management improve 
government credibility and mitigate the risks faced by both develop-
ers and the state.
•  Targeted sectoral capacity-building that emphasizes coalition-
building improves intergovernmental coordination and enhances 
predictability in policy making and implementation. Conversely, it 
may be necessary to enclave capacity-building efforts to enhance 
domestic technical skills; this can be complemented with contracted-
in expertise to ensure functionality in key areas of natural resource 
management.
Each of the technical chapters also develops implications specifi c to the 
respective component of the value chain, some of which are highlighted 
in table 1.2. Both sets of implications, those that carry across the value 
chain and more targeted options for specifi c value chain steps, are pre-
sented in greater detail and with empirical examples in the technical 
chapters.
Roadmap of the Volume 
The resource curse is a phenomenon at once political and economic. 
The concentration of mineral wealth in countries with undiversifi ed 
economies is associated with poor economic and political outcomes that 
feed each other and are simultaneously affected by the distinctive fea-
tures of these resources, as mentioned above: super-normal profi ts, price 
volatility, and the long timeframe of the production cycle and unique-
ness of ownership structures in the resource sectors. As government 
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offi cials in resource-dependent settings attest, policy decisions and insti-
tutional frameworks for their implementation are more often than not 
fundamentally affected by the real or perceived presence of resource 
wealth. The operational challenge is how to design interventions that 
work within the parameters of the political space to achieve desired 
objectives. 
International development partners have a technocratic mandate, 
as evidenced by the World Bank’s Articles of Agreement; but this does 
not preclude the necessity of understanding political context in order 
to enhance development effectiveness. International development 
agencies must provide both feasible and creative support to counter-
parts in resource-dependent countries as they attempt to navigate the 
trials associated with turning resource rents into riches. Agencies like 
the World Bank can be important advocates of good practice by 
 bringing to bear international experience. At the same time, it will be 
important to be conscious of the incentives and constraints faced by 
counterparts, ensuring good fi t as well. What might seem like excellent 
measures from a normative perspective may have little upside and 
potentially signifi cant downside effects for local counterparts, embed-
ded as they are in specifi c political economy dynamics. A key analytical 
challenge is assessing the extent to which specifi c country context pro-
vides the basis for enabling resource-dependent countries to address 
the weakest links in their natural resource management value chain, 
and for setting them on a more promising developmental trajectory. 
Table 1.2. Examples of Tractable Interventions Across the Value Chain
Extraction Taxation Investment
•  Build intertemporal fl exibility 
into contract terms
•  Activate third-party brokers 
(development partners, NGOs) 
to ease information 
asymmetry
•  Disclose terms of extractive 
contracts
•  Calibrate fi scal regime to 
administrative capacity
•  Use windfall taxes to protect 
against reneging
•  Provide tax incentives to 
investors when geological 
prospects are uncertain
•  Develop stability clauses 
combined with taxation 
instruments that allow for 
price adjustments 
•  Build conscious demand for 
public investments
•  Prioritize PIM system 
components (“investing to 
invest”)
•  Explore alternative modalities 
for implementation (resource 
for infrastructure deals)
Source: Authors. 
Note: NGO = nongovernmental organization.
32 Rents to Riches?
Deploying a systematic political economy framework helps to inform 
the prioritizing and sequencing of measures desirable in resource-
dependent settings, emphasizing prescriptions that are both techni-
cally sound and compatible with incentives.
This chapter underscores the value of country-level lessons on natu-
ral resource management from around the world. Good practice exem-
plars, such as Botswana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Chile, can provide 
signifi cant inspiration and act as guiding lights for counterparts in devel-
oping countries, and their historical context and experiences signifi -
cantly shape their future. Policy makers in Nigeria and Mexico, at the 
same time, have learned their own important lessons in the repeated 
game of dealing with exogenous shocks in the form of global commod-
ity price volatility. The experience, good or bad, of regional neighbors 
and other resource-dependent peers is particularly pertinent for engaged 
stakeholders, and it is often more relevant than hectoring on normative 
models of technical best practice. This volume hence seeks to build heav-
ily on the empirical lessons emerging from the case studies conducted 
under the associated global study. 
The volume provides a comprehensive treatment of issues in natural 
resource–led development by presenting key policy issues spanning the 
NRM value chain. Overall, and most important, the intention is to illus-
trate the value of complementing strong technical analysis with a more 
systematic perspective of political economy and institutional dynamics. 
To that end, the next chapter sets out an analytical framework for posi-
tioning countries within an operationally relevant political economy 
typology, and the following three thematic chapters marry an exposition 
of the key policy and technical choices across the value chain with a sense 
of the underlying political economy dynamics at each step. A brief road-
map of the volume is as follows.
Chapter 2 presents an overarching framework designed to help 
conceptualize key issues of political economy and institutional devel-
opment in natural resource–dependent developing countries. It is 
designed to help practitioners and stakeholders draw on seminal schol-
arship and international experience in situating their own context of 
engagement. The chapter surveys the most relevant literature on the 
natural resource paradox, emphasizing that the quality of governance 
and institutions is a crucial factor for resource-dependent countries in 
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achieving sustainable, development-oriented policies and sector gov-
ernance. Resource-dependent countries are on a particular set of 
development trajectories, and the aim here is to develop an analytical 
framework that enables practitioners to assess the nature of opportu-
nities and vulnerabilities in natural resource sector policies, institu-
tions, and governance. In this spirit, a typology of political economy 
settings in resource-dependent developing countries is developed, 
highlighting the related evidence emerging from the cross-country 
study. On that basis, a series of emerging principles or higher order 
objectives to structure interventions has been identifi ed, depending on 
a country’s trajectory. Assessing a resource-dependent country through 
this political economy analytical lens enables the articulation of 
 good-fi t targets, that is, reform goals that are welfare-enhancing in an 
incentive-compatible way.
Three thematic chapters then build a more granular understanding of 
the political economy dynamics of specifi c technical interventions at 
various steps of the natural resource value chain. Chapter 3 develops a 
framework for understanding the challenges facing resource-dependent 
countries in organizing the natural resource sector, examining in par-
ticular the relationship between the state and the extractive industries in 
terms of ownership and contracts. Different forms of sector organiza-
tion represent mechanisms to resolve the competing political, economic, 
and social priorities of both governments and investors and enable them 
to manage the risks and uncertainties they face in the extractive indus-
tries. These choices with regard to sector organization, in turn, affect the 
performance of the mineral and petroleum sectors. The chapter focuses 
on four key dimensions of sector organization and their implications for 
sector governance: sector regulation, models of ownership, licensing and 
contracting processes, and the capacity of government agencies in regu-
lating and monitoring the extractive industries.
Chapter 4 addresses taxing natural resources and implementing 
 fi scal regimes in the sector, providing an analytical framework for 
assessing the effi ciency and effectiveness of alternative fi scal regimes 
applicable to extractive industries. The broad criteria for evaluation of 
such fi scal regimes include the assignment of revenues (and associated 
economic risks) to the state, corruption risks, and potential tax-induced 
deviations from optimal exploration and production profi les, given 
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underlying political economy and institutional constraints. The chap-
ter provides a conceptual guide for analyzing the gaps between best-
practice theoretical models and the functioning of politically feasible 
fi scal policies, thereby identifying the nature and scope of good-enough 
tax policies in resource-dependent countries.
Chapter 5 turns to the issue of investing proceeds from natural 
resources into productive physical assets, both on aggregate and in 
those localities most directly associated with resource extraction. It 
contextualizes investment over three sets of policy choices: aggregate 
levels of spending, temporal and spatial allocation of resources, and 
the modalities used to produce infrastructure. Depending on the pref-
erences of policy makers regarding the quantity and quality of public 
investment spending and on the administrative capacity of selected 
principals, governments exert various degrees of effort and approaches 
to enhancing the productive public capital stock versus redistributing 
rents for private interests. Drawing on a selected number of illustra-
tive problems in public investment in these settings (infl ated quanti-
ties, high volatility, low capability to invest effi ciently, and contested 
subnational claims associated with resource extraction), the chapter 
identifi es incentive-compatible measures across different political 
economy settings. The main challenges in institutionally weak settings 
are to lengthen politicians’ and policy makers’ time horizons and 
enhance their ability to credibly coordinate and effectively initiate 
spending efforts with longer-term benefi ts. 
A concluding chapter articulates the key crosscutting principles for 
intervention that carry across the NRM value chain, reviewing emerging 
lessons and their consequences for strengthening interventions in the 
natural resource sector. In light of this analysis, the chapter then elabo-
rates a number of commonly advanced prescriptions or mechanisms for 
addressing the resource curse and notes their strengths as well as poten-
tial limitations. Finally, the evolving landscape of development partner 
engagement is discussed, and the importance is noted of crowding-in 
emerging stakeholders at the global and local levels in building truly col-
laborative and strategic programs of reform. 
Better political economy diagnostics alone will not solve the pro-
nounced policy challenges in resource-dependent countries. The core 
concern of this volume, namely institutional development for enhanced 
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natural resource management, is a long-term endeavor. But for commit-
ted domestic reformers and their development partners, the authors 
hope that this book will provide a practical resource for engaging more 
smartly by elaborating better-fi t interventions, thereby helping countries 
to navigate the prospective road from resource rents to sustainable devel-
opment riches.
Notes
 1.  Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001) are credited with a seminal empirical statement 
of the resource curse that demonstrates this paradoxical relationship between 
resource dependence (measured by the raw material export share of gross 
domestic product) and growth. Subsequent cross-sectional empirical research 
indicates that the quality of existing institutions is perhaps the key factor that 
mediates a resource-rich country’s economic outcomes; see, among others, 
Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006); Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003); 
Dunning (2008b); Vatansever and Gillies (2009). The last two papers were pre-
pared as background for this volume. 
 2.  The resource curse typically refers to the hydrocarbon (oil and gas) and mineral 
sectors. This study does not cover renewable resources such as fi sh and forestry, 
although these sectors are also inherently extractive and generate signifi cant 
rents, and their political economy may have signifi cant parallels with that of oil, 
gas, and mining.
 3.  See Brahmbhatt and Canuto (2010) for a recent summary of major issues. 
Collier, van der Ploeg, and Venables (2009) and Frankel (2010) survey recent 
work in this area, positioning fi ndings in the context of how the literature on 
the resource curse has evolved over time. “Good practice” approaches to better 
harnessing extractive resources for development include Ascher (1999); 
Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007); Collier (2009; 2010a). In addition, the 
Natural Resource Charter (2010) sets out 12 good practice precepts for 
resource-dependent settings; a number of the good practice benchmarks can 
be mapped to the value chain framework adopted in this volume. 
 4.  Rodrik (2003; 2007) has advocated this perspective eloquently.
 5.  See World Bank GAC Implementation Strategy (World Bank 2007); World 
Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (1997); and World 
Development Report 2011: Confl ict, Security and Development (World Bank 
2011b).  
 6.  Mayorga-Alba (2009) provides a thorough description of the technical compo-
nents embedded in the extractive industry (EI) value chain. Choosing this lens 
necessarily circumscribes the analysis to some extent; for example, there are 
other upstream issues in the extractive industries not covered in this value 
chain, such as the fi nancing of resource infrastructure development, which is 
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particularly signifi cant when national oil and mining companies are involved; 
there is also the management of foreign assistance inputs to the sector. We are 
grateful to William Ascher for noting the importance of these issues.
 7.  The methodology applied was a structured, focused diagnosis, often used in 
case-comparative research design in the social sciences (George and Bennett 
2005). 
 8.  Aid and resource revenues can both be considered “sovereign rents” (Knack 
2008). Aid may come with a greater degree of external accountability for per-
formance (for example, through the Millennium Development Goals). Many 
have highlighted, however, that traditional aid fl ows to governments have 
been associated with disappointing developmental impacts (for example, 
Easterly 2006).
 9.  This defi nition follows the new institutional economics. A seminal statement 
can be found in North (1990).
10.  Perverse incentives are often the result of the enormous wealth generated by the 
extractive industries, which can in turn be used to avoid and discourage trans-
parent oversight and investments in institutional capacity. See Karl (1997); 
 Eifert and Gelb (2002); Woolcock, Pritchett, and Isham (2001); Jensen and 
Wantchekon (2004).
11.  Reservoir characteristics (such as pressure) and the physical characteristics of 
crude oil are important factors that affect the cost of its production. Because 
these characteristics vary substantially across different geographic locations, the 
cost of producing oil also varies substantially. “Lifting costs” refer to the cost of 
bringing a barrel of oil to the surface, which ranges from under US$4 in Central 
and South America, to US$8–10 in the United States and Canada. Substantial 
variations are also associated with “fi nding costs,” ranging in 2005–07 from 
under US$5 in the Middle East to ten times that much in the United States. 
While technological advances have made it possible to bring oil to the surface 
from more remote reservoirs at ever-increasing depths, such as in the deepwater 
Gulf of Mexico, total fi nding and lifting costs have increased sharply in recent 
years. Much of this increase is attributable to the rapid expansion of the world 
economy and the corresponding hunger for oil, and these increases could reverse 
direction due to the recent economic slowdown (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, http://www.eia.doe.gov). 
12.  The authors thank William Ascher for this observation.
13.  For example, gas prices tend to be more dispersed at any given time, yet more 
stable over time due to a smaller spot market and the prevalence of varying 
long-term supply agreements often linked to pipeline deals.
14.  We are indebted to Michael Ross for these important insights on volatility. Karl 
(1997) illustrates the differences between the boom and bust political econo-
mies in the case of Venezuela.
15.  Often this risk is hedged through the developer’s global portfolio, making more 
attractive, at least for the bigger and more successful developers, investment 
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prospects in certain countries or sites that might otherwise appear prohibitively 
risky. 
16.  Here are noted only a handful of meta-level differences in the structures of the 
two industries. The World Bank’s Oil, Gas, and Mining Group is currently con-
ducting a series of research studies that emphasize and detail similarities and 
differences between the two industries at a much more granular and technical 
level. 
17.  This is assuming random distribution of natural resources across the globe, 
although geological probability would suggest that, in reality, certain regions 
and countries are simply better endowed in particular or overall extractable 
subsoil assets. Knowledge of these assets is continually being updated; the World 
Bank is in the process of updating its 2000 baseline data on overall asset endow-
ments (World Bank 2006a).
18.  This follows the International Monetary Fund’s method of measuring resource 
dependence, taking the average share of resource revenues in total revenues over 
the most recent three-year period. The IMF defi nes a country as resource-
dependent if this measure is greater than 25 percent.
19.  Ross (forthcoming 2012) also notes the shift of the petroleum frontier to devel-
oping countries, observing that booming oil prices over the past decade have led 
oil companies to fi nd the risks of working in poor and badly governed settings 
increasingly counter-balanced by the enormous potential benefi ts of new dis-
covery.
20.  The notion of developmental trajectories that can be examined through analytic 
narratives has been advanced succinctly in Rodrik (2003). We are also indebted 
to Alan Gelb for his emphasis of this point over the course of this work.
21.  The concept of “good-enough governance” is an attempt to move away from 
“fi rst best” reform dictums for low-income countries. It refers to contextually 
grounded and feasible governance arrangements that achieve a de minimus 
degree of quality suffi cient to enable a country to fulfi ll its developmental goals. 
For the original articulation of this concept and a full defi nition, see Grindle 
(2004; 2007). See also Rodrik (2007) on the signifi cance and value of focusing 
on institutional function over form, and World Bank (2007), which moves 
toward operationalizing this perspective. 
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Why study the political economy of natural resource–led development? 
It has become a truism to state that development or reform programs 
sometimes falter because they are politically infeasible. Over the past two 
decades the development community has recognized that understand-
ing the political economy aspects of policy interventions can mean the 
difference between a successful intervention compatible with political 
incentives and a “fi rst-best” technical fi x that falls fl at (Keefer 2006; Fritz, 
Kaiser, and Levy 2009; and Center for the Future State 2010, among oth-
ers). Leading political economy scholars have concluded that it is futile 
to try to change economic institutions without considering the underly-
ing political forces through which they emerged and are sustained (Ace-
moglu and Robinson 2010). Recent reviews of the World Bank’s devel-
opment effectiveness across a number of sectors and country contexts 
have concluded that more attention to the political economy of reform 
is needed (World Bank 2005; 2006b; 2008c).
How Natural Resources and Political Economy Interact
Resource wealth introduces a specifi c set of dynamics into a country’s 
political economy both because economic stakes are so high and, depend-
ing on global commodity prices, because massive amounts of rents can 
become quickly available. Karl (1997) has argued that the fact that 
resource-dependent countries derive their revenues from the same 
source leads to certain elements of “sameness” in terms of institutions as 
The Political Economy of the 
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well as elite behavior, because how a state extracts, collects, and utilizes 
or distributes revenues defi ne its nature. Other characteristics of the 
sector accentuate the impact of resource rents and themselves under-
mine longer-term, developmentally oriented cooperation among polit-
ical elites (see Karl 1997, 46–49; Dunning 2008b). The timeframe from 
resource discovery to production or extraction can be long—typically 
multiple years for oil, on average more than 20 years for mining—and 
an obsolescing bargain problem is inherent to the life cycle of extrac-
tive industries projects (which will be discussed further in chapter 3). 
Resource-dependent countries are highly vulnerable to exogenously 
determined commodity price volatility as well as to production shocks 
that can occur for commercial and domestic political reasons. This vul-
nerability intensifi es the payoffs from rent-seeking practices when com-
modity prices are high. Furthermore, oil, gas, and mining resources are 
nonrenewable and exhaustible, which limits the extent to which elites 
view decision making in the sector as an iterated game with cumulative 
consequences over time. Finally, extractive industries tend to be capital-
intensive, hence often reliant on foreign investment, and tend to operate 
as enclaves with minimal linkages to other domestic economic sectors.
The State–Society–Developer Triangle
Embedded in the political economy dynamics that emerge from its 
structural characteristics, the natural resource sector encompasses a par-
ticular set of relationships among the state, society, and natural resource 
developers. Most importantly, for the purposes of this volume, the bal-
ance and relevance of these relationships transforms across the value 
chain (fi gure 2.1). 
None of these groups is monolithic; on the contrary, each group com-
prises a variety of actors and, in many cases, the specifi c roles of these 
agents are central to understanding political economy dynamics and 
they vary across country contexts. In some countries, for example, the 
ministry of fi nance will be the central state agent; in others, it will be 
made peripheral by other more powerful actors under the state umbrella, 
such as a national oil company. The relative power of specifi c actors in a 
particular country will, moreover, inevitably evolve over time, as com-
modity prices bounce up and down and as a country moves further 
along its resource extraction cycle. As opportunities for intervention 
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emerge within these temporal and exogenous shifts, the elaboration of 
incentive-compatible interventions requires a more granular under-
standing of the specifi c actors involved. Here the state-society-developer 
triangle is illustrated for heuristic purposes. Later chapters focusing on 
different parts of the natural resource value chain delve into the roles of 
individual actors.
Upstream in natural resource management, the key relationship is 
between the state and resource developers. The state plays an outsized 
role in the extractive industries compared with other sectors because of 
the convention, at least in most developing countries, that the state owns 
subsoil mineral resources on behalf of its citizens and is entitled to a 
share of the wealth generated from their extraction.1 In some resource-
dependent countries, the state is also involved in extraction of hydrocar-
bons and minerals through national oil or mining companies (discussed 
in greater depth in chapter 3). Even when extraction is carried out by 
private investors or developers, however, it is invariably the state that 
grants rights to investors and developers to explore and extract natural 
resources. Thus developers must negotiate extraction rights and fi scal 
terms with the state (discussed, along with the political economy dynam-
ics put into play, in chapters 3 and 4).
Societal groups sometimes also play a role upstream in the value chain, 
depending on the overall accountability relationship between state and 
society. In some countries, for example, populations affected by mining 
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have a right to view (and sometimes also to object to) specifi c contract 
terms; even in countries with limited forms of state-society accountabil-
ity, civil society groups play a role in monitoring resource extraction 
operations. A “short route to accountability” is often activated between 
developers and society over the life cycle of a project on externality-related 
issues such as compensation for resettlement or livelihoods related to 
environmental impact.2 In this respect, a relatively new institutional 
innovation in the mining sector, labeled the “social license to operate,” is 
a mutual agreement of consent to operating principles and accountabil-
ity measures between affected societal groups and a mining company.
At the midpoint of the natural resource value chain, the relationship 
between the state and resource developers changes to one where, instead 
of a resource developer acting (at least in part) as an extractive agent for 
the state, the state takes on the role of collecting tax revenues from devel-
opers (discussed in detail in chapter 4). In addition, although these 
dynamics are covered only in a cursory fashion in this volume, the state 
plays important monitoring and inspection roles at the midpoint of the 
value chain.
Finally, moving downstream into public investment management, 
the state-society relationship again comes into play, with the state as the 
agent charged with making sustainable, developmentally oriented sav-
ings, consumption, and investment decisions on behalf of society (dis-
cussed in detail in chapter 5).
Figure 2.1 centers on the interaction of key actors in the context of a 
particular resource-dependent country, but these interactions must be set 
in a global context. Extractive industries typically compete at the interna-
tional level, but are also subject to mandatory or voluntary standards. For 
example, internationally listed companies may need to adhere to particu-
lar reporting or home country legislation (for example, in the area of tax 
and anticorruption). International nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), ranging from the Publish What You Pay initiative to contract 
transparency movements, have aligned in important ways with domestic 
civil society groups. Resource-producing governments may be engaged in 
signifi cant strategic multinational interactions, such as those through the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Therefore, 
external factors will play an important part in shaping the country-level 
interplay among fi rms, states, and citizens; in addition, international 
 The Political Economy of the  Natural Resource Paradox 43
dynamics can play either a supporting or an aggravating role in shaping a 
resource-dependent country’s prospective development trajectory. Nev-
ertheless, a critical starting point must be the nature of domestic politics. 
Institutions and the Resource Curse
Contemporary political economy research suggests that whether a 
country falls prey to the resource curse depends on a number of struc-
tural and economic factors. The cumulative body of large-N analyses 
of resource-dependent developing countries indicates that the quality 
of existing institutions is perhaps the key factor that mediates a 
resource-dependent country’s economic outcomes (Mehlum, Moene, 
and Torvik 2006; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Vatansever and 
Gillies 2009; Frankel 2010). There is a long-standing debate in the lit-
erature on the causal direction underpinning this relationship. For the 
operationally oriented purposes of this volume, however, the authors 
take the pragmatic position that ascertaining the direction of causality 
is less important than recognizing the centrality of institutional quality 
to the development outcomes of resource-dependent countries. 
In other words, this study is premised on the notion that natural 
resource wealth and the political economy of a country are mutually con-
stitutive. Resource wealth can have signifi cant effects on economic, insti-
tutional, and political performance, stability, and quality; and a country’s 
political economic context shapes how natural resources are managed by 
the state. As Karl states in her seminal book, The Paradox of Plenty:
[T]he fate of oil-exporting countries must be understood in a context in 
which economies shape institutions and, in turn, are shaped by them. 
Specifi c modes of economic development, adapted in a concrete institu-
tional setting, gradually transform political and social institutions in a 
manner that subsequently encourages or discourages productive out-
comes. Because the causal arrow between economic development and 
institutional change constantly runs in both directions, the accumulated 
outcomes give form to divergent long-run trajectories. (Karl  1997, 6) 
This mutual constitution of natural resource wealth and policy econ-
omy means that resource-dependent countries embark upon particular 
developmental trajectories. Appropriate developmental interventions in 
any given country in turn will depend on its trajectory. Hence, this 
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 chapter builds a typology of political economy settings in resource-
dependent countries. 
The quality of a country’s institutions is central in the resource 
paradox. Institutional quality tends to vary along with levels of eco-
nomic development.3 A simple empirical fact often ascribed as a major 
dimension of the resource curse is that resource-dependent countries 
are endowed with poorer institutional quality than they should have, 
given their income levels. Holding gross domestic product (GDP) 
constant, resource-dependent countries perform less well in governance 
indicators (fi gure 2.2)—demonstrating the institutional dimension of 
the resource curse.
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Source: Authors’ compilation; Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset “Voice and Accountability” indicator, World Bank 
(2009). 
Note: Only the cases studied for this volume are labeled on the chart. Resource-dependent countries are marked with a 
diamond, and tend to fall below the best-fi t line, thereby showing that resource-dependent countries tend to have worse 
institutional quality than would be predicted by their income levels. Voice and accountability is an index with the range 
–2.5 to +2.5.
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Another way of putting this is that nonresource income levels are cor-
related with institutional quality across all countries, which, in turn, means 
that the additional growth and income related to resource dependence are 
not matched by the increase in institutional quality that comes with non-
resource-related growth. Herb (2005), for example, shows that when a 
measure of development that excludes the effect of oil on the economy is 
used in place of GDP per capita in statistical analysis of the causes of 
democratization, oil-rich countries fi t the same pattern as other countries. 
He thus confi rms that dependence on resource rents fails to deliver the 
expected democratic benefi ts associated with development. Box 2.1 out-
lines the rich scholarship on the political dimensions of the resource curse, 
focusing on how natural resource wealth is thought to co-vary with 
authoritarianism and confl ict.4 
There is a consensus in the political economy literature that natural 
resources interact with governance and state institutions in two 
 interrelated ways. First, extraction of natural resources might induce 
deterioration in governance. One line of logic is that dependence on 
natural resource wealth limits other forms of government revenue gen-
eration such as tax collection. This in turn can lead to a decline in admin-
istrative and institutional capacity building, particularly as the core 
 tax-accountability linkage between state and society is weakened—Karl 
(1997) articulates this as the core logic of the “petro state,” and Moore 
(2004) further explains the link between fi scal sources and accountabil-
ity. Additionally, resource wealth might adversely affect governance qual-
ity by provoking more intense political or bureaucratic battles between 
powerful interest groups for control over natural resource rents and the 
state institutions responsible for collecting and distributing them.5
Second, even if resource dependence does not worsen governance, the 
quality of institutions and governance will most likely condition the 
quality of the economic and natural resource management policies 
adopted as well as their implementation across the value chain.6 From 
this viewpoint, institutional quality and the government’s  ability to make 
policy effectively, minimizing discretion and rent-seeking, affect out-
comes in the natural resource sector much as they affect other develop-
ment outcomes. In addition, because natural resources generate revenue 
windfalls, governments may be tempted to make policy and public 
spending decisions with adverse long-term consequences.
46 Rents to Riches?
Box 2.1 Political Dimensions of the Resource Curse
Natural Resources and Authoritarianism 
A voluminous and nuanced strand of the political science literature on the resource curse has 
focused on the impact of natural resource (usually oil) wealth on the potential for democratic 
outcomes, for the most part arguing that resource wealth raises the likelihood that a country will 
be authoritarian. This line of inquiry is generally advanced on the basis of the rentier state logic, 
which posits that since a state can rely on resource rents, its need for alternative forms of taxation 
is reduced and, subsequently, the accountability relationship with society is weakened. 
Ross (2001) presented one of the fi rst major cross-national, large-N studies of the relationship 
between natural resource dependence and democracy, fi nding economic dependence on oil and 
mineral rents to be correlated with authoritarian government; Wantchekon (2002) and Jensen and 
Wantchekon (2004) have found similarly. Providing support for the logic that nonrepresentative 
regimes are more likely to be able to maintain control when they have the resources to pay off 
opposition and support repressive technologies, Smith (2004) and Ulfelder (2007) have found that 
authoritarian regimes generally last longer in countries with oil wealth.
Yet the evidence on the relationship between resource wealth and authoritarianism is more 
mixed, as demonstrated by case study work and more recent scholarship deploying cutting-edge 
statistical and formal modeling tools. The case of República Bolivariana de Venezuela in the 1960s 
and 1970s suggests that oil rents initially seemed to help the country transition into and consoli-
date what was, at least on the face of it, a democracy (Karl 1997). Dunning (2008a) fi nds that oil 
wealth generally increases the likelihood of authoritarianism, but identifi es the mechanism 
through which resource rents can have an indirect democratic effect by reducing the need to 
redistribute nonresource rents and thus potentially making democracy less costly for elites. Haber 
and Menaldo (2011), emphasizing the importance of a longitudinal perspective in controlling for 
endogeneity and bias, fi nd no evidence of an authoritarian resource curse.
Natural Resources and Confl ict 
Another important strand of the political economy literature on natural resources has been con-
cerned with the impact of resource wealth on confl ict (Ross 2004; 2006). Valuable resources and the 
rents they generate have been found to enable the perpetuation of confl ict, because political elites 
can use resource rents to fi nance arms and war. Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffl er (2004), 
Snyder and Bhavnani (2005), and Humphreys (2005) have found that economic dependence on 
petroleum and mineral wealth is correlated with civil war and chronic confl ict. The “lootability” of 
resources is often central to the argument. Where resources are spread geographically and are rela-
tively are easily extractable, such as alluvial diamonds, different groups can use them to perpetuate 
civil confl ict indefi nitely—witness Angola, the eastern Congo, and Sierra Leone, for example. On the 
other hand, Cotet and Tsui (2009) fi nd no signifi cant correlation between resource rents and civil war. 
They argue that oil-rich autocracies have generally managed to avoid civil strife by buying off 
would-be challengers, attributing confl ict in oil-rich Africa to weak central governmental authority.
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) more recently have argued that the conventional measure of 
resource dependence (resource exports as a share of GNP) is actually endogenous with respect to 
confl ict; the positive correlation between resource dependence and confl ict occurs because con-
fl ict drives down other economic activity and makes countries dependent on the resource sec-
tors by default. Using a proxy measure for resource abundance, they fi nd that the statistical rela-
tionship between natural resources and confl ict actually reverses, making clear the importance of 
fi nding the right measures for analysis. 
Source: Authors. 
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The “Rentier State” 
Natural resources yield extraordinary “rents,” or returns from invest-
ment in their extraction. Attempting to articulate principles for inter-
vention, as well as specifi c recommendations, involves understanding 
the centrality of rents to the natural resource sector and its develop-
mental outcomes. Rents, in short, are a political currency. Natural 
resources generate signifi cant windfall revenues for the state, which in 
turn are a valuable prize for those who control and have access to polit-
ical power. They can play an outsized role in the political economy of 
developing countries because the political deals struck—between gov-
ernments and developers on the one hand, and between the state and 
society on the other—can be contingent on rents being extracted and 
distributed in specifi c ways. In other words, rents are often crucial to 
sustaining specifi c political economy bargains. As a result, interven-
tions that may make perfect technical sense will often be politically 
infeasible since they affect these rent fl ows and the delicate political 
deals they underpin.
This chapter develops a political economy framework that rests on 
understanding how natural resource rents fl ow through the system. A 
system for mapping the fl ow of rents and their recipients is crucial for 
determining vested interests and, therefore, the roots of what may mani-
fest as low-level developmental equilibria. Understanding the political 
economy of natural resource dependence in this manner in turn informs 
the analyst about the specifi c political equilibria in place, therefore illu-
minating which specifi c interventions toward achieving fi rst-order objec-
tives might be possible in the context at hand. In order to situate this 
analytical framework, the state of the art of scholarship on the rentier 
state is outlined here. Discussions of the rentier state often invoke Beb-
lawi and Luciani’s (1987) characterization of the phenomenon, whereby 
rents accrue to the government directly with only a few actors in society 
engaged in the generation of rent, while the majority are involved in dis-
tributing or using it.7
Contemporary scholarship on the resource paradox emphasizes how 
different political economic systems deal with resource rents, focusing 
on the nature and role of state institutions and how the dynamics of 
state capture and principal-agent incentives infl uence the management 
of natural resource rents (Auty 1993; Karl 1997; Ross 1999; Dunning 
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2008a). The very nature of resources like hydrocarbons and hard rock 
minerals implies that the main political-economic impacts come through 
the effect that resource rents have on the revenue collection and expen-
diture patterns of the state (Dunning 2008b). Natural resource booms 
turn countries into rentier states that live off unearned income; the state 
is resourced through rents rather than taxes and requires correspond-
ingly little organizational effort from the state apparatus (Karl 1997; 
Moore 2004). Rents thus can obviate the extent to which the state must 
engage in costly revenue-generating activity in nonresource sectors and, 
quite simply, they can reduce the fi scal need for nonresource taxation 
(Dunning 2008a, 45). Substantial comparative and temporal empirical 
evidence indicates that resource revenues displace other forms of taxa-
tion or revenue (Dunning 2008a, 46–52; Karl 1997, 61–63; Knack 2008). 
Ross (forthcoming in 2012) argues that the resource curse in oil and 
gas states can be traced directly to the properties of petroleum revenues 
in terms of their scale, source, stability and secrecy; that is, oil yields 
government revenues that are unusually large, do not come from taxa-
tion, are extremely volatile, and can easily be concealed from public 
scrutiny. 
With extraordinary rents accruing to the state , public offi ce or access 
to those in public offi ce becomes the most valuable commodity in a 
resource-dependent country’s political economy.8 Resource rents induce 
patronage behavior, or the seeking of political infl uence for economic 
gain (Karl 1997, 56). Rents also generate an incumbency advantage. 
However, at the same time, politics can be quite unstable: the fact that 
the prize associated with political control is so large can mean that 
there is a constant battle over the state. Despite the primacy of the 
state, all power does not rest with government offi cials and institu-
tions. Rather, the ruling elite comprises individuals and groups both 
within and outside government who together assert a monopolistic 
control of wealth. In particular, a “class of rent-seeking pseudo- 
entrepreneurs” enjoys an umbilical relationship with the state (Daud-
erstädt and Schildberg 2006, 21). These business elites are intertwined 
in the state capture of resource rents and prove to be entrenched 
obstacles in the face of transformative measures. Together with this 
rent-seeking dynamic between political and economic elites, the intru-
sion of the state in the economy—as a result of its control over natural 
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resource sector activities—blurs the distinction between public and 
private (Vatansever and Gillies 2009, 15). 
Keeping in mind the defi nition of fi scal reliance on natural resource 
rents, note that in resource-dependent countries, a lack of other revenues 
concentrates rent-seeking on the resource sector. A preview of some of 
the arguments advanced in the thematic chapters below highlights the 
centrality of rents to the political economy dynamics associated with the 
natural resource sector. A government’s dependence on resource rents 
tends to weaken its bargaining power with developers (chapter 3). The 
extraction and collection of natural resource rents is often extremely 
centralized (chapter 4); as a result, the state is an enormous prize because, 
in thinly institutionalized environments, the victor can claim all the 
spoils. Building in mechanisms to ensure that rents are shared broadly—
for example, distributing rents through public goods rather than hoard-
ing rents through private goods—is crucial to breaking into this dynamic 
(chapter 5). Furthermore, the extractive industries provide a number of 
different channels to distribute rents at each step of the value chain: 
through licensing and contracts, as a result of the specifi cs of the fi scal 
regime, and through both budgetary and off-budgetary allocations. Each 
of these successive rent distribution opportunities—where the state col-
lects rents and then allocates them in ways that strengthen the position 
of those in power—is discussed in further detail in this volume. Together 
these distributive patterns constitute what Ross (2001) has labeled the 
“rentier effect.”
By limiting the need for other forms of government revenue genera-
tion, such as tax collection, natural resources can lead to the attenuation 
of state administrative and institutional capacity building.9 Hence, a core 
set of the political effects of the resource curse derives from what Moore 
(2004) has dubbed the “fi scal sociology” paradigm.10 This paradigm was 
illustrated sharply by Bates (2008) in his examination of state failure in 
Africa: if political elites calculate that their own best interests are served 
by collecting tax revenues and protecting producers with the rule of law 
to maximize the tax base, they will establish bureaucratic infrastructure 
to enable them to do so; if not, they will be prone to turning the state 
apparatus into a predatory instrument that extracts rent from society 
and dispenses that rent through patronage networks. Supporting hypoth-
eses advanced in the contemporary political economy literature suggests 
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that the political and institutional dimensions of the resource curse are 
made more likely when: (1) natural resources constitute the “only game 
in town,” (2) the distribution of resource rents aligns with existing 
political-economic cleavages, (3) political power is concentrated in the 
executive, and (4) policy commitment is made more diffi cult by price 
volatility or political instability (Dunning 2008b, 2). 
The bulk of the political economy literature thus identifi es institu-
tional quality and the development outcomes of resource-dependent 
countries as intertwined. Resource dependence actually shapes the insti-
tutions of the state and the framework for decision making in predict-
able patterns. In turn, those political and institutional constellations 
have predictable effects on economic outcomes. As Karl (1997) points 
out, the very nature and capacity of the state in resource-dependent 
countries is skewed by the imperatives of resource extraction.
Building on this general logic of the rentier state and its effects, this 
chapter defi nes the fl ow of rent through the natural resource value 
chain—that is, the nature of resource rent extraction, management, and 
distribution—as the primary lens through which political economic 
outcomes associated with natural resource management can best be cat-
egorized for operational purposes. It then identifi es an explanatory logic 
that rests on cutting-edge political economy scholarship along with the 
series of key political economy dynamics that have emerged from the 
empirical work commissioned under the study.
Two Key Rent Arenas: Rent Generation 
and Distribution 
The global research underpinning this study was premised on the view 
that disaggregating a country’s natural resource management policies 
and practices through the lens of the natural resource management 
(NRM) value chain offers a systematic, more fi nely grained, and opera-
tionally relevant apprehension of the political economy of natural 
resource-dependence than has to-date been available. Putting together 
the value chain and the rentier state logic sketched above raises two key 
questions that characterize a government’s management of the natural 
resource sector and the channeling of those resources into sustainable 
development policies. The questions are as follows:11 
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•  How effectively does a government generate and capture rents from 
the extractive industries? The extent to which a government can 
effectively generate and capture rents from the natural resource sec-
tors depends on both the enabling framework of hydrocarbon pro-
duction or mineral extraction and the design of the fi scal regime 
and administrative capacity to implement it. This set of concerns is 
further elaborated in chapters 3 (extracting resource wealth) and 4 
(taxing resource wealth).
•  How does the government spend resource wealth and to what extent 
is it invested in a sustainable, pro-development manner? Once a 
government has collected resource revenues, a number of different 
options for saving, consumption, and investment are available to it. In 
turn, each of these mechanisms is subject to varying degrees of rent 
leakage away from a development orientation. This set of concerns is 
elaborated in chapter 5 (spending resource wealth).
In essence, outcomes across the natural resource value chain can be 
reduced to two rent arenas: (1) extracting and taxing resource wealth, or 
generating rents, and (2) spending and investing resource wealth, or dis-
tributing rents (fi gure 2.3). As mentioned earlier with regard to the state-
society-developer triangle, the state is involved in the generating rents 
arena with resource developers and in the distributing rents arena with 
citizens or society. A number of state actors are involved in these two 
Figure 2.3. The Two Key “Rent Arenas” in the Natural Resource Value Chain











Source: Authors’ compilation, based on Webb (2010). 
52 Rents to Riches?
arenas, but it is worth noting that the ministry of fi nance, a key World 
Bank interlocutor, sits at the intersection of these two dimensions. 
Although its strength and centrality varies across country contexts, the 
ministry of fi nance (or other central fi scal agency) usually serves as the 
state agent that is the arbiter of public resources. It is responsible for 
collecting public revenues as well as prioritizing their use and distribu-
tion; in the best-case scenario, it undertakes these functions with a 
medium- to long-term focus on channeling the nation’s wealth into 
productive and sustainable development that enhances the collective 
welfare. 
The case studies conducted for the global study illuminate this 
nuanced understanding of patterns of resource wealth generation, cap-
ture or taxation, and distribution at the country level. Table 2.1 provides 
an assessment of how the case study countries appear to have performed 
across these three core dimensions in managing resource rents. Invest-
ment in the extractive industries is used as a proxy for the potential of 
rent generation; stability in the receipts generated by the fi scal regime is 
used as a key indicator of the quality of the institutional framework for 
rent capture; and the degree to which public spending is oriented toward 
particularistic (private) or public goods provides the key indicator of the 
quality of rent distribution through public spending. 
Highlighting the cases of a few countries helps make the logic of this 
analysis clear. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, a 
recent World Bank mining report calculates that only 15 percent of the 
estimated revenue from the sector is collected; the rest is siphoned away 
through rent-seeking. In Angola, a high degree of resource wealth is cap-
tured, but has historically been channeled off-budget through the 
national oil company, Sonangol. In Lao PDR, opacity around contracts 
enables potentially signifi cant elite capture of corporate payoffs, but 
administrative corruption in revenue collection and procurement are 
limited and the formal public fi nancial management system appears to 
handle resource rents well. Mexico’s government is highly fi scally depen-
dent on oil revenues, although this sector is far less important in the 
more diversifi ed economy overall, and upstream control by PEMEX, the 
state-owned oil company, has meant that exploration and new capacity 
has not come on stream to the extent desirable. There are some indica-
tions that Ghana could improve its existing fi scal take from the mining 
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sector, although it has managed to attract investment in the sector. Nige-
ria’s infamous bunkering has historically raised signifi cant concerns 
about upstream management, in addition to the quality of its down-
stream expenditures. In Timor-Leste, the upstream institutional archi-
tecture surrounding the Petroleum Fund and the on-budget channeling 
of all resource revenues are exemplary, but signifi cant leakages and tar-
geted rent distribution occur through the public procurement process 
and cash transfers.
Table 2.1. Generating, Capturing, and Distributing Rents
Generating Wealth 




Distribution of Rents 
(Public Versus Private 
Goods Provision)
Angola Increasing investment Stable Predominantly particularistic
Congo, Dem. Rep. Underinvestment Unstable Predominantly particularistic
Ghana Increasing investment Stable Predominantly particularistic, 
but some public goods
Niger Increasing investment Unstable (but extensive 
use of stability clauses)
Predominantly particularistic
Nigeria Increasing investment Stable Predominantly particularistic, 
persistent patronage
Lao PDR Increasing investment Unstable Predominantly public goods, 
but persistent patronage
Mongolia Increasing investment Unstable Predominantly particularistic, 
but some public goods
Timor-Leste Increasing investment Stable Predominantly particularistic, 
but some public goods
Bolivia Underinvestment Unstable Predominantly particularistic, 
but some public goods
Chile Underinvestment (public) 
Increasing (private)
Stable (but increased 
take during last boom)
Predominantly public goods, 
but percentage earmarked 
for defense spending
Ecuador Underinvestment Unstable Predominantly particularistic, 
but some public goods




Effective (public) Stable Predominantly public goods, 
but persistent patronage
Source: Authors’ assessment of case studies. 
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Political Economy Settings in Resource-Dependent 
Countries 
What explains how a country performs in the two rent arenas of extract-
ing natural resource rents and allocating those rents toward sustainable 
development across society? To help answer this question, a simple 
political economy typology for characterizing resource-dependent 
countries in an operationally relevant schema is presented. The focus is 
on mapping the orientation of a country’s governing regime and over-
all political economy context in terms of how natural resource rents are 
managed. The typology hinges on two dimensions: 
•  The credibility of intertemporal commitment, or the degree to 
which extractive bargains and policy stability (that is, government 
commitments to natural resource companies and to citizens) can be 
enforced over time and the degree to which deviations from such 
agreements are subject to sanction; and 
•  The overall political inclusiveness of the prevailing state-society 
compact, or the extent to which diverse social, economic, and 
political viewpoints are incorporated into decision-making, and a 
sense of collectivist welfare is privileged over purely elite interests 
such that government is inclined to turn resource rents into public 
goods.
These dimensions are interdependent to some extent, but each can be 
distinctly unbundled into a number of key analytical components. A 
country’s positioning on each of these dimensions thus can be gauged 
along the further criteria proposed below (see fi gures 2.4 and 2.5). 
Political economy scholarship offers a number of regime typologies 
to distinguish why certain country settings yield particular outcomes. 
To explain a country’s performance on resource rent generation and 
allocation, table 2.2 indicates a typology of natural resource-dependent 
settings and key dimensions of credibility and inclusiveness insofar as 
these dimensions affect the management of resource rents. This volume 
is concerned with ensuring the relevance of the typology to resource-
dependent developing countries and how they generate and allocate 
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rents, although it may be adaptable to thinking through other issues of 
sustainable development in poor countries more broadly. The typology 
elaborates four settings:
•  Patrimonial rule: political economic settings characterized by indi-
vidualized political authority, usually resting on a hierarchy of crony-
ism, where the exercise of power faces few constraints. These can be 
settings of persistent instability and a high degree of political contes-
tation with frequent turnover among confl icting groups; or they can 
be characterized by dictators who avoid establishing organizational 
arrangements that constrain their actions (such as an institutional-
ized ruling party). These “roving bandits” are typically unlikely to 
make credible intertemporal commitments or protect property rights 
because they are unconstrained.12 In settings of patrimonial rule, 
extractive capacity is low, constant theft from society means economic 
production is low, time horizons are short, and the exploitation of 
public resources for private gain is common.13
Table 2.2. Typology of Natural Resource–Dependent Settings
Political inclusiveness









Individualized political authority 
built on a hierarchy of cronyism; 
emphasis on private (elite) goods; 
exploitation of public resources 
for private gain
Hegemonic government
Institutionalized one-party regime; 
either predatory or benevolent; 
emphasis on private (elite) goods 






Political competition based on 
extensive use of clientelism; 
provision of particularist goods; 
low horizontal accountability
Programmatic pluralism 
Electoral competition based on 
programs geared toward collective 
welfare enhancement; provision of 
public goods; horizontal and 
vertical democratic accountability
Source: Adapted from Barma and Viñuela (2010).
Note: Phil Keefer provided insights into refi ning the typology. The typology particularly builds on the 
 theoretical work of Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth (2002); Evans (1989; 1995);  Kohli (2004); Lal and Myint (1996); and 
Olson (1993).
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•  Hegemonic government: an uncontested, institutionalized political 
force or one-party regime, or “stationary bandit,” that successfully 
monopolizes “theft” through regular taxation and in turn provides 
peaceful order and some degree of public goods for society.14 The 
degree to which the regime needs to pay off other social groups (usu-
ally with a mix of particularistic and developmental goods) can vary, 
and it relates to the predictability of succession and the potential of 
revolt. For example, in Angola, the ruling elite is able to enrich itself 
with relative inattention to broader societal demands; whereas, in 
Suharto-era Indonesia, a certain degree of broad-based growth and 
development was necessary to underwrite the regime’s grip on 
power. Thus, hegemonic governments can appear either predatory 
or relatively benevolent. Time horizons are lengthened due to regime 
stability; combined with greater institutionalization, this enables 
credible intertemporal commitment.
•  Clientelist pluralism: political-economic settings where some degree 
of political competition takes place (mainly through electoral con-
tests), usually on the basis of extensive patron-client networks.15 The 
need to reward supporters results in some public goods provision; but 
the reliance on clientelist distribution of particularist goods to mobi-
lize support undermines vertical and horizontal accountability and 
has self-enforcing characteristics that lead to the under-provision of 
public goods that enhance collective welfare. Time horizons are short 
because politics are relatively unpredictable and the degree of institu-
tionalization (and hence constraint on power) is low.
•  Programmatic pluralism: electoral competition on the basis of pro-
grams that are geared toward collective welfare enhancement, with an 
emphasis on societywide public goods provision.16 A higher degree of 
institutionalization brings with it built-in democratic mechanisms of 
horizontal and vertical accountability, facilitates the articulation and 
protection of property rights, and enables credible intertemporal 
commitment.
In summary, a country’s positioning along the two key dimensions 
captured in the typology—the credibility of intertemporal commitment 
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and degree of political inclusiveness—determines the manner in which 
stakeholder incentives and the institutional landscape interact with the 
structural characteristics of natural resources, and hence how a country 
actually experiences the resource paradox. In noninclusive settings where 
the credibility of intertemporal commitment is low, rent generation will 
be weak, because the state will fi nd it diffi cult to make benefi cial extractive 
bargains with resource developers, and rent allocation will be biased 
toward consumption by political-economic elites and away from saving 
and investment for society. Factors that make intertemporal commit-
ments more credible—by lengthening time horizons and strengthening 
institutionalization and the enforcement of property rights—will tend to 
improve a country’s performance in terms of rent generation by enabling 
governments to strike better deals, at a lower risk premium, with devel-
opers. Factors that increase political inclusiveness—incorporating more 
political, social, and economic groups into decision making—will make 
the state more accountable to society and orient rent allocation toward 
collective welfare through the provision of public goods and investment 
for sustainable development.
The structural characteristics of resource-dependence—especially 
the very rapid availability of large windfall rents, the concentration of 
ownership and decision making in the sector, and the often unrivalled 
access to rents for those with political and economic power—tend to 
push resource-dependent developing countries into the upper-left quad-
rant of this typology, a setting of patrimonial rule, or to entrench regimes 
in hegemonic government (that is, the upper-right quadrant). This is 
suggested by the cumulative scholarship on the political economy 
dynamics associated with natural resource wealth. A secular “modern-
ization” theory, on the other hand, places countries in the bottom-right 
quadrant of programmatic pluralism as they develop economically 
(Rostow 1960; Lipset 1968; Przeworski et al. 2000). 
The typology may be used to characterize a country at a point in 
time; but, perhaps more importantly, countries also evolve dynamically, 
sometimes shifting from one quadrant to another. The limited access 
order logic would lead to positing, for example, that in most developing 
countries, political elites control and divide economic rents themselves, 
moving to open access orders characterized by economic competition 
and electoral pluralism only after they pass through several key 
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 “doorstep conditions” (North et al. 2007). As Olson (1993) articulated, 
the transition from roving to stationary bandit, or from patrimonial 
rule to hegemonic government, is a common one, which has welfare-
enhancing implications. Countries with patrimonial rule also some-
times move directly to clientelist pluralism, with larger portions of the 
population gaining access to spoils. Hegemonic governments may 
transition to situations of clientelist pluralism as one particular party’s 
grip on power falters. Finally, most programmatic pluralist settings, or 
electoral democracies, have emerged from more clientelist pluralist 
settings. It would be unusual for a country to transition directly from 
patrimonial rule or hegemonic government to mature, programmatic 
democracy without an interlude characterized by clientelist competi-
tion. Of course, these transitions might occur equally in the opposite 
direction.
Development partners cannot affect regime type in any meaningful 
sense.17 Nevertheless, well-designed interventions can work within, and 
have the potential to transform, some of the stakeholder incentives and 
institutional constraints leading to poor outcomes. Development inter-
ventions to mitigate the resource curse are aimed at assisting reform in 
countries such that their policy making and institutional frameworks 
across the natural resource value chain approximate those found in 
countries squarely within the ideal quadrant of programmatic plural-
ism. In other words, natural resource rents are most reliably transformed 
into sustainable development riches when a government can make cred-
ible intertemporal commitments to both extractive companies and its 
citizens, and when the political regime is inclusive such that the govern-
ment faces the incentives to use resource rents to provide public goods 
that enhance collective welfare. 
From a political economy perspective, if they are to be successful, 
development initiatives must fi nd mechanisms to work within the 
constraints of the underlying political and institutional dynamics 
associated with resource dependence, resonate with them, and eventu-
ally transform them. Thus, the typology is now unbundled to articu-
late a core set of factors prevalent in resource-dependent countries 
that affect the ability to make intertemporal commitments and the 
degree of political inclusiveness. In each of the countries in the study, 
the observed outcomes are linked to peculiarities of the political 
 The Political Economy of the  Natural Resource Paradox 59
 economic system, which any attempt at mitigation must take squarely 
into account. Hence, the key operational utility of this typology in any 
given country would be to identify those components of intertempo-
ral credibility and political inclusiveness along which performance 
appears to be particularly weak, and, where possible, to seek to elabo-
rate interventions that tilt these toward improvement. Improvements 
along each of these individual components are no guarantee for better 
natural resource management. Rather, interventions designed with 
these political economy dynamics in mind will be more feasible and 
incentive-compatible, and hence stand a greater chance of transform-
ing resource rents into developmental riches. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 pres-
ent examples of such interventions at specifi c points of the natural 
resource management value chain.
Credibility of Intertemporal Commitment 
The types of transaction that political actors are able to engage in depend 
on the possibilities and constraints embedded in the institutional envi-
ronment.18 In essence, the credibility of intertemporal cooperation will 
be low if the incentive to break a deal is high, that is, if the payoffs of 
deviating from agreements are substantial, or the sanctions or punish-
ment for deviation are low or unenforceable, or both. In other words, the 
capacity to enforce political and policy agreements is crucial for political 
actors to be able to engage in intertemporal transactions and to cooper-
ate and create stable policies more generally. Policy outcomes are deter-
mined by the political institutions in place, such as regime type, political 
system, form of government, electoral system, and the degree of inde-
pendence of the judiciary. These institutional factors determine which 
actors participate and in which arenas they interact, and they defi ne the 
formality and transparency of decision making; together, these factors 
determine the credibility of intertemporal commitments in the context 
of the system (fi gure 2.4). Later chapters will illustrate potential targeted 
interventions aimed at shifting the key observed elements of credibility 
from the left (weaker and less enforced) to the right (stronger and more 
enforced) side of the fi gure.
Natural resource rents, because of their sheer magnitude, can make it 
tempting to deviate from wealth-sharing agreements, either between 
state and developer or elites and society. Resource rents provide the 
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Figure 2.4. Credibility of Intertemporal Commitment
weaker/less enforced stronger/more enforced
high lowpayoff from deviating from agreement
patronage programmaticstrategies to mobilize political support
weak strongbureaucratic autonomy and competence
weak severesanctions for reneging on commitment
low highdegree of political institutionalization
high lowpolitical fragmentation
shallow deeppenetration of state into society
Source: Authors.
incumbent government with resources to reward supporters and head off 
opponents, weakening the sanctions for reneging on commitments and 
potentially altering the distribution of power and the outcomes from 
future competition. Rents also raise the stakes of controlling offi ce, since 
the state is the main collector and distributor of rents; hence, they can 
trigger intense elite battles over succession and the control of the state 
(Soares de Oliveira 2007).
In many developing countries, political parties tend to be institu-
tionally weak; they compete using patronage networks rather than on 
the basis of programs (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Jensen and 
Wantchekon 2004). Resource rents allow parties to distribute subsidies 
to large portions of the population to secure popular legitimacy 
(Anderson 1987; Crystal 1995; Karl 1997). In addition, many resource-
dependent countries have fractionalized societies, making it diffi cult 
for the state to penetrate into society to effectively project authority 
and implement policy (Herbst 2000; Kohli 2004). All in all, political 
exchanges take place in more informal, more uncertain, and less trans-
parent arenas, complicating the enforcement of agreements, increasing 
decision makers’ discount rates, and making them more risk averse. It 
is important to note that sometimes this opacity and instability can 
actually benefi t resource developers, if they are able to secure a better 
deal from governments to compensate for the risk. When the Angolan 
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rebel leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in 2002, marking an end to the 
country’s prolonged civil war, the shares of companies holding dia-
mond extraction concessions in the country actually fell on interna-
tional stock markets (Guidolin and La Ferrara 2007).
How well countries prioritize objectives and how consistently they 
pursue policies are shaped by formal and informal institutions and the 
distribution of political power. To produce the stable and coherent 
policies necessary to harness the potential of natural resources, the 
multiple actors that intervene in the policy-making process need to be 
able to strike agreements and enforce them over time (Haggard and 
McCubbins 2001; Stein et al. 2008). Institutions can contribute to solv-
ing collective action problems and increasing the predictability and 
stability of political exchanges by providing the incentives for intertem-
poral coordination (or time consistency) between members of a gov-
erning party or coalition and between competing political parties or 
groups that alternate in offi ce through time (Weaver and Rockman 
1993; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Tsebelis 2002), a logic that applies to 
both democratic and nondemocratic regimes (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2002). The capacity of a political system for credible commitment 
hinges largely on the existence of enforcement technologies that bind 
political actors to their agreements, such as independent and capable 
judiciaries, a strong bureaucracy, and constitutional and other institu-
tional constraints on the executive (Stein et al. 2008). Ascher (2009) 
inventories potential technologies for building the credibility of inter-
temporal commitment regarding the challenges of development.
Inclusive political competition, embedded in an institutional frame-
work that provides incentives for intertemporal cooperation, produces 
policies that are sustainable through time and across changes in gov-
ernment. In collaborative environments, policy changes tend to be 
incremental and achieved through compromise. Actors that interact 
repeatedly in institutionalized arenas tend have longer time horizons 
for policy making and invest resources in creating policy capabilities, 
such as tax administration capacity (Stein et al. 2008). Cooperation is 
easier when there is an impartial referee and enforcer of political agree-
ments (Dixit 1996); however, even in the absence of a third party, insti-
tutions can provide incentives to agents to self-enforce equilibria. For 
example, political losers in any given time period can be encouraged to 
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cooperate or stand by the terms of an intertemporal policy bargain 
when they can foresee that they may be political winners and stand to 
benefi t from a stable policy environment in the next time period. A 
virtuous circle results in that such self-enforcing bargains promote 
commitment and encourage reluctant investors or legislators alike to 
take the risks and bear the costs necessary to achieve joint gains (North 
and Weingast 1989).
Political Inclusiveness of the Prevailing State-Society Compact 
A state-society compact can be defi ned as society’s ceding of sovereignty 
to the state in exchange for public goods, such as the rule of law and 
public service delivery.19 The strength and inclusiveness of the state- 
society compact is a fundamental and necessary feature of development. 
Several factors underlie the degree of political inclusiveness as refl ected 
in a country’s compact between state and society (fi gure 2.5). 
Institutions affect the mix of public and private goods in public pol-
icies and the degree of separation between public and private domains. 
Different features of the political system defi ne which actors take part in 
the policy-making process and how they are selected. One key feature 
affecting the degree of political inclusiveness underlying the state- 
society compact is where the sources of authority and political power 
lie in society (Kohli 2004). In some countries, political authority is 








less inclusive / equitable more inclusive / equitable
rule of law
distinction between public and private spheres
legitimization of authority
sources of authority and political power
developmental orientation of state
orientation of goods provision
constraints on executive
Source: Authors.
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highly concentrated, that is, the size of the “winning coalition” is small 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002), and few additional groups need to be 
bought off for their acquiescence to the regime (North et al. 2007). The 
smaller the coalition that leaders need to secure their position in power, 
the more likely they are to provide private goods to a small coalition 
instead of public goods to a broader population (Bueno de Mesquita 
2001; Bates 2008). 
On the other hand, the more inclusive the political system, the greater 
the emphasis of leaders on public policy. As discussed in the last section, 
more institutionalized and enforceable intertemporal agreements will 
induce parties to reduce their dispensation of patronage, because this 
becomes comparably less cost-effective (Jones Luong and Weinthal 
2001). As Keefer and Vlaicu (2007) underscore, however, the nature of 
democracy and political party organization will matter a great deal as to 
whether governments provide private or public goods. Clientelist 
democracies may target private goods fairly broadly but, unlike pro-
grammatic democracies, they show a low propensity for providing pub-
lic goods. In Mexico, for example, the PRI (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional) regime strategically distributed rents across localities in 
the country to secure the electorate that would keep them in offi ce, but 
largely through the manipulation of rent distribution rather than the 
systematic provision of public goods (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and 
Weingast 2003).
A concentration of power in the executive leads to the co-optation 
of potential checks and balances or other sources of accountability—
including executive, legislative, and judiciary agencies and civil 
 society—and rents tend to weaken agencies of restraint (Eifert and 
Gelb 2002). The ability of a legislature or parliament to impose effec-
tive constraints on the executive will depend on the constitutional 
powers of the legislature and the legislative prerogatives of the execu-
tive, such as decree and veto powers. The nature of the party system 
and the  electoral incentives of legislators infl uence their degree of 
independence, and legislative leverage is reduced by other presidential 
prerogatives, such as the power to appoint the cabinet and other gov-
ernment offi cials unilaterally. 
An independent judiciary is another important enforcer of agree-
ments (Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002; Chavez, Ferejohn, and 
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Weingast 2003); and the strength of the rule of law is crucial. Moreover, 
professional bureaucracies can limit the scope of opportunistic policies 
and enhance trust in commitments, because policy agreements are put 
in practice over time (Huber and McCarty 2001); they also increase the 
strength of the government in relation to other actors, such as private 
developers. Even if not co-opted, these accountability institutions can 
be undercapacitated (purposefully, by withholding fi nancial resources) 
and marginalized from decision-making processes. As Chaudhry (1997) 
describes, oil-rich countries in the Middle East explicitly designed pro-
grams to depoliticize the population, deliberately destroying indepen-
dent civil institutions while investing in those designed to facilitate the 
aims of the state.
If the natural resource sector is subject to a high degree of state own-
ership, for example, through national oil companies, the boundaries 
between the state bureaucracy and management of these enterprises is 
often blurred. Bureaucrats from various ministries become involved in 
daily management roles and vice versa; consequently, the opportunities 
for political manipulation of policy decisions in favor of particularistic 
interests can be high. By contrast, incentives under private ownership are 
such that resource developers aim to maximize profi t and the state aims 
to successfully regulate and maximize tax take. Yet privatization is no 
simple panacea to the resource curse. Private companies can be as secre-
tive and unaccountable as state-owned enterprises and might not sig-
nifi cantly alter taxation practices (Ross forthcoming 2012; Jones Luong 
and Weinthal 2006).
In both competitive and single-party systems, highly institutionalized 
parties with strong organizations are likely to promote greater policy 
consistency (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). They contribute to the rou-
tinization and depersonalization of interparty and intraparty competi-
tion and prolong time horizons because commitments by current party 
leaders are more likely to be respected in the future. The more that par-
ties and internal factions compete on the basis of policy options or pro-
grams, the more likely it is that the system will produce public goods 
(Haggard and McCubbins 2001). More generally, the political system 
will be relatively more inclusive if political elites tend to gain their legiti-
macy through such regularized channels, rather than on the basis of 
more arbitrary ascriptions.
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What’s Your Setting?  
The goal of the typology of natural resource-dependent settings offered 
here, along with the dimensions underlying the two major axes of inter-
temporal credibility and political inclusiveness, is to enable a snapshot 
assessment of a country’s political economy in relation to its natural 
resource-dependence. The concepts embedded in this framework are 
inherently diffi cult to measure quantitatively. Most important, the two 
main parameters, intertemporal credibility and political inclusiveness, 
are continuous rather than binary. Moreover, they are interrelated to 
some extent and endogenous to or mutually constitutive with the fact of 
resource-dependence. And each of the underlying dimensions is a com-
plicated enough concept that reasonable scholars and practitioners may 
disagree on defi nitions, salience, and, certainly, precise measurement.
With these caveats stated, however, this typology offers a useful tool for 
characterizing the political economic landscape of a resource-dependent 
country and understanding its performance in terms of rent generation 
and allocation. Different analysts certainly may come to different conclu-
sions on any one specifi c dimension underlying intertemporal credibility 
or political inclusiveness. Some of the dimensions can be measured with 
available quantitative indices; taking a position on others will require 
more detailed qualitative understanding of a country’s politics. But a 
comprehensive and informed judgment using these concepts to sort 
through and organize available political economy data and reports is 
more likely than not to enable analysts to agree on whether a country is 
broadly tilting toward weaker or stronger intertemporal credibility and a 
more or less inclusive political and policy-making system, thereby allow-
ing agreement on the political economy setting that best characterizes its 
current situation. Again, these are snapshots in time. It is equally impor-
tant to try to capture a sense of the dynamic trajectory that a country is 
embarked upon; that is, determining whether intertemporal deals are 
being increasingly enforced or the political compact seems to be changing 
from more to less inclusive.
Policy choices, including those concerning natural resource man-
agement that can aid in transforming rents into sustainable develop-
ment riches, are conditioned on the prevailing institutional context. In 
other words, a country’s success in making and implementing welfare-
enhancing policy for the many, rather than capturing rents for the few, 
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is related to its institutional characteristics. To illustrate this broad 
point—and to demonstrate that different data sources are available to 
help position countries within this typology and its underlying dimen-
sions—highlighted here are a few crucial institutional features, using 
three databases that capture institutional characteristics: the Institu-
tional Profi les Database (IPD) collected by the French Development 
Agency,20 the Public Policy Attributes (PPA) database put together by 
the Inter-American Development Bank,21 and the Worldwide Gover-
nance Indicators (WGI) assembled by the World Bank.22 These are in 
no way the only such data sources, or even the most accurate; the goal 
here is to show how an analyst might use any data source selected. It is 
a given that the more data sources that are examined and triangulated, 
the more robust and reliable any quantitative assessment will be. Cross-
tabulations of core indicators from the three datasets show a relatively 
high degree of (statistically signifi cant) correlation across their mea-
sures for the dimensions of intertemporal credibility and political 
inclusiveness and the institutional characteristics underlying them; 
thus the data can be deployed with relatively more confi dence than 
relying on one dataset alone. The high level of correlation also makes it 
possible to pick and choose across datasets those indicators most likely 
to faithfully measure the concepts being depicted.
Certain scores embedded in these datasets may seem surprising to an 
observer with rich contextual knowledge of a specifi c country or coun-
terintuitive to an analyst who favors still other cross-national datasets. 
Nevertheless, the three datasets mentioned here offer recent cross-
country comparative data on many of the crucial institutional features 
proposed here as central to understanding the political economy of 
natural resource–led development. Hence, caveats notwithstanding, a 
few indicators are used to illustrate how analysts and practitioners 
might characterize the institutional environment in their country of 
interest. It should be noted that a more qualitative assessment is always 
useful in combination with quantitative indicators, especially if particu-
lar discrepancies across datasets remain or the quantitative characteriza-
tion appears to be strikingly inaccurate. This volume emphasizes such a 
qualitative approach, relying heavily on the rich empirical detail embed-
ded in the cases in this study for comparative analysis and supplement-
ing that case material with cross-national datasets where possible. 
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Highlighted below are data positioning countries along the core 
typological dimensions of intertemporal credibility and political inclu-
siveness, and demonstrating how these dimensions are correlated with 
sustainable development outcomes. 
Intertemporal credibility and political inclusiveness. The political econ-
omy typology is premised on two core dimensions: the intertemporal 
credibility of policy bargains, in turn largely hinging on the existence of 
formal or informal mechanisms to enforce agreements over time; and 
political inclusiveness, which refers to the degree to which diverse social, 
economic, and political views are incorporated in policy making, and an 
emphasis is placed on public goods provision. Figure 2.6 plots these two 
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key axes, using the PPA measure of policy coordination and the IPD 
measure of political inclusiveness as the two indicators the authors judge 
as best representing the underlying concepts. Referring to the earlier 
political economy typology, in the top-right quadrant of the scatterplot 
are countries that fall under the category of programmatic pluralism, 
namely those countries with inclusive political systems that have devel-
oped institutionalized mechanisms to ensure intertemporal policies 
around the governance of natural resources. Countries where con-
tracts and regulations are sustained over time but where policy mak-
ing is less inclusive, or there is a one-party system or a hegemonic gov-
ernment, can be found in the bottom-right quadrant. In the top-left 
quadrant are countries characterized by clientelistic pluralism, where 
political systems are relatively inclusive yet challenges are still faced in 
ensuring time consistency across different governments and mobilizing 
support on the basis of programmatic rather than particularistic incen-
tives. Countries that fall under the patrimonial rule type are in the bot-
tom-left quadrant, with weak intertemporal credibility and low political 
inclusiveness. 
Sustainable development outcomes. Embedded in the typology is the 
insight, supported by the literature and the case studies, that the ability 
of a government to engage in credible commitments is an essential 
ingredient for better, longer-term management of natural resources. 
Credibility is manifested through a government’s track record, hence it 
can often be depicted as either a virtuous circle or a vicious cycle. Yet 
intertemporal contracts and bargains can also be sustained by institu-
tional mechanisms, such as the legal and regulatory framework and 
checks and balances on the exercise of executive power. Especially in the 
context of extraction and taxation of natural resources, the ability to 
engage in credible commitments can serve as an important factor in 
attracting investments to the extractive sector, given prevailing geologi-
cal endowments, which will be elaborated upon at the beginning of 
chapter 3. Figure 2.7 depicts the relationship between intertemporal 
credibility and the developmental orientation of the country’s ruling 
elite. The latter is essentially correlated with income levels and serves as 
a useful proxy for the degree to which a country achieves salutary devel-
opmental outcomes.
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Equally, the typology posits that countries that are more politically 
inclusive are likely to enjoy better natural resource management and 
developmental outcomes. Countries where a greater proportion of soci-
ety has a voice in policy making and where decisions are made on the 
basis of public goods provision to the many rather than private spoils to 
the few are more likely to benefi t from welfare-enhancing policies that 
share developmental riches across social, political, and economic groups 
in a sustainable fashion. Figure 2.8 illustrates the relationship between 
political inclusiveness and the developmental orientation of the coun-
try’s ruling elite. 
Together fi gures 2.7 and 2.8 show that the two key components of the 
political economy typology are indeed correlated with development out-
comes: countries where intertemporal coordination is more credible and 
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the political system is more inclusive are more likely to be able to trans-
form natural resource rents into sustainable development riches. Mea-
sures representing the underlying components of the two main political 
economy dimensions can also be examined using the three datasets. For 
brevity of this volume examples of these fi gures are not included, but the 
component measures align well with the two major dimensions. For 
example, government respect for contracts and security of property 
rights (both from the Institutional Profi le Database) correlate highly 
with intertemporal policy coordination and policy stability (from the 
Public  Policy Attributes Database). 
This preliminary sketch of institutional characteristics across 
resource-dependent countries illustrates the degree of variation across 
our sample, highlighting the importance of understanding each indi-
vidual country’s context in order to develop good-fi t interventions on 
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the basis of positive analysis. Also clear is the fact that any given country 
exhibits unique constellations of such institutional characteristics; that 
is, all institutional features, whether good or bad, do not necessarily go 
together. On the contrary, even the worst-performing country is likely to 
exhibit some dimensions of relatively better performance, offering hints 
as to what types of intervention may be practical there. Turning to the 
specifi cs of natural resource management, the empirical case study 
work for this volume does indeed demonstrate that, at any given time, 
countries manifest notable variation in the apparent management and 
functionality of different links across the value chain; for example, 
poor downstream management may coexist with good upstream man-
agement. From an operational perspective then, some countries may 
be more amenable to upstream reforms in sector organization and 
ownership, while it may be more constructive to emphasize down-
stream spending and investment questions in other countries. As a 
fi nal note, any cross-sectional snapshot of a country’s institutional 
environment must also be paired with a dynamic view of resource-
dependent countries as embarked upon an evolving trajectory. Build-
ing a holistic and dynamic understanding of the distinctive context of 
any country is crucial to prioritizing and sequencing reforms in the 
natural resource sectors.
So What? Designing Feasible Interventions 
The operational utility of the typology presented in this chapter lies in 
the extent to which it can help practitioners, both domestic reformers 
and technical experts working with development partners, to design 
politically feasible interventions toward enhancing natural resource 
management. One useful way to conceptualize the macro picture pro-
vided by an assessment of the dimensions underlying intertemporal 
credibility and political inclusiveness is that it sketches the shape of the 
feasible political space within which good-fi t interventions must be 
elaborated if they are to prove tractable or sustainable. A crucial part of 
articulating targeted reforms in this manner is to recognize explicitly 
the incentives facing the various stakeholders and constituencies 
involved at different points of the value chain. Ideally, a more systematic 
emphasis on political economy and institutional analysis should also aid 
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development partners in building coherent reform strategies across the 
value chain that are specifi c to context.
Analytically, the typology presented is useful for a broad positioning 
of a country’s political-economic context. From an operational perspec-
tive, the dimensions underlying the two main axes of intertemporal 
credibility and political inclusiveness themselves offer traction in terms 
of developing principles for intervention. The goal is not, and cannot be, 
to change a country’s political economy setting per se; countries are 
where they are on the basis of long historical trajectories and deeply 
rooted sociopolitical forces. Rather, the objective is to target interven-
tions to be compatible with underlying incentives and dynamics and 
possibly alter them for the better. In other words, “[An] institutional 
approach opens the promise that if we can understand the determinants 
of political equilibria, then we can design interventions that will make 
poor societies prosperous.” (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010, 161).
In this spirit of an analytically positive and operationally prescriptive 
logic, the authors propose that the framework adds value to the similar 
typologies noted and built upon. This chapter has articulated the dimen-
sions underlying the two axes of intertemporal credibility and political 
inclusiveness showing that strengthening performance on each dimen-
sion is associated with more salutary developmental outcomes. With this 
more fi nely grained appreciation of the underlying political and institu-
tional characteristics affecting natural resource management outcomes, 
development practitioners and country counterparts can move toward 
articulating good-fi t interventions that are compatible with underlying 
incentives.
Building from the typology, three basic types of incentive-compatible 
intervention are possible across the value chain as follows:
•  Interventions primarily aimed at extending time horizons, thereby 
enhancing intertemporal credibility; for example, emphasizing a sim-
ple, rule-based process for granting resource concessions that mini-
mizes investor uncertainty and enhances predictability.
•  Reforms that emphasize mobilizing stakeholders to cooperate on natu-
ral resource management, thereby broadening political inclusiveness; 
for example, easing information asymmetries by using model con-
tract and fi scal regimes, or at least disclosing contract terms in order 
to empower third-party audit and oversight.
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•  Interventions that enclave institutions and capacity in natural resource 
management so that some functionality, albeit limited, is possible 
even when the wider political economy dynamics are perverse. 
Such intelligently designed interventions can support institutional 
dimensions in which countries are relatively strong, strengthening 
salutary dynamics by tapping into incentives that push in the right 
direction. Furthermore, where opportunities present themselves to tip 
dimensions to a better trajectory, development partners can work with 
counterparts on bundling transformative interventions that could 
alter underlying dynamics.
Each of the following thematic chapters—chapter 3 on sector organi-
zation, chapter 4 on taxation, and chapter 5 on public investment—
explains the political economy incentives and dynamics that are 
 particularly relevant at each respective point of the value chain, position-
ing them against the four political economy settings sketched in the 
typology and showing how they contribute to typical natural resource 
management outcomes in low-income, resource-dependent countries. 
Specifi c potential good-fi t interventions are presented that make sense 
within those political opportunities and constraints, with descriptions of 
how different mechanisms might be incentive-compatible and perhaps 
ultimately transformative. In other words, the interventions specifi ed in 
these more technically oriented chapters are practical and institutional 
technologies for addressing, in different ways based on context, the 
f undamental political economy challenges facing resource-dependent 
developing countries.
Notes 
 1.  Even in countries with traditions of private subsoil ownership, natural 
resources are still a source of revenues for the state; perhaps most importantly, 
though, that revenue fl ow requires neither an expansive tax apparatus 
nor an intrusive role for the state in the economy or in relation to society (see 
Dunning 2008b). 
 2.  The concept of the “short route to accountability” was developed in the context 
of service delivery to society. Whereas the traditional, long route goes through 
clients as citizens infl uencing policy-makers who then infl uence service provid-
ers, the short route sees clients exerting direct infl uence over their service pro-
viders (World Bank 2004b).
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 3.  Beginning with modernization theorists such as Rostow (1960) and Lipset 
(1959), a long and distinguished tradition in political science and political econ-
omy has been concerned with the relationship between economic development 
and political and administrative institutions. Przeworski et al. (2000) have pro-
vided a seminal statement: Above a certain income threshold, countries are 
likely to be democratic. Here, it should be recognized that that institutional 
quality is, at least to some extent, endogenous to income levels. 
 4.  A caveat is worthwhile in presenting these fi ndings: Most of the studies men-
tioned are cross-national statistical studies, and the mixed results come from 
the fact that the statistical models are, of course, sensitive to which variables are 
included or omitted. We adopted a qualitative approach for this study in the 
belief that context matters. This type of case study work also offers a comple-
mentary methodology through which to draw causal inferences about how 
resource dependence and authoritarianism or confl ict are intertwined.
 5.  This is known as the “voracity effect,” modeled by Tornell and Lane (1999).
 6.  Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) have modeled a country with weak insti-
tutional controls where a resource boom creates incentives for politicians who 
want to stay in power to spend resource windfalls on public programs and 
employment.
 7.  Mahdavy (1970) is usually attributed with the fi rst articulation of the phenom-
enon of the rentier state and the notion that governments’ access to windfall 
rents frees them of the need for taxation and thereby dampens accountability.
 8.  Adnan Vatansever and Alexandra Gillies (2009) informed this document by 
articulating this important point.
 9.  Karl (1997) and Dunning (2008a) provide empirical details on how natural 
resource countries have lower rates of nonresource taxation, both in a compara-
tive sense and over time within specifi c cases.
10.  Moore (2004) provides a discussion of rentier states and their conformity to the 
propositions of fi scal sociology. 
11.  Steven Webb initially articulated these two rent arenas in his paper synthesiz-
ing fi ve Latin American cases, which was commissioned for this study (Webb 
2010). 
12.  Olson (1993) develops the concepts of roving and stationary bandits in articu-
lating a theory of economic development under dictatorship and democracy. 
One of the key characteristics that distinguishes a political economy setting 
under a stationary bandit (or institutionalized regime) from that under roving 
bandits (leaders who are unconstrained by organizational arrangements) is that 
the time horizons are longer in the former. The intertemporal dimension of the 
typology presented here hinges on this elegant insight. Clague et al. (1996) pro-
vide valuable observations on this concept. 
13.  Evans (1989) identifi ed developing countries with such outcomes as predatory 
apparatuses. Lal and Myint (1996) characterize such settings as predatory and 
factional. Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth (2002) label this outcome a predatory 
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autocracy. Kohli’s (2004) spectrum of developing countries characterizes such 
settings as neopatrimonial.
14.  This political-economic setting corresponds, to varying degrees, to Lal and 
Myint’s (1996) predatory and autonomous, and paternalistic or modernizing 
autocracies in the Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth (2002) scheme.
15.  Corresponding to Lal and Myint’s (1996) factional and benevolent states, 
Kohli’s (2004) fragmented-multiclass states, and factional democracies in the 
Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth (2002) typology.
16.  Evans (1989) identifi ed such outcomes as developmental; Lal and Myint (1996) 
characterize such settings as autonomous and benevolent; Eifert, Gelb, and 
 Tallroth (2002) label this outcome a mature democracy; and Kohli (2004) char-
acterizes such settings as cohesive-capitalist.
17.  The World Bank is explicitly prevented from doing so by its Articles of 
 Agreement.
18.  This discussion draws heavily from Barma and Viñuela (2010). 
19.  This discussion draws heavily from Barma and Viñuela (2010). 
20.  Developed under the auspices of the French Development Cooperation agency, 
based on informed and comparable respondents, the Institutional Profi les Data-
base (IPD) provides a rich assessment of specifi c political-economy and institu-
tional dynamics. Refer to Crombrugghe et al. (2009); database is found at http://
www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/institutions.htm. 
21.  The Public Policy Attributes (PPA) dataset of the Inter-American Development 
Bank, originally constructed to draw links between political institutions and 
policy outcomes, presents a range of indicators for fi ve core attributes of public 
policy and four core attributes of political institutions. Data are now available 
for 152 countries spanning all regions of the world, at http://www.iadb.org/res/
pub_desc.cfm?pub_id=DBA-008. See also Berkman et al. (2008).
22.  The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset maintained by the World 
Bank provides cross-country measures over time of six dimensions of gover-
nance. Each indicator is aggregated from a series of underlying indices; the data 
should be treated with caution, as the composition of each indicator varies from 
one year to the next, but the measures provide a reasonable cross-country com-
parative snapshot across dimensions of governance, as well as a fair sense of 
evolution in a country’s governance environment over time. Data are available 
at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. See also Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009). Note: the World Bank’s Country Performance and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) scores countries on 16 indicators, a number of 
which are more specifi c than the WGI data; yet CPIA indicators are publicly 
available only for International Development Association countries. 
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The organization of the natural resource sector at the upstream part of 
the value chain—specifi cally the legal and regulatory framework, the 
government’s establishment of its role in key dimensions of resource 
ownership and in distribution of extraction and production rights, and 
government agencies’ capability to oversee and regulate the sector—has 
reverberating consequences for how resource rents can be transformed 
into developmental riches. Different forms of sector organization repre-
sent mechanisms to resolve the competing political, economic, and social 
priorities of both governments and investors and enable them to man-
age the risks and uncertainties in the extractive industries. This chapter 
provides a political economy framework for understanding the chal-
lenges facing resource-dependent countries in organizing the extractive 
industries sector.
Competition over rents, no matter from where they derive, is a central 
fact of any political economic system. In resource-dependent developing 
countries, the magnitude of rents can be enormous, making the extrac-
tive industries sector itself a key locus of political contestation. More-
over, once any particular group of elites has access to a share of the 
resource rents, distribution of those rents will be subject to multiple 
objectives. A dynamic centrally related to the upstream part of the natu-
ral resource value chain is associated with time horizons. On one hand, 
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governments are keen to maximize short-term rents, for example, in the 
form of signing bonuses and contracts that front-load revenue streams. 
These rents can be distributed in near-time periods, particularly to 
secure political stability and support and sometimes to increase the pro-
vision of private goods to elites and their clients in patronage networks. 
On the other hand, it is also in the interest of governments to maximize 
long-term rents, usually in the form of revenues from taxation and roy-
alties, because these resources can be used to invest in public infrastruc-
ture and service delivery, which in turn can enhance societal welfare and 
increase government legitimacy and support as it delivers on the state-
society compact. The effects of time horizons on public expectations and 
the political economic system are thus central to choices or outcomes in 
terms of sector organization.
In addition to these temporal concerns, governments also must cali-
brate the optimal mix between two often competing goals: (1) effi ciency, 
hence maximal wealth creation and (2) fl exibility, or the ability to maintain 
discretion in how resource rents are created and distributed. With these 
basic trade-offs in mind, this chapter explains how certain types of 
upstream arrangements regarding state ownership of natural resources 
and different contract or license allocation mechanisms can be incentive-
compatible and sustainable; the chapter further offers potential “good 
enough” governance innovations that can enhance welfare while still con-
sidering political and social objectives.
It is worth noting that the extractive processes for hydrocarbons are 
different from those for metals and minerals. Yet many of the underlying 
political economy dynamics are present across both sectors, or, at least, 
vary in degree rather than in kind. This chapter, as well as the volume as 
a whole, proceeds generally by discussing the similarities, but explicitly 
makes distinctions when necessary. From an analytical perspective, fur-
thermore, many of the political economy dynamics pertaining to the 
upstream part of the value chain (sector organization, ownership, license 
allocation, and so on) are inherently interrelated with those at the mid-
stream (taxing and collecting resource rents). A brief introduction links 
these dimensions, then the chapter examines how governments, inves-
tors, and social groups interact in the process of extracting hydrocarbon 
and mineral resources. Chapter 4 focuses on alternative tax policies and 
fi scal regimes for the capturing of resource rents.
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A Stylized Look at Rent-Capture Regimes
As discussed in chapter 2, governments of countries richly endowed in 
natural resources face two major sets of policy challenges, or, as termed 
here, need to make decisions in two “rent arenas” (fi gure 2.3), in trans-
forming oil, gas, and mining resources into economic and social develop-
ment. Upstream decisions center on the organization of natural resource 
extraction and the generation of resource rents through taxation. Subse-
quently, downstream management concerns the state’s allocation of natu-
ral resource rents across consumption, investment, and fi nancial savings.
Presented here is a stylized framework for the upstream dimension of 
how a resource-dependent government can generate and capture rents 
from the extractive industries, the challenges falling in three key sets of 
policy questions:
•  Model of ownership: How does a country choose to structure the 
ownership of natural resources? Does a national oil or mineral com-
pany exist? Does the state choose to take an equity share in hydrocar-
bon or mineral production, and how does it structure that share? 
What are the ownership rights of subnational levels of government 
and affected communities? 
•  Contract models: What contracting models does a country select on 
the spectrum between criteria-based licensing (increasing transpar-
ency and effi ciency) and direct negotiation (increasing government 
discretion and fl exibility)? How do governments use contractual 
arrangements to cope with price volatility?
•  Fiscal regime: What is the optimal combination of taxes and royalties 
that over time maximizes the rent stream that a country can generate 
from its natural resources while ensuring administrative capacity to 
implement the selected fi scal regime? How can a fi scal regime miti-
gate a country’s vulnerability to price volatility?
A country’s “rent-capture regime” is the cumulative result of such 
choices, incorporating decisions regarding exploration, extraction, 
and taxation. Exploration and, especially, extraction typically involve 
signifi cant outlays of investment under highly risky, uncertain con-
ditions. Negotiated agreements on contract terms and fi scal regimes 
between resource-endowed countries and investors are also subject to an 
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 obsolescing bargain (described in further detail below), whereby the rela-
tive risks faced by government and investor change over the life cycle of 
the project. 
Given that oil, gas, and mining projects have life spans from a few years 
to decades, a key challenge is to make credible bargains that optimally 
align the time horizons of investors and country counterparts. At any 
given time, a country will want to ensure a balance of suffi cient invest-
ment in exploration and extraction to ensure future rent streams, while 
maximizing formal rent taxation in the present period. The stylized 
model is shown in fi gure 3.1. To sustain and increase rent streams, the 
host government will need to mobilize fi nancing for investment through 
private or public operators (x-axis). The government will concurrently 
seek to maximize the overall rent stream from the sector (y-axis). For 
now, assume that this is a formal rent stream, accruing to the treasury, 
rather than a private rent stream to particular members of the elite 
 coalition, although instances can be found in which revenues are kept 
 off-budget to make side payments to ensure specifi c political economy 
bargains or to draw on for illicit purposes, that is, outright corruption.1
In essence, in order to optimally secure rent streams from the natural 
resource sector, countries will want to move outward on the 45-degree 
line shown in the fi gure. To move in this general direction, a country may 
have to tack back and forth, as in sailing, and may even have to deviate 
signifi cantly from the 45-degree line. Contracting and taxation policy and 
administration are the key instruments the country will use, and which 
“sail” to use at any given point will depend on possible trajectories to the 
desired destination. Proper sequencing is crucial because time lags across 
the phases of exploration, securing investment for extraction, and resource 
rents coming on stream can be from 3 to 10 years for oil and up to 20 years 
for mining. Trying to capture the rent stream too early, for example, 
through expropriation, will dampen future investment by making a coun-
try likely to move northwest and then south in the framework.
A description of the historical trajectories of upstream management 
in Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Mexico will illus-
trate the framework. (Annex 3.1 provides a snapshot of current prac-
tice in the countries studied for this volume.) DRC in 2003 had very 
weak institutions and a high risk premium in international markets, 
but it moved east on the investment axis by attracting a number of 
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blue-chip investments (for example, Freeport and First Quantum). The 
2007–09 contract review process arguably complicated this move, with 
concerns about potential expropriation of these two high-profi le deals 
as they were coming to production. At the same time, in 2009, DRC was 
able to conclude a major resources-for-infrastructure deal with China. 
It is unclear in which direction DRC will now head and whether such 
bundled resources-for-infrastructure deals with China are somehow 
more immune to a high-risk profi le than are Western traditional invest-
ments. A key challenge is that DRC’s formal capture of rents from the 
sector is very low, owing both to the risk premium that investors 
demand from the country and to weaknesses in the country’s revenue 
administration.
Over the past two decades, Chile has been successful in attracting 
more investment in extractive industries (moving east in the frame-
work), and to some extent increasing formal rent capture (moving 
north). This has largely been a result of a bifurcated approach to upstream 
management. The state-owned operation CODELCO continues to gen-
erate most rents, but with low investment in exploration. On the other 
hand, private investors generated most of the expansion in investment 
and hence in extractive capacity over the time period, but at low levels of 
rent taxation. This “discount” may have been necessary to attract invest-
ment, given the uncertain institutional environment during the Pinochet 
era. Now, however, given institutional development and the apparent 
strengthening of the rule of law in recent elections, Chile enjoys a better 
reputation and can begin trading up to more rents in the future stream 
of contracts. 
Finally, Mexico is extracting signifi cant rents from existing state-
owned PEMEX operations, but has not been able to attract other oil 
investment. Comparing extraction on the south coast of Texas and 
Louisiana with the Gulf of Campeche offers a stark contrast. From the 
perspective of further developing the sector and enhancing future rent 
streams, Mexico should now want to see more investment (that is, move 
east), in order to then be able to generate more rents (moving north). 
But what are the policy options that could enable it to do so, and would 
the underlying political economy dynamics support such a move? 
At any stage, country authorities will want (1) to maximize present 
rents and (2) to attract and sustain investments in both exploration and 
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extraction that promise the generation of future rents. Policy advice in 
terms of the rent-capture regime consists of a range of extraction and 
taxation options. This chapter now focuses on the fi rst part of that equa-
tion: how the extractive industries are organized, in terms of sector regu-
lation, models of ownership, licensing and contracting processes, and the 
capacity of government agencies to regulate and monitor the extractive 
industries. The political economy dynamics surrounding the explora-
tion and extraction stages tend to be parallel. Here, the focus is mainly on 
extraction; while exploration is crucial, it concerns potential rather than 
actual rents. Chapter 4 takes up the matter of taxing resource wealth.
Paradoxes of Sector Organization in 
Resource-Dependent Settings
The way a resource-dependent country’s government interacts with 
would-be resource investors, along with the mechanisms through which 
it exercises control over the natural resource sector, is crucial in deter-
mining the rents and sustainable development benefi ts that will accrue 
to its citizens. In a concrete sense, questions of sector organization set 
the tone for natural resource management. In turn, the quintessen tial 
paradoxes of natural-resource-dependence emerge upstream in the sec-
toral value chain. These problems are common in form to public poli-
cies in general, which, for successful implementation require decision 
 makers willing to work with long time horizons and operating in insti-
tutionalized arenas for the effective enforcement of political and policy 
agreements (as discussed in chapter 2). But these challenges are increased 
by the singular features of the hydrocarbon and mineral sectors that 
erode intertemporal cooperation and decrease political inclusiveness. 
The three key paradoxes related to sector organization that frame this 
 chapter concern the predictability of natural resource management pol-
icies, the relative bargaining power between government and investor at 
different points of the project lifecycle, and the tension between private 
and public interests. 
The predictability of policy and the regulatory framework related to 
the natural resource sector is essential to salutary developmental out-
comes, yet it is common for governments to seek to retain discretion to 
change the rules of the game. All else being equal, lower predictability 
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undermines confi dence and increases the risk investors face, no matter 
what rules are set out; in turn, this means that investors will demand 
more favorable terms if they are to take on this higher risk. A vicious 
cycle may develop, as a government (particularly a new government) 
may seek to unravel the terms of a previous agreement if the perception 
is that the investor received terms unfavorable to the country. The risks 
of policy instability and contract renegotiation will also result in under-
investment in future extractive projects (Bohn and Deacon 2000). As 
will be described further below, the predictability or stability of policy is 
contingent upon the political economy setting and how it interacts with 
the distinctive characteristics of the sector—in particular price volatil-
ity and high economic and technological risk, which undermine domes-
tic policy commitments. Predictability does not preclude change, but 
implies that adjustments should be made incrementally without affect-
ing the stability of the overall framework. 
Contract negotiations in the hydrocarbon and mineral sectors are 
characterized by asymmetric capacity and information between the 
parties, but the relative bargaining power between governments and 
investors shifts over the life cycle of extractive industry projects. As a 
result of these asymmetries, commitment problems are inherent in the 
upstream part of the natural resource value chain. In addition, over a 
project lifecycle, government and investors take on different forms of 
risk and uncertainty at different stages. Institutional design is crucial to 
resolving this specifi c challenge of the obsolescing bargain; in short, 
investors need to be assured that their contractual arrangements are 
stable. In order to develop interventions or self-reinforcing institutional 
designs for the sector, it is essential to understand the time horizons fac-
ing key decision makers and what shapes these time horizons. 
Resource rents have the potential to allow governments to expand 
the public goods they provide without imposing additional taxes; but 
there is tension in decision making because private and public prefer-
ence regarding resource ownership must be balanced, and this tension is 
intensifi ed because of the stakes involved. The tendency of upstream 
decisions to be made by a small cadre of elites often undermines the 
extent to which these decisions are welfare-enhancing for the country as 
a whole. The more resource-dependent the country, the more likely even 
very technical decisions are to rise to the top of the power ladder and 
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become highly politicized. In many political economy settings, natural 
resource rents are used to underpin delicate political bargains. Some-
times these rents take the form of formal side payments to groups with 
the potential to perpetrate violence (North et al. 2007); for example, in 
Chile, the military receives a fi xed share (currently 10 percent) of rents 
from the national mining company. In other cases, political elites siphon 
off resource rents as personal payments, limiting the rent stream chan-
neled on-budget for sustainable development outcomes.
Key Technical Issues in Sector Organization
Different forms of sector organization serve as mechanisms to resolve 
the competing priorities of governments and investors and enable them 
to manage the risks and uncertainties of the extractive industries. In this 
chapter, the focus is on four key dimensions of sector organization and 
their implications for sector governance: (1) the legal and regulatory 
framework, (2) models of ownership in the extractive industries (with an 
emphasis on national oil and mining companies), (3) the allocation of 
rights for exploration and production (oil and gas) or extraction (miner-
als), and (4) the capacity of government agencies tasked with  regulating 
and monitoring the sector.
Legal and Regulatory Framework
Decisions on sector organization are made within the context of a coun-
try’s constitution and the legal and regulatory framework in place for the 
extractive industry in question. Who owns and has rights over subsoil 
natural resources is commonly defi ned at the constitutional level, while 
all other aspects of extractive activities are left for petroleum and mining 
laws to delineate. These sector laws defi ne, for example, whether the state 
has a monopoly on the extractive industries or competitive principles 
are in place, and who is responsible for allocating licenses and monitor-
ing operations, along with the procedures in place. These rules and the 
incentives they create have important implications for the behavior of 
policy makers, bureaucrats, and investors at all stages of natural resource 
management. An enforceable, transparent, and comprehensive regula-
tory framework for natural resource sectors provides a stable and pre-
dictable policy environment. Policy reversals or constant changes to laws 
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and regulations tend to undermine the credibility of the regulatory 
framework, no matter whether the specifi c set of rules devised is most 
benefi cial to investors, government, or society. Yet the legal and contrac-
tual frameworks for extractive industries must be fl exible enough to 
adapt to the exogenous price and production shocks that cyclically affect 
these sectors (Tordo 2007). 
Mongolia’s experience with its evolving legal framework illustrates 
“how sensitive mineral sector investors are about tenure security and 
how easily and quickly positive developments can be reversed if the fun-
damental pillars in mining policy and granting principles are modifi ed” 
(Ortega Girones, Pugachevsky, and Walser 2009, 63–64). As part of its 
political and economic transition from socialism, Mongolia enacted a 
new minerals law in 1997 that was considered extremely attractive to 
investors and thought to embed many good governance hallmarks in the 
minerals sector, including especially a commitment to the fi rst-come, 
fi rst-served principle for granting mineral rights. In 2006, however, the 
minerals law was amended, changing the security of rights tenure and 
creating new risks for license-holders. The 2006 amendments also desig-
nated a category of “strategic deposits” in which the government had the 
right to take a 50 percent equity share in extraction; this marked the 
beginning of a prolonged and energetic public debate about what con-
stituted the government’s and, by extension, citizens’ fair share in the 
 country’s mineral wealth. Commercial activity in the sector was directly 
affected by these changes to the legal framework. The enactment of the 
1997 law marked a clear increase in sector investment and activity. The 
2006 amendment, in turn, has had a negative impact on the sector—
bringing a marked decline in license activity. Mongolia witnessed the 
consequences of this period of investor uncertainty on the predictability 
of mineral sector policy—with activity on the world-class Oyu Tolgoi 
copper deposit halted as a result of the debate on equity share, the 
 country was not positioned to take full fi scal advantage of the most 
recent boom in copper prices. Similarly, since the mid-2000s Bolivia and 
Ecuador have repeatedly introduced changes in their laws governing 
hydrocarbons, triggering renegotiation of contracts and the withdrawal 
of several investors (Cuevas 2009; Toranzo Roca 2009).
The formal rules established by the legal and regulatory frame work 
also interact with informal social norms and traditional codes of 
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 conduct, hence it is important to mention customary or indigenous 
rights to subsoil assets.2 This issue is necessarily setting-specifi c, but 
many countries (including Australia, Canada, the United States, and 
many Latin American nations) must deal with the claims of indigenous 
peoples to “own” mineral or hydrocarbon resources and their conse-
quent demands to have a greater (if not dominant) voice in project 
development and mineral extraction negotiations. A parallel issue is 
the equivalent claim of subnational governments and groups to owner-
ship of natural resource reserves, which has great import in the political 
economy of Nigeria and Iraq, for example. A related debate is whether 
or not a local or affected community, however defi ned, should have a 
veto or at least a stronger voice in project development. Global practice 
in this realm varies a great deal. Serious constitutional issues emerge 
when, as in most countries, the resources are owned by all the nation’s 
people. Increasingly, local communities, whether indigenous or subna-
tional, have been exerting claims to resources and the derivative bene-
fi ts streams, often at loggerheads with central government authorities 
and sometimes having a major effect on macropolitical discourse and 
outcomes in resource-dependent countries. Such issues can constitute 
a key risk for would-be investors and national governments and can 
discourage the development of natural resource sectors. 
Turning back to formal institutional frameworks, the quality and 
consistency of the legal, regulatory, and fi scal frameworks in a country 
have a major infl uence on natural resource management across the 
value chain. Niger’s mining sector legislation is subject to major incon-
sistencies because both its Mining Code of 1993 and its more recent 
Mining Law of 2008 are currently in effect. Moreover, this legislation 
presents key discrepancies with the 2003 Mining Code of the West 
 African  Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), of which Niger is a 
member (Yungu, Chevallier, and Viñuela 2010). As a further example, 
Ghana’s Mining Code confl icts with Ghanain customary law on land 
tenure, creating disputes over access to land, the allocation of responsi-
bilities and benefi ts, and compensation to displaced or affected com-
munities (Ayee et al. 2011). 
In other cases, gaps in legislation or complementary regulations cre-
ate problems throughout exploration and production. The more gaps 
there are in the regulation, the more complex contracts must become, 
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since they must cover issues well beyond the details of a specifi c opera-
tion. Such situations give the government enormous discretion in the 
allocation of extraction rights, but can also enable companies to negoti-
ate overly advantageous terms for themselves. Ghana’s mining code is 
widely considered investor-friendly, but it does not provide guidance on 
social and environmental issues, and these omissions have led to prob-
lems at the local level and growing tensions with local communities 
(Ayee et al. 2011). In some cases, special laws have even been passed to 
satisfy specifi c investors: Niger passed its 2008 Mining Law mainly to 
enable the development of the Imourarem mine, giving special incen-
tives to large investors (Yungu, Chevallier, and Viñuela 2010).
Finally, enforcement of the legal and regulatory regime can be 
unpredictable, or worse, nonexistent. In many of the country studies 
for this volume, provisions penalizing companies for violating terms of 
the regulation and contracts were found to be seldom enforced. In 
Ghana, companies’ uncertainty regarding environmental and commu-
nity health and safety issues has led to contracts having to be treated on 
a case-by-case basis and has created considerable regulatory capture 
risks. Moreover, in spite of extensive evidence of health and safety 
problems, environmental damage, child labor, and other infringements, 
few companies, across this study’s cases, have been fi ned or have had 
their licenses revoked as a consequence. Even in countries where regu-
latory reform appeared to have achieved salutary outcomes, good-
practice institutional design is always vulnerable to renewed political 
interference (see box 3.1). 
Models of Natural Resource Ownership
Ownership of natural resources and extraction or production rights can 
be shared between governments and investors in different ways, each 
type of arrangement having implications for the relative ability of gov-
ernments and investors to structure sector institutions and governance 
(Jones Luong and Weinthal 2006). The countries examined for this study 
exhibit different levels of participation of state-owned and private fi rms 
in the exploration and production of minerals. Ownership models in the 
extractive industries are determined by the attractiveness and stability of 
regulatory and fi scal regimes, past decisions on structuring the sector, 
and the instruments used to allocate rights and licenses.
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With few exceptions, developing countries in which state-owned 
enterprises are the major operators in the natural resource sector tend 
to face the problem of insuffi cient reinvestment to sustain exploration 
activities, as well as a lack of technical capacity. In Mexico, no major oil 
discovery has been recorded since the early 1980s. Despite being the 
Box 3.1 Mining Code Reform and Political Interference in Madagascar
With Madagascar being rich in precious gemstones, rising prices and improvements in exploration 
in the early 2000s initiated a major mining boom. A new mining code adopted in 1999 also laid the 
foundation for sector governance, creating the Mining Cadastre Offi ce (BCMM) as an arm’s length 
agency under the Ministry of Mines to prevent political interference. Most signifi cantly, perhaps, 
the BCMM replaced a discretionary system of mining permit management with a transparent, 
fi rst-come, fi rst-served principle. The code was completed in 2002 with the adoption of a special 
legal framework for large-scale mining investments, providing a privileged tax regime for projects 
above a specifi c investment threshold, along with a 40-year guarantee of the fi scal regime in place 
at the time of the extraction permit. The move toward greater transparency in mining rights 
management was associated with a surge of demand for exploration permits. 
Evidence suggests that until 2005, the mining rights allocation process scrupulously followed 
existing regulations. But since 2006, repeated political interference in mining rights management, 
sometimes in open violation of existing regulations, has called into question the transparent, fi rst-
come, fi rst-served governance of mining rights, as shown in the following examples: 
•  Eighty-six mining squares in a gold-rich area were given to an entity under the control of the 
military by presidential order, violating transparency.
•  The permit allocation process was de facto frozen from January to December 2007, putting a 
hold on new exploration in a period of high international investor interest.
•  A transparent permit auction for iron ore deposits in the Soalala region in 2008 was diverted 
into a discretionary process, screening out most interested bidders by requiring high upfront 
payments. Only three bidders stayed in, and negotiations between government and interested 
parties have been opaque.
•  The transition government doubled the mining administration fee in 2010, disregarding the pro-
visions of the mining code. 
•  Research permits for large surface areas have been allocated nontransparently to single compa-
nies, disrespecting legal ceilings on holder concentration. There is a formal ceiling on the number 
of permits a single company can hold, but there are examples of this rule being circumvented 
by registering a single company under different names. 
Following the 2009 political crisis, the permit management process appears to have reverted 
further back to discretionary management. The BCMM appears to have de facto lost its permit 
allocation function since now these decisions are made directly by the Ministry of Mines. Alleg-
edly, approximately 1,200 older applications and another 2,500 new applications currently remain 
on standby. According to insiders, in at least one case, a large number of mining permits might 
have been allocated to a foreign company in disregard of procedures, following political interfer-
ence and supposedly involving high bribe payments.
Source: Adapted from World Bank 2010.
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fourth-largest oil producer in the world and one of the most highly 
vertically integrated, PEMEX has neither the capital nor the technical 
expertise needed to exploit gas and deep-water offshore oil fi elds (Webb 
2010). Similarly, Chile’s CODELCO has problems raising revenues for 
new projects and exploring new areas (Navia 2009). Bolivia’s YPFB, 
though established in 1937, only started operating fi elds previously run 
by private companies in 2000. Since then, it has not conducted any 
exploration or maintenance activities, and private investment in explo-
ration has fallen to a quarter of the initial level (Toranzo Roca 2009). 
High costs, overemployment, above-market pay, and low productiv-
ity are also commonly observed when state ownership levels are high, as 
many of the state-owned enterprises in the countries studied for this 
volume illustrate. The practice of establishing state-owned enterprises 
creates powerful organizations, subsidiary companies, and unions, which 
can and do use their resources and mobilization capacity to acquire 
political capital and prevent major reforms. Moreover, high state par-
ticipation can crowd out private investments in the sector, reducing the 
overall level of investment as well as the level of competition. 
Some countries have mitigated the problems of state ownership by 
entering into joint ventures with private partners and opening new areas 
for competitive exploration. Trinidad and Tobago’s national oil company 
PETROTRIN relies heavily on foreign corporations to raise the capital 
and expertise needed to extract offshore resources, mainly through joint 
ventures. The Trinidadian government offers incentives for private invest-
ments and uses its own capital to signal the genuineness of its commit-
ments (Webb 2010). In contrast, the Chilean government, unable to 
inject capital into CODELCO, allowed private investments in the sector 
with generous tax incentives. While the best areas with known reserves 
continue to belong to the state-owned company, the stable policy envi-
ronment that has characterized the country since the 1990s has attracted 
important investments; currently, two-thirds of copper exports are made 
by private companies (Navia 2009).
In addition to economic effi ciency and competitiveness concerns, 
high turnover in senior management, politicization of appointments, 
and political interference in management decisions introduce additional 
considerations in the governance of state-owned companies. These fea-
tures are emblematic of public offi cials’ practice of using national oil or 
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mining companies to reward clients with jobs and contracts, common 
practice in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico (Toranzo Roca 2009; Cuevas 
2009; Diaz-Cayeros 2009, respectively). Some of the most severe exam-
ples of political interference and confl ict of interest are found in DRC 
and Niger. In DRC, investors with interests in the sector are frequently 
appointed as senior managers at Geçamines, the country’s mining com-
pany (Chevallier and Kaiser 2010). The company’s board is directly 
appointed by the president, who balances the representation of different 
elite groups, and is subject to little or no oversight by the parliament. A 
panel of experts established by the United Nations identifi ed such prac-
tices as interlinked with asset-stripping of the company through part-
nership agreements, control of procurement and accounting, theft, and 
use of the corporate facade for other illegal activities. Similarly, Niger’s 
offi ce of the president directly selects the board members of the coun-
try’s national mining company, SOPAMIN, and confl icts of interest are 
rife (Chevallier and Kaiser 2010). In addition, legislators and other 
high-ranking public offi cials are often traders in the sector or on the 
payroll of mining companies.
Moreover, in cases in which the executive has the discretionary power 
to remove the management, the credibility of state-owned companies to 
enter in long-term contracts and joint ventures with private partners is 
compromised. In Chile, for example, the mining law allows CODELCO 
to enter into contracts with private investors, but managers lack autono-
mous decision-making power because they can be removed at the presi-
dent’s discretion (Webb 2010). Consequently, the company faces prob-
lems raising capital and expanding production areas.
National oil companies (NOCs) gained prevalence in developing 
countries with petroleum resources in the 1970s, as governments sought 
to increase their control over the petroleum sector and its rents through 
direct participation. NOCs are common to almost all major oil-produc-
ing developing countries and, because of their prevalence and centrality 
to the management of hydrocarbon resources, they are worth examining 
in more detail. Five of the six petroleum producers in the sample studied 
here have NOCs (see appendix), and the sixth, Timor-Leste, is currently 
planning to establish its own (Anderson, Barma, and Porter 2010). In 
general, NOCs are expected to perform well commercially while also car-
rying out a number of noncommercial activities such as policy making, 
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regulatory, and sometimes even public investment roles. The World Bank’s 
Oil, Gas, and Mining Division recently completed a major comparative 
study of about three dozen national oil companies around the world 
(Tordo, Tracy, and Arfaa 2010), which emphasized that, unlike  private oil 
companies, NOCs are driven by considerations beyond  shareholder 
return. These motives include rent capture for the state (including through 
better domestic exploration and extraction), as well as achieving national 
developmental priorities, building local capacity, and enhancing domestic 
industry involvement in the processing of petroleum products. If a NOC 
exists, it frequently plays a major role in managing both the petroleum 
sector itself and subsequent development outcomes; that is, NOCs are 
commonly expected to operate both upstream in exploration and pro-
duction and downstream in petroleum refi ning and marketing (McPher-
son 2003). More than 100 NOCs worldwide are estimated to control 
around 80 percent of known oil reserves and account for about three-
quarters of global production (McPherson 2003). Given their prevalence 
and their handling of a huge volume of public revenues, governance of 
these companies has important consequences for the overall quality of 
petroleum sector management.3
When a country chooses to structure its natural resources sectors 
using a national company, it can implement certain principles of gover-
nance to enhance sector management.4 For example, the “Norwegian 
model” of petroleum sector governance may be appropriate for other 
countries. Norway administers its petroleum sector using three distinct 
agencies: a national oil company, Statoil, that engages in commercial oil 
and gas operations; a government ministry that sets policy; and a regula-
tory body that provides oversight and technical expertise. Benefi ts from 
this separation of functions include more focus on commercial com-
petitiveness by the NOC combined with better performance through 
independent regulation; reduction of potential confl icts of interest and 
prevention of state capture (and the tendency of NOCs to become a 
“state within a state”); and the fostering of innovation and checks and 
balances against poor decisions (Thurber, Hults, and Heller 2010). 
Among countries with NOCs, Algeria, Brazil, Colombia, Nigeria, and 
Peru (among others) have attempted to empower an autonomous 
agency within government with responsibilities for policy and regula-
tion (Stanford University 2010). Nigeria tried but failed to separate 
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 sector management functions, and how this failure unfolded is particu-
larly instructive from a political economy perspective (Gboyega et al. 
2010; Thurber, Hults, and Heller 2010). The organization of the Nige-
rian oil sector in the early 1970s looked remarkably like the Norwegian 
model: the original NOC, the Nigerian National Oil Company (NNOC), 
was created in 1971; the Ministry of Mines and Power made policy; and 
the Department of Petroleum Resources managed regulatory affairs. 
But this separation of functions rapidly deteriorated under a powerful 
permanent secretary at the ministry who could subdue both his NNOC 
and regulatory counterparts. In response to extremely poor outcomes in 
the sector in the 1970s, the government decided to consolidate the coun-
try’s limited human and institutional resources in the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), combining the regulatory and com-
mercial functions. Formal regulatory independence was reestablished in 
the 1980s, removed in 1998, then instituted again in 1999. Yet the Depart-
ment of Petroleum Resources, even when formally empowered, has been 
unable to effectively oversee the oil sector. As Thurber, Hults, and Heller 
(2010, 13) found: “The principal reason is that Nigeria’s political system 
is built around a patronage network fueled by oil revenue, and those in 
power have been disinclined to support the development of a truly 
autonomous regulator that could constrain their ability to distribute 
spoils to kin and associates.” These same patronage dynamics can be 
seen in many other cases, undermining attempts to assert regulatory 
oversight and policy independence and thereby contributing to poor 
sector performance.
The benefi ts of the separation of functions notwithstanding, it may 
be that in resource-dependent developing countries—particularly those 
with low levels of human capacity and technical knowledge of the petro-
leum industry—consolidating the commercial, policy, and regulatory 
functions in one body may yield better outcomes (for example, Sonan-
gol in Angola, Petronas in Malaysia, and PDVSA in República de 
 Bolivariana Venezuela). Sonangol has facilitated the building of a very 
productive petroleum sector as one entity that operates as commercial 
operator, sector manager, and regulator (Hansen and Soares de Oliveira 
2009; Thurber, Hults, and Heller 2010). This success is in part explained 
by Angola’s historical lack of political competition and its consistent 
investment in domestic capacity. In the face of civil war, members of the 
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ruling Angolan elite formed a tightly knit, homogeneous leadership that 
was able to assert a united vision for the country’s development, which 
in turn was implemented by close allies at Sonangol.
Ten of the 13 cases in the study sample have national oil or mining 
companies. The extent to which they observe principles of good corpo-
rate governance or achieve important outcomes like reinvestment in the 
sector varies a great deal, as illustrated in table 3.1.
In many developing countries, NOCs have become the focal point 
for a broad range of national economic and industrial development 
 initiatives that go well beyond a focus on the petroleum sector. Such 
activities are more usually and appropriately carried out by govern-
ments, but “NOCs have been enlisted to perform them because of the 
cash they control, and because of their perceived capacity, a perception 
that . . . is probably true in relative terms.” (McPherson 2003, 6). Elites 
have resorted to numerous mechanisms to assert political control over 
NOCs, decreasing transparency and diluting accountability in the pro-
cess. Moreover, these poor forms of sector governance within NOCs 
have in turn fed back into and facilitated an erosion in the quality of 
national governance.
Allocation of Exploration and Production and Extraction Rights
Countries allocate exploration and production (petroleum) or extrac-
tion (minerals) rights for the extractive industries in a variety of ways.5 
In allocating these rights, governments try to optimize results by bal-
ancing effi ciency maximization, and hence wealth creation, against 
fl exibility, or the ability to retain discretion in how resource rents are 
created and distributed. Most countries choose a system that operates 
somewhere in between, by either (1) direct negotiation between the 
state and interested producers through solicited or unsolicited chan-
nels, sometimes called “open door” systems, or (2) criteria-based licens-
ing via open bidding rounds in petroleum or the fi rst-come, fi rst-served 
principle in mining, where the criteria for license awards can vary but 
are made public.6 The former maximizes government discretion and 
fl exibility, while the latter—depending on the design and clarity of 
parameters—enhances transparency and effi ciency. An auction model 
for criteria-based licensing has a number of infl uential proponents 
among development partners and natural resource sector experts. 
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Table 3.1. National Oil and Mining Company Characteristics in the Study Sample
Country
Oil/Mineral 
Revenues as % of 







Angola 83.6 Sonangol 84.5 Medium High High Yes
Bolivia 26 YPFB — Low Low Low Yes
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2.4 Gécamines — Low Low Low Yes
Chile 22.73 CODELCO 36.6 Medium Medium Medium No
Ecuador 49 Petroecuador 52 Low Low Low Yes
Ghana 13 GNPC 54.4 Low Low Low Yes
Mexico 35.59 PEMEX 31 Medium Low Medium No
Niger 42 SOPAMIN — Low Low Low Yes
Nigeria 83.69 NNPC 85 Low Low Low Yes
Trinidad and Tobago 57.77 Petrotrin, NGC 68.2 High High High No
Source: Authors’ compilation from IMF Article IV Consultations; Tordo, Johnston, and Johnston 2009; Otto and Andrews 2006; and case studies.
Note: — = not available.
a. This can be a misleading statistic to gauge a country’s resource-dependence, because it relies on the government’s ability to collect revenues from the sector. DRC, for example, is far 
more resource-rich and resource-dependent than the 2.4 percent fi gure suggests; the low number is a direct result of high rent leakage and the government’s excessively weak capacity 
to assess and collect mineral revenues.
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The rationale is that by fostering competition, auctions force fi rms to 
reveal the true value of the natural resource for which they are bidding; 
the increased transparency that results can in turn prevent the corrup-
tion that often accompanies noncompetitive allocation of contracts 
(Collier 2008; 2010a). 
The countries studied under this project show signifi cant variation 
across the following contracting and licensing dimensions: transparency 
in procedures for awarding exploration licenses and production con-
tracts; degree of competition in the allocation of permits; and the proce-
dures used to prequalify bidders or applicants. A lack of transparency in 
procedures for allocating contracts, including secrecy and revolving-door 
policies, is a major problem for the development of the sector that has 
consequences for all other links of the value chain and hence the govern-
ment’s ability to transform resource rents into developmental riches. In 
DRC and Lao PDR, for example, exploration and extraction rights are 
commonly allocated on a discretionary basis without a bidding proce-
dure instead of by employing a fi rst-come, fi rst-served system that oper-
ates on more competitive principles. Adding to this problem, the major-
ity of deals are secret (Ayee et al. 2011; Chevallier and Kaiser 2010; Barma, 
Fritz, and Rex 2010). In many countries, award rules give competitive 
advantages, or even access to confi dential information, to preferred com-
panies. In Nigeria, for example, certain companies are sometimes given 
the “right of fi rst refusal” for oil blocks, which allows them to put in the 
winning bid after the bidding round is offi cially closed (Gboyega et al. 
2010). Other awards have been allocated directly, with the government 
invoking extraordinary circumstances to avoid holding competitive 
 procedures. Another problem observed in countries that use bidding or 
auctions is a lack of adequate prequalifi cation rules or stringent require-
ments for companies making an offer. In Nigeria and Niger, the absence 
of minimal prescreening of bidders has created enormous opportunities 
for speculation as companies with neither the credentials nor the capac-
ity to explore were given blocks that they then sold later at a higher price 
(Yungu, Chevallier, and Viñuela 2010; Gboyega et al. 2010). 
In some cases, contracts are awarded as the result of bilateral negotia-
tions among heads of state or as a result of the direct intervention of 
political economic elites from other countries. Unsurprisingly, these proj-
ects then receive special treatment, with feasibility and  environmental 
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evaluations either fast-tracked or ignored. In other cases, the repayment 
of investments is guaranteed by the awarding government. The resource-
rich host country usually receives bilateral aid from the investor coun-
try or infrastructure to complement the projects in an exchange termed 
a “bundled resource-for-infrastructure deal.” Chinese government-
backed investors are increasingly prevalent partners in such deals across 
Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. One potential positive result of 
such deals between sovereign or sovereign-backed entities is that they 
may help to resolve credibility issues and improve the enforcement of 
intertemporal cooperation and commitments. Note that, from a full 
value chain perspective, such bundled deals, particularly on the African 
continent, represent an “institutional technology” for resolving the 
broader inability of governments—in the face of the challenges around 
intertemporal cooperation and political inclusion—to transform 
resource rents into infrastructure. (This subject is discussed further in 
chapter 5.)
Policy failures in the contract negotiation and award stage will be 
closely related to weak transparency and accountability in the political 
system and the public sector writ large, but often the consequences are 
more acute in the mineral sector than in oil and gas. Even after initial 
resource discovery has occurred, the quality and quantity of mineral 
assets in abutting cadastral areas are more uncertain than those of hydro-
carbon stores in adjoining blocks. Moreover, the structure of the global 
mining industry is subject to greater information asymmetries, since it is 
common for junior companies to take on exploration and then resell the 
rights for extraction to majors once a discovery has been made. This 
practice generates a rent stream from the majors to the minors that can 
be substantial and rarely benefi ts the host country.
Technical Capacity of Sector Agencies
In countries with weak governance and institutional quality, sector min-
istries and agencies seldom have adequate capacity to properly regulate 
and monitor exploration and production. Ambiguous or ill-defi ned 
 legislative mandates and other organizational weakness often refl ect and 
magnify the perverse incentives embedded within the broader political 
economy context. A variety of problems are commonly observed with 
institutional quality in public agencies tasked with natural resource 
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 management. Institutional redundancy, or overlapping institutional 
mandates, and weak coordination among public agencies and offi cials 
constitute a major obstacle to the effective management and regulation 
of the natural resource sectors. Ghana, for example, has more than half 
a dozen institutions with jurisdiction over land ownership, while Niger 
has two environmental agencies. DRC is an example of little coordina-
tion even among members of the same agencies. In Lao PDR, the lead or 
coordinating agency for the minerals sector is the Ministry of Planning 
and Investment, instead of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, but it is 
the latter in which technical capacity and monitoring responsibilities 
are vested (Barma, Fritz, and Rex 2010). In each of these settings, unclear 
and overlapping institutional mandates often mean, paradoxically, that 
no one agency is responsible for and can be held accountable for natural 
resource management. 
Political interference throughout the natural resource management 
value chain is pervasive in resource-dependent developing countries. 
Even in countries where an independent regulatory agency is clearly 
empowered on paper, its functions are often hampered by political inter-
ference. Key positions in sector agencies, including regulatory bodies, are 
fi lled with political appointees with little sector background, in countries 
including DRC, Ghana, Mongolia, Niger, Nigeria, and Timor-Leste. 
Sector ministries and agencies often lack independent and adequate bud-
gets, worsening the impact of political involvement (Ayee et al. 2011; 
 Chevallier and Kaiser 2010). Often, the government agencies in charge of 
the contracting and licensing processes are staffed by political appoin-
tees, and contract negotiations are conducted as much through informal 
channels as via the designated processes. In Mongolia, for example, the 
head of the Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia 
(MRPAM) has been replaced more than fi ve times in the past decade, 
and there is a high level of discretion in the license allocation process, 
resulting in weaker credibility and transparency in the license allocation 
 system. In Ghana, similarly, the government controls the selection of 
members to special commissions in the minerals sector, appointing indi-
viduals on the basis of political loyalty rather than merit and integrity. 
Such problems are by no means exclusive to the natural resource sectors 
in developing countries but, as discussed in chapter 2, can have particu-
larly deleterious effects because of the massive stream of rents involved.
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Sector agencies face severe problems in attracting, training, and 
retaining specialized personnel. In addition, they often are not provided 
with suffi cient resources to conduct onsite monitoring of exploration or 
extraction sites. DRC’s Directorate of Mines has 30 staff with no logisti-
cal support, laboratories, or vehicles (Chevallier and Kaiser 2010). Niger’s 
Ministry of Mining and Energy has 23 engineers supervising mining 
projects and 30 oil exploration sites; it even relies on private extractive 
companies to provide government engineers with training and some-
times transportation to the sites (Yungu, Chevallier, and Viñuela 2010). 
In Lao PDR, government offi cials monitoring major mining projects are 
provided room and board and sometimes even salary supplements by 
the private companies, raising concerns about confl icts of interest 
(Barma, Fritz, and Rex 2010). In the other countries in the study, the 
administrative quality of regulatory agencies is equally weak due to low 
human capacity and the lack of salary competitiveness. As is the case 
with national oil companies or other state-owned enterprises involved in 
resource extraction, sector agencies experience high turnover in senior 
management, further weakening institutional capacity. 
These problems of political interference and weak technical capacity 
are compounded by a lack of effective oversight from either the legisla-
ture or civil society organizations. Even in countries like DRC where 
there has been successful dissemination of information about the cor-
rupt practices of government offi cials and mining sector investors, civil 
society groups continue to face obstacles to being able to have mean-
ingful input into or oversight of contract negotiations. Together these 
factors make the sector agencies unable to resist political and external 
pressures, they increase transaction costs for operators, and they multi-
ply the opportunities for administrative corruption and state capture. 
In short, each of these problems represents a leakage of resource rents 
into ineffi ciencies or private pockets, rather than being channeled into 
developmental riches.
Political Economy Settings and Dynamics
In making decisions about sector organization—the structure and con-
tent of the legal and regulatory framework, models of ownership, and how 
licenses are allocated and sector agencies organized and staffed—political 
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elites respond to distinctive patterns of underlying political economy 
incentives and dynamics. These upstream dynamics are presented 
here using the typology of the four political economy settings pre-
sented in chapter 2, along the axes of intertemporal cooperation and 
political inclusiveness (table 3.2). In this context, the paradoxes char-
acterized in this chapter—regarding policy predictability, intertem-
poral commitment problems, and private versus public calculus—
manifest themselves in different ways across the four types of political 
economy settings. Also discussed here are political economy factors 
particularly relevant to the upstream part of the value chain, includ-
ing narratives of sovereignty and ownership of natural resource assets, 
and particular forms of risk and uncertainty in the extractive indus-
tries sector.
Political economy settings of patrimonial rule are characterized by few 
restraints on the exercise of power and weak enforcement of intertempo-
ral commitments. Predictability of policy making and implementation 
will be extremely low in these countries, with investors experiencing a 
Table 3.2. Political Economy Contexts and Upstream Dynamics
Political 
inclusiveness
Credibility of intertemporal commitment




Patrimonial rule: Individualized 
political authority; crony hierarchy; 
few restraints on power
• Extremely low predictability; high risk 
to contractual stability 
• Extreme time inconsistency— 
obsolescing bargain acute
• High private rent-seeking, more 
arbitrary 
Hegemonic government: Institutional-
ized one-party regime; either predatory 
or benevolent
• Moderate predictability; lower risk to 
contractual stability
• More time consistency—obsolescing 
bargain managed





Clientelist pluralism: Political 
competition based on extensive 
use of clientelism/patronage
• Low predictability; some risk to 
contractual stability
• High time inconsistency—
obsolescing bargain acute
• Less private rent-seeking (some 
political side payments)
Programmatic pluralism: Electoral 
competition based on programs; 
horizontal and vertical accountability
• Higher predictability; little risk to 
contractual stability
• More time consistency—obsolescing 
bargain managed
• Little private rent-seeking; emphasis 
on rent-sharing 
Source: Authors.
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high risk that contracts will be unstable, and consequently demanding 
better contractual terms in order to operate in such environments. Because 
of truncated time horizons and low political inclusiveness, elites have the 
incentive to enrich themselves as much as possible in the short term. In 
other words, because elites cannot know how far into the future they will 
be in power and therefore able to continue to secure private benefi ts, they 
engage in a high degree of rent-seeking in the present. These are  settings 
of extremely low institutionalization, where risk premiums for operating 
extractive industries are very high and reforms of extractive industries 
governance are extremely challenging. 
Decision makers facing shorter time horizons highly discount future 
payments and prefer rewards in the current time period. These time 
horizons are in turn infl uenced by structural factors such as the nature of 
the regime or electoral system and expectations about future conditions 
such as projections of resource wealth (contingent on both production 
volumes and commodity prices) or the likelihood of maintaining power. 
When political elites face short time horizons, they are less likely to put 
in place transparent upstream processes and regulatory architecture, as 
evidenced in DRC and Niger, for example. Political incumbents with 
such time limitations, such as those worried about being replaced at the 
polls, may display strong preferences for signing bonuses and other 
upfront payments, in lieu of agreements that would increase govern-
ment take in the future (Dunning 2008b). 
In settings of both patrimonial rule and clientelist pluralism (that is, 
the left side of the table), commitment problems are intense and, as a 
result, time inconsistency is acute. The credibility of government’s 
commitment in turn affects the quality of any deals that can be struck 
from the government’s perspective. If a commitment is more credible, 
investors see that the bargains reached have longer time horizons and 
thus can offer the government better terms. If the credibility of the 
government’s commitment is poor, on the other hand, this results in a 
lower quality equilibrium with relatively less attractive terms. More-
over, this is a dynamic process that shifts over time, with actions in the 
current time period affecting expectations and outcomes in the next 
time period and later. A vicious cycle often develops in settings where 
intertemporal bargains are only weakly enforced, as a government 
(particularly a new government) may seek to unravel what it views as 
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the unfair terms of a previous agreement, leading to the further under-
mining of commitments over time. 
The particular commitment problem common in the natural 
resources sector in such settings has been defi ned as the “obsolescing 
bargain” between government and (particularly multinational) inves-
tors (Vernon 1971). At the start of a project’s life cycle, investors typi-
cally exercise substantial leverage in extracting favorable terms from the 
host government: on one hand, they face substantial geological risks 
and, on the other hand, they possess the required capital and technical 
skills to initiate exploration and extraction. Once production or extrac-
tion has actually begun, however, the bargaining power shifts to the 
government side, raising the political and fi nancial risks to investors 
even as geological risks decline. At this point, investors have consider-
able sunk costs and governments have signifi cantly increased leverage to 
renegotiate the terms of contracts. The ability and desire of govern-
ments to violate or subvert production agreements depend on other 
factors—global commodity prices, the timing of election cycles, popu-
lar sentiment on rights to a “resource dividend,” and so on—but the fact 
remains that over time the government has increased leverage to change 
the terms of the deal. Outright expropriation of extractive industry 
operations through nationalization is the extreme embodiment of this 
phenomenon; however, in many other cases, more subtle shifts to con-
tract terms can occur. 
The obsolescing bargain problem is worst in settings of patrimonial 
rule and can be almost as acute in countries characterized by clientelist 
pluralism. In the latter, commitment problems in general can be inten-
sifi ed by the pressures of nascent political competition, particularly 
emergent narratives of sovereignty over natural resource wealth. In 
Mongolia, for example, the commodity price boom interacted with the 
electoral cycle in such a way that the two most recent elections were held 
in an atmosphere of heightened awareness of the mining sector, with 
party platforms and subsequent government policy interconnected with 
the political economy of that sector. As a result of this activated demand 
to secure the national interest, the government sought to adapt the 
 minerals law and attain a higher state equity share in the world-class 
Oyu  Tolgoi copper mine. Investors in the mine resisted fi nalizing the 
deal on extraction terms with the government until public and political 
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clamor for a “fair share” for Mongolia had quieted down during the most 
recent global fi nancial crisis (Finch 2009). Similar narratives have also 
been used at the subnational level, with impacts on intergovernmental 
relations; as the cases of Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria illustrate, high com-
modity prices have ignited demand from local governments in resource-
dependent subnational regions to increase their share of the revenues 
derived from extractive industries. 
On the right side of table 3.2, by contrast, there is a much lower degree 
of time inconsistency in countries with hegemonic government or pro-
grammatic pluralism. Investors in Lao PDR, for example, where the 
 government is perceived as relatively nontransparent, have been able 
to make relatively longer-term deals with the state on the basis of their 
confi dence in the regime’s stability and developmental orientation 
(Barma, Fritz, and Rex 2010). In Angola, the track record between the 
national oil company, Sonangol, and the government has proven their 
ability to make and enforce credible deals with investors (Hansen and 
Soares de Oliveira 2009), which illustrates that a virtuous circle of gov-
ernment credibility can develop. In such hegemonic governments, how-
ever, the benefi ts of secure contracts and greater investment in the 
extractive industries are often captured by a relatively small elite, often 
anecdotally, through confl icts of interest in the contracting system or 
backroom deals and kickbacks on contracts. It is important to note that 
the fl ow of resource wealth itself has consequences for the distribution 
of political and economic power in a country. Newly empowered actors 
(for example, domestic investors, often building on success in other sec-
tors, such as construction companies in Lao PDR entering the mining 
sector) may fi nd it in their best interests to demand changes to the insti-
tutional arrangements in place (Dunning 2008b), which, in cooperation 
with hegemonic governments, can concentrate wealth and benefi ts even 
further in the hands of the few. 
In contrast, in programmatic democracies, investors can rely more on 
the fi rm checks and balances offered by vertical and horizontal systems 
of accountability—including checks on executive power by the legisla-
ture, bureaucracy, and judiciary, and the population’s oversight of gov-
ernment through elections and civil society—to enforce intertemporal 
commitments that are, in addition, relatively more welfare-enhancing 
for society at large. These institutionalized mechanisms of enforcement, 
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of both time consistency and political inclusiveness with public goods 
provision, also mean that the predictability of policy, and hence contrac-
tual stability, is much higher in programmatic democracies. 
Policy Implications and Potential Interventions
The premise of this volume is that using a positive analytical framework 
to understand how political dynamics shape certain outcomes, as out-
lined in the examples above, enables us to prescribe incentive-compati-
ble, or “good enough,” interventions to enhance sector governance. As 
emphasized in chapter 2, some reform measures may be targeted at 
enhancing the performance of sector organizations, given the political 
and institutional constraints at hand. In addition, more ambitious pro-
grams sometimes aim to transform underlying incentives and move 
countries to a higher-level equilibrium. Presented here is an initial set of 
such good-fi t interventions, focusing on the three paradoxes of predict-
ability, time consistency, and private versus public calculus, showing how 
they play out differently in the four political economy settings. Table 3.3 
outlines possible good-fi t innovations for each environment.
Proposed are potential incentive-compatible reforms for various 
dimensions of sector organization, including emphasizing legal and reg-
ulatory clarity, building intertemporal fl exibility into contract terms, 
easing information asymmetries in contract negotiations, disclosing the 
terms of extractive contracts, building sector capacity in various ways, 
and minimizing discretion in the license award process. 
Legal and Regulatory Clarity
Achieving consistency and predictability of political and policy decisions 
with regard to natural resources may be more sustainable and welfare-
enhancing in the long run than emphasizing the most welfare-enhancing 
solution at any given moment. In this respect, a clear, simple, and 
 nondiscretionary legal and regulatory framework is a crucial factor for 
attracting foreign investment.7 Such a framework is particularly impor-
tant in settings of patrimonial rule and clientelist pluralism. In these set-
tings, weak enforcement is a major constraint, hence the simpler the 
legal and regulatory framework and, especially, the more clear-cut its 
assignment of responsibility and accountability to specifi c sectoral agen-
cies, the more outcomes can be improved.
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Intertemporal Flexibility
How can the risks associated with the obsolescing bargain be mitigated? 
To relieve some of the pressures of short time horizons, and the instability 
they engender over time, it may be possible to build some degree of inter-
temporal fl exibility into the terms of deals or contracts. In other words, 
contracts could contain clauses that permit governments and investors to 
agree to change the terms of the deal, for example, based on shocks in 
commodity prices. This issue is discussed further in chapter 4, since it is 
often the terms of the fi scal regime that would have to be renegotiated. 
Similarly, international development organizations have attempted to 
Table 3.3. “Good Fit” Upstream Innovation for Resource-Dependent Countries
Political 
inclusiveness
Credibility of intertemporal commitment




Patrimonial rule: Individualized political 
authority; crony hierarchy; 
few restraints on power 
• Simple, nondiscretionary legal and 
regulatory framework
• Checks and balances in decision-
making about license allocation; 
minimize discretion
• Empower nonexecutive stakeholders 
(legislature, civil society) with oversight 
powers
• Ease information asymmetries through 
geological surveys, model production-
sharing contracts, etc.
Hegemonic government: Institutional-
ized one-party regime; either predatory 
or benevolent
• Sector agency capacity-building 
(enclaving capacity in key agencies)
• Automation of objective steps in 
license allocation, minimizing 
discretion
• Empower nonexecutive stakeholders 
(legislature, civil society) with 
oversight powers
• Emphasize checks on executive power 




Clientelist pluralism: Political 
competition based on extensive use 
of clientelism/patronage
• Simple, nondiscretionary legal and 
regulatory framework
• Sector agency capacity-building 
(building incentives and coalitions for 
administrative reform and investments 
in capacity)
• Checks and balances in decision 
making about license allocation
• Mitigate risks associated with 
obsolescing bargain through inter-
temporal fl exibility on contract terms
• Ease information asymmetries through 
contract disclosure
Programmatic pluralism: Electoral 
competition based on programs; 
horizontal and vertical accountability
• Automation of objective steps in 
license allocation
• Separation of functions across organs 
of government, relying on horizontal 
checks and balances
• Full contract disclosure to enable 
monitoring by nonexecutive organs of 
government and civil society
Source: Authors.
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intervene to mitigate political risk in some countries, but the results have 
been mixed. In its Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, the World Bank 
attempted to tie the Chad government to earmarking a specifi c portion of 
revenues to poverty reduction as part of an aid package to help the land-
locked country develop its oil industry; however, in a sharp example of 
the obsolescing bargain, the government reneged on the deal once the oil 
started fl owing. In Lao PDR, on the other hand, the World Bank has led a 
group of donors in supporting the Nam Theun II (NT2) hydropower 
project. Development partners have successfully assisted the government 
in developing what are known as the NT2 Revenue Management Arrange-
ments to channel a portion of revenues to priority sectors, including 
health and education; the partners have further provided risk insurance 
to the consortium of private donors to guard against, among other forms 
of risk, sovereign default.8 
Easing Information Asymmetries
Development partners can play a role as third-party brokers in extractive 
industry contract negotiations to help to ease information asymmetries, 
or mismatches in the information available to different parties about 
issues like geological prospects, legal arrangements, and market condi-
tions. Such efforts can enhance time consistency, improve predictability, 
and reduce the risks that investors face, thereby assisting client countries 
in securing better resource extraction deals for themselves. Several dimen-
sions of contract negotiation and license allocation are amenable to 
greater transparency and more information-sharing. For example, donors 
might support geological surveys as an entry point, helping to make more 
geological information available to all parties about potential mineral 
reserves; this occurred in the World Bank–DfID (UK Department for 
International Development) Promines project in DRC. 
Often, investors have more private information about petroleum and 
mineral reserves, so governments can benefi t a great deal from more infor-
mation before entering contract negotiations; for example, Brazil’s invest-
ment in greater information on hydrocarbon reserves enabled the country 
to secure better extraction deals. At the same time, safeguard mechanisms 
should be put in place to ensure that the information is used adequately 
from the perspective of the collective good. The easing of information 
asymmetries is important in all types of political economy settings, but 
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could be of particular value in settings of patrimonial rule and clientelist 
pluralism as a mechanism to both enhance predictability and reduce time 
inconsistency, as well as to help diminish the impunity with which politi-
cal and economic elites are able to pocket natural resource rents. 
Disclosing Contract Terms
Development partners can also persuade governments to disclose the 
terms of extractive contracts. This is an issue in which international 
nongovernmental organizations such as Oxfam International, Revenue 
Watch, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative play an 
important role (Rosenblum and Maples 2009). Contract disclosure 
achieves a number of interrelated goals. First, it enables all government 
agencies to know and play their respective roles in monitoring and 
inspection in the natural resource sectors. Poor monitoring can result 
from government agencies tasked with the responsibility not even being 
privy to the contract terms they are supposed to be overseeing, as is 
the case in Lao PDR (Barma, Fritz, and Rex 2010). Second, contract dis-
closure is a fi rst and necessary step in enabling civil society and non- 
executive organs of government to exercise oversight in the extractive 
industries as well. Third, it reduces information asymmetries between 
governments and investors, which helps bolster credibility and predict-
ability over time and usually improves the deals that governments can 
make. One mechanism to achieve contract disclosure is to use model 
production-sharing contracts such that the bulk of terms are essentially 
standardized, as Timor-Leste did with encouragement from its develop-
ment partners (Anderson, Barma, and Porter 2010).
Sector Capacity-Building
Sector capacity-building is a more conventional, yet still important, 
intervention for improving outcomes in upstream natural resource man-
agement. Such reforms may achieve better outcomes if they are more 
targeted to context rather than being delivered as a supply-driven form 
of technical assistance. In situations of clientelist pluralism, for instance, 
capacity-building initiatives that emphasize coalition-building and 
coherence across the public sector could improve predictability in the 
extractive industries and might possibly mitigate some of the risks 
 associated with time inconsistency while actually creating incentives for 
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actors to use this capacity. In contrast, in a hegemonic government, more 
targeted or enclaved forms of capacity-building could help to reduce the 
incidence of rent-seeking in contract negotiations by empowering public 
offi cials with the technical knowledge and skills necessary to implement 
a nondiscretionary licensing process. Further, capacity-building initia-
tives in weakly institutionalized environments—those of patrimonial 
rule as well as some hegemonic governments and some settings of clien-
telist pluralism—should emphasize as concrete reforms as possible. For 
example, development partners could assist domestic reformers in carv-
ing out niches in an organizational portfolio in which these reformers 
and their allies could begin to develop greater autonomy (Thurber, Hults, 
and Heller 2010, 24). Even in these weak governance environments, 
development partners may fi nd they have some leverage and support for 
such targeted capacity-building by emphasizing the salutary effects it 
would have on the government’s technical reputation and the potential 
consequent uptick in investment in the natural resource sector.
Further extending this logic, countries with very weak human and 
institutional capacity might not benefi t from establishing a separation of 
sector functions as in the Norwegian model of distinct agencies playing 
separate sector functions (Thurber, Hults and Heller 2010).9 In design-
ing a good-fi t organizational structure for a national oil company, con-
solidating domestic petroleum sector capacity, as was done with Angola’s 
Sonangol, may be more fruitful, may help avoid capture of regulatory 
and policy functions (such as occurred in Nigeria, as discussed above), 
and may even be a step on the path to achieving a meaningful separation 
of functions. Regardless of whether functions are consolidated, an 
emphasis must be placed on capacity-building in the domestic extractive 
industries sector. Joint ventures between NOCs and international com-
panies are common in oil-rich developing countries, and can be an 
important vehicle for transferring technical, commercial, and manage-
rial skills and capacity to the NOC.
Minimizing Discretion
In countries where political inclusiveness is low, that is, settings of patri-
monial rule or hegemonic government, two types of intervention could 
help reduce rent-seeking and the accrual of natural resource rents to pri-
vate pockets rather than for public gain. Development partners could 
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advocate minimizing discretion in the award of contracts and licenses 
through automating as much as possible the objective steps in the con-
tract- or license-granting process. For example, simply recording whether 
the necessary supporting fees and materials are received with a minerals 
license application helps to ensure that proper procedures are being fol-
lowed. In the petroleum sector, the analog would be using  criteria-based 
rather than open door systems for allocating exploration and production 
rights. In both cases, government priorities can be emphasized by using 
explicit bidding or qualifi cation parameters, while unnecessary discretion 
is removed. Adoption, public disclosure, and implementation of detailed 
regulations that encompass all phases of the granting of petroleum and 
mineral rights would support the minimization of discretion. To be sure, 
these are often politically diffi cult reform measures, since entrenched 
interests will fi ght to keep the status quo. The challenge, and at least part 
of the solution, lies in understanding the stakeholder landscape well 
enough to identify workable coalitions for such reform steps. 
Furthermore, separating decision-making authority over the alloca-
tion of resource rights would help to limit rent-seeking and improve 
transparency and information-sharing (Dunning 2008b). For example, 
interventions could emphasize clear lines of institutional accountability 
in licensing decisions in the minerals sector and build in separate checks 
and balances, which could be accomplished through an inter-ministerial 
committee to vet allocation decisions and emphasize oversight in  settings 
where an entirely independent license-allocation agency is unrealistic. 
Empowering nonexecutive stakeholders, such as a legislature or civil 
society groups, would provide even more extensive checks and balances 
and further bolster oversight. In the most diffi cult reform cases of weak 
political institutionalization and few limits on the exercise of power by 
elite-centered patronage networks, empowering other stakeholders 
within society through an emphasis on transparency—for example, 
audit of the NOC, clear bidding parameters for rights  allocation—is an 
essential building block to greater accountability and better governance.
Conclusion
This chapter has laid out some of the core policy and capacity decisions 
governments must make in extracting natural resources, particularly as 
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they strike deals with private investors in order to do so. When consider-
ing the legal and regulatory framework, the principles of simplicity, 
 clarity, and predictability are at a premium across all political economy 
contexts. When it comes to questions of how ownership is structured 
and the process of contract and license allocation, on the other hand, 
there is no “best practice” model that all countries should follow. Finally, 
sector capacity-building is an important objective and conventional 
mechanism of intervention everywhere, but what was illustrated here is 
how it could be targeted more carefully to the specifi c environment.
The quintessential political economy challenges of natural resource 
management—predictability and stability of policy, enforcement of 
intertemporal commitments, and the private versus public calculus in 
deal-making—are apparent in the upstream part of the value chain. By 
the same token, many of the basic principles of intervention apply in 
 sector organization: minimizing discretion to remove rent-seeking 
opportunities, easing information asymmetries and enhancing transpar-
ency, targeting capacity-building, and activating enforcement through 
checks and balances. More specifi c measures, emphasizing which might 
be most conducive in different political economy settings, have been 
outlined here. Similarly, the next chapter explores how “good-fi t” tax 
policy and fi scal regimes can be developed based on country context. 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the value chain framework 
is not strictly sequential—in other words, downstream decisions made 
on public investment management in any given time period will inevita-
bly have an impact back on upstream decisions on extraction in the next 
time period. For example, if a government decides that it needs to secure 
greater public support by providing cash transfers to the population or 
by expanding the public investment program to invest heavily in infra-
structure, then pressures will build upstream to unlock greater rents by 
securing better deals on extraction; such a dynamic appears to be build-
ing in Timor-Leste with more rent-seeking in contract negotiations 
(Anderson, Barma, and Porter 2010). The impact of downstream issues 
on upstream management notwithstanding, policy decisions and prac-
tices upstream do set the tone for the potential of natural resources to 
aid in development.
Annex 3.1. Basic Upstream Characteristics of Country Cases
Country
GDP per 
Capita, PPP a 
2008 (US$)
Hydrocarbon 

















Angola 5,452.06 83.60 — Sonangol Production sharing, 
royalty
84.5
Bolivia 3,954.37 26.00 — YPFB Tax/royalty Tax/royalty 43.1
Chile 13,369.62 — 22.73 CODELCO Tax/royalty 36.6
Congo, Dem. 
Rep.
 297.11 — 2.40 Gécamines Tax/royalty
Ecuador 7,402.49 49.00 — Petroecuador Production sharing, 
royalty
52
Ghana 1,342.16 — 13.00 GNPC Tax/royalty Tax/royalty 54.4
Lao PDR 1,985.70 n.a. 17.00 Revenue terms 
of specifi c 
concessions 
and licenses
Mexico 13,406.74 35.59 — PEMEX Tax/royalty Tax/royalty 31 49.9




Niger 632.22 — 42.00 SOPAMIN Tax/ad valorem 
royalty
Tax/royalty
Nigeria 1,924.30 83.69 — NNPC Tax/royalty 85
Timor-Leste 40.30 98.16 n.a.  Tax/royalty 72
Trinidad and 
Tobago





Source: World Bank Indicators 2011; Tordo, Johnston, and Johnston 2009; Otto and Andrews. 2006.
Note: a. PPP = purchasing power parity in US$.
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Notes
 1.  Chile, for example, provides a formal share of revenues (currently 10 percent) to 
the military from copper. In many settings, these arrangements are less formal.
 2.  Craig Andrews provided valuable insights that make up this discussion. Ross 
(2007) discusses issues related to the geographic distribution of resources. 
 3.  National mining companies are less common, in both developed and develop-
ing countries. Mineral extraction is technically more complex than petroleum 
production, and, with a variety of products and operations depending on the 
particular site, it requires more specifi c expertise. National mining companies, 
when they do exist, tend to be essentially vehicles for taking on state equity 
share, rather than being involved in operations in any meaningful way. In con-
trast, NOCs are often heavily involved in production.
 4.  For example, the Natural Resource Charter (2010) states that nationally owned 
resource companies should be competitive and commercial operations, which 
should avoid conducting regulatory functions or other activities. (precept 6, 
p. 12).
 5.  As mentioned at the chapter beginning, the focus here is mostly on extraction 
rather than exploration. 
 6.  See Tordo,  Johnston, and Johnston (2009) on technical issues regarding the 
allocation of exploration and production rights in the petroleum sector and 
Ortega Girones, Pugachevsky, and Walser (2009) on technical issues regarding 
mineral rights cadastres. This chapter expands on and adapts these frameworks 
in order to incorporate broader political economy concerns. 
 7.  A number of policy papers produced by the Oil, Gas, and Mining Division of the 
World Bank outline the criteria for a such a legal and regulatory framework; see, 
for example, Mayorga-Alba (2009).
 8.  The NT2 project concerns hydropower, not the extractive industries of oil, gas, 
or mining. As noted in the introduction to this volume, however, many similar 
political economy dynamics apply in other natural resource sectors like hydro-
power, and the NT2 experience provides an example of a good fi t and innovative 
intervention.
 9.  The Norwegian separation of functions model is usually discussed in relation to 
national oil companies and the petroleum sector, but the logic also applies more 
broadly to the extractive industries.
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A tax regime that is progressive and based on profi ts is commonly con-
sidered best practice for natural resource–endowed countries. These 
regimes promise to capture the bulk of resource rents from the sector, 
while ensuring the required investment associated with capital-inten-
sive extractive industries. But developing countries often fi nd this model 
challenging and even impossible to enforce. Instead, underlying politi-
cal economy drivers and the resulting institutionally weak and frag-
mented revenue administration often lead to an excessive reliance on 
regressive fi scal regimes. At the same time, in many developing coun-
tries, tax legislation leaves ample room for ad hoc negotiations that 
ignore formal rules and create major risks for regulatory capture and 
revenue leakage.
Because of the high uncertainty and unpredictability of future 
resource wealth and market prices, as well as the accompanying political 
pressures, fi scal regimes are prone to instability and frequent change. 
Governments fi nd it diffi cult to achieve stable taxation policies because 
the distinctive features of the natural resource extraction are com-
pounded with the problems that weak institutions have in enforcing 
commitments over time. Developing countries with time consistency 
problems cannot simply copy the best models applied elsewhere; instead, 
they need to design country-specifi c “good enough” or “good fi t” fi scal 
Taxing Resource Wealth: 
The Political Economy 
of Fiscal Regimes 
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regimes that are simple, transparent, and politically feasible given a 
state’s objectives and tolerable risk level.
This chapter assesses the policy choices available to countries endowed 
with natural resources, focusing on fi scal regime design and implemen-
tation. Although a number of recent contributions already provide 
excellent policy guidance on natural-resource taxation and general tax 
administration reforms (see Daniels, Keen, and McPherson 2010; Otto 
and Andrews 2006; McLaren 2003; Gillis 1989), these studies build on a 
signifi cant tradition of public fi nance that separates technical, economic, 
and institutional aspects of taxation and explains departures from best 
practice models as being a result of a lack of political will. The objective 
of this chapter is to fi ll the gap in the literature on how politics affect fi s-
cal regimes by examining how particular choices in resource revenue 
policy and administration result from prevailing political economy fea-
tures and institutional capacity endowments. The chapter provides guid-
ance on how different starting points might shape the prioritizing and 
sequencing of certain policy choices in this area to enhance both overall 
rent-capture by the state and successful and sustained extractive indus-
try investment in the sector.
Incorporating lessons on the underlying political economy and institu-
tional constraints in low-income, resource-dependent countries, this 
chapter evaluates alternative fi scal regimes by examining their political 
economy and governance vulnerabilities and makes recommendations for 
designing good-enough alternative fi scal regimes. Given the political con-
straints in decision making regarding fi scal regimes, the framework points 
to measures that might mitigate the risks of unstable fi scal regimes.1 
The fi rst section presents a set of recurrent but seemingly paradoxical 
design and implementation choices in decisions on natural resource fi s-
cal regimes. Existing fi scal regimes in developing countries are typically 
too complex to implement correctly, subject to instability, and affected 
by pervasive weaknesses in revenue administration capacity. The fol-
lowing section discusses the way natural resource taxation is designed 
and implemented, including the impact of such factors as  diversity of 
resource type, intertemporal extraction considerations, price  volatility 
and uncertainty, and optimization rules. Alternative fi scal instruments 
are then examined from a technical perspective, considering effi ciency, 
administration and compliance costs, variability of revenue fl ows, and 
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corruption risks, while recognizing that various tax instruments tend to 
induce different types of distortions in investors’ exploration and pro-
duction decisions. This chapter then covers the institutional and politi-
cal determinants of fi scal regime design as they relate to a government’s 
discount rate, risk perceptions, and institutional and policy rigidities. 
The following section introduces a framework to identify feasible policy 
measures that contribute to durable commitments regarding fi scal 
regimes and tax administration capacity building. A concluding section 
summarizes policy recommendations for different political economy 
contexts.
Natural Resource Fiscal Regime Paradoxes 
Of the numerous fi scal instruments available for extractive industries, 
each has its own benefi ts and disadvantages along economic, adminis-
trative, and revenue enhancing dimensions. Tax regimes refl ect various 
competing objectives, particularly simplicity, economic effi ciency, and 
neutrality, along with adequacy and low variability of revenue intake. 
The inherently complex process of policy design becomes even more 
challenging in the extractive sector because of its distinctive technical 
and economic characteristics and the institutional and political incen-
tives that are associated with it. A tax regime’s design is determined by a 
number of political economic factors, including features of the extrac-
tive resource endowment, the mechanisms and institutions available for 
enforcing commitments over time, revenue administration capacity and 
governance, distribution of power, policy rigidities, and the extent of tax 
competition. Three areas of recurrent concern regarding nonrenewable-
resource taxation will be outlined—namely fi scal regime design, time 
consistency, and revenue administration capacity—and the wider issue 
of how resource revenue-dependence affects state-society accountability 
will be considered.
Complex and Contradictory Fiscal Regime Design 
Countries that are resource-rich but have weak governance and low 
capacity often fi nd it overly challenging to administer a fi scal regime 
centered on progressive, direct income taxes. Governments often decide 
to frontload revenues using production-based royalty as the major fi scal 
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instrument. This is a rational strategy in that although royalty is eco-
nomically ineffi cient, it is simple to administer and has low revenue vari-
ability. Preference for steadier revenues, short-term horizons that hinder 
the development of administrative capacity, and risk avoidance explain 
the fact that royalties or other regressive instruments are the most com-
monly used taxes on mineral extraction. 
But, paradoxically, developing countries often have more complex 
regimes than do higher-capacity countries. Many low-income, resource-
dependent countries with poor governance and capacity in their revenue 
administration in practice resort to an overly complex multirate royalty 
regime imitative of the income/profi t-based taxes or resource rent taxes 
on nonrenewable resource production. For example, in Ghana, until 
recently the nominal royalty rate structure was between 3 and 6 percent of 
the total revenues of minerals, applicable to all types of mining lease hold-
ers, large or small. However, the effective rate of royalty is based on the 
profi tability of mining operations, which implies that the royalty can 
be determined only after both revenues and costs are calculated (Ghana 
Minerals and Mining Act 2006, section 25). Some countries apply a fi scal 
regime that is both complex and consisting of sharply contradictory ele-
ments, for example, combining high taxation rates and generous tax 
incentives. Nigeria’s fi scal regime for the oil sector is a case in point. The 
royalty rates vary depending on the location (onshore or offshore) of pro-
duction, on water depth of oil extraction, and on quantity extracted; how-
ever, the royalty is not linked to international oil prices. On the one hand, 
the regime applies rates considerably higher than the international average 
(20 percent royalty on onshore fi elds, and profi ts tax of 85 percent); on the 
other hand, it offers multiple compensating tax incentives. International 
experience shows that such regimes often lead to low compliance and high 
administration costs. A simple technical review of individual tax instru-
ments in isolation from in-depth understanding of the country-specifi c 
political economic context would fail to explain the motives for such com-
plex and contradictory tax policy design in these countries.
Perpetuating Time Inconsistency 
Fiscal regimes for nonrenewable resources in many developing countries 
often seem erratic and focused on short-term goals. For investors, the 
extractive sector is risky: it is capital-intensive and long term, and with a 
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high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability in both demand and 
production. For host governments, exploration and extraction risks, as 
well as commodity price volatility, make the revenue fl ow highly vari-
able and cyclical. Both investors and the government would benefi t 
from stable fi scal policies. Nevertheless, the absence of intertemporal 
cooperation among political forces, high discount rates for government 
offi cials, substantial payoff for deviating from agreements, and the fact 
that political exchanges take place in largely informal, uncertain, and 
nontransparent arenas—as commonly observed in resource-rich devel-
oping countries—contribute to ubiquitous time consistency problems. 
Time inconsistency arises when policy makers are unable to commit 
in advance to a specifi c decision-making rule or a steady fi scal policy, 
which results in less desirable policy outcomes (Kydland and Prescott 
1977; Persson and Tabellini 2000). The paradox is that time inconsis-
tency is often exogenous to investors, but endogenous to domestic 
political economy. Repeated negotiations and fi scal regime changes 
elevate discount rates perceived by both fi rms and governments and 
result in less investment, ineffi cient short-term policy design, and poor 
performance. The inability of governments to commit, even if willing, 
to stable policies increases investors’ perceptions of risk that the gov-
ernment will renege on contracts and increase taxation after invest-
ments are completed. Thus, it discourages new development and intro-
duces distortions in the production profi les of existing projects. The 
fact that extractive industries require long timeframes for planning, 
and consequently involve irreversible and specifi c investments, incom-
plete contracts, asymmetric information, and price volatility, intensifi es 
the commitment issues (Olsen and Osmundsen 2001; Boadway and 
Keen 2010). 
Past tax increases are associated with a lack of credible commit-
ments by the government. Investors will expect the host country to 
behave opportunistically after investments are sunk. In that case, in 
order to attract new investments, governments must signal that they 
are willing to compensate investors for the additional risk (and even 
lock in their ability to change the regime, for example, by introducing 
stability clauses). However, when investments are completed, and espe-
cially if prices surge at the same time, governments face diffi culties in 
enforcing these commitments—because of voracity, rent-seeking, or 
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increased social demands—and tend to increase taxation. Some 
resource-dependent countries like Zambia were under tremendous 
pressure from civil society organizations and communities to review 
their contracts with fi rms while prices boomed. In Tanzania, as the 
mining sector became more prominent in the economy, electoral poli-
tics drove the change of the mining code. President Jakaya Kikwete 
promised to review the mining sector immediately when he took power 
in 2005. He initiated a review process in 2006 and, despite lengthy 
delays in drafting and negotiating the new mining code, the new Min-
ing Act 2010 was passed by the parliament in April 2010. Prominent in 
the new act is the sharp increase in the royalty rate and base; in par-
ticular, the rate is to be applied on the gross value of minerals instead 
of the net value. This change is detrimental to the government’s cred-
ibility in the long run and is likely to further deteriorate its negotiating 
position, forcing it to make greater concessions in the next round of 
negotiations, which in turn will become more and more diffi cult to 
sustain politically.
In response to fi scal regime changes that increase government’s take, 
and the ensuing uncertainty, companies generally reevaluate future 
investments and adopt a more short-term production approach, 
increasing the rate of extraction at the expense of the long-term pro-
ductivity of reservoirs. The result is that in the long run there will be 
deadweight welfare losses and the reduction of future tax revenues by 
an amount greater than the short-term gains. Thus, the repeated inter-
action between government and investors in these situations if com-
mitment problems are not resolved leads to a suboptimal equilibrium 
of underinvestment and an unstable taxation regime that follows the 
price cycle.
Australia’s recent efforts to increase revenue mobilization from its 
mining sector suggest that these types of negotiations are also present in 
more developed economies and are not exclusive to low-income coun-
tries. As government pronouncements indicate, the Australian govern-
ment clearly faced pressures for capturing a greater share of rents for the 
country as oil and mineral prices reached unprecedented levels. Yet, 
 Australia as well as Chile and Norway have successfully revisited tax 
regimes while at the same time safeguarding the long-term sustainability 
of the industry and without causing signifi cant damage to investor 
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 confi dence, precisely because of their strong reputation for good gover-
nance and transparency (Hogan and Boldsworkty 2010). Importantly, 
these countries have revised tax rates, but maintained their tax policy 
largely unchanged and respected the industry’s overall economic posi-
tion (Osmundsen 2010). In contrast, when developing countries with 
weak governance and low intertemporal credibility revise their tax 
regimes, they face serious reputational risk and tend to make their invest-
ment environments much less attractive.
Low Incentive to Invest in Revenue Administration Reforms 
Despite the fact that natural resources provide an abundant rent stream 
for governments to invest in improving their administrative capabilities, 
many low-income, resource-dependent countries exhibit notably low 
capacity and poor governance in revenue administration. The typical 
problems in revenue administration are inadequate organizational 
structuring, low human resource capacity, perverse incentive systems for 
revenue collection and taxpayer service, cumbersome processes, and lack 
of information technologies and logistical support. In addition, resource 
revenue collection spreads across multiple institutions, which generally 
do not have the incentives to cooperate or are not legally bound to do so. 
Because revenue administrations often have insuffi cient capacity, multi-
national corporations in the extractive industries typically self-assess 
their tax liabilities, which are, for the most part, not subjected to audit 
and instead simply accepted by government. 
Prevailing institutional and political incentives, however, discour-
age investment in revenue administration capacity. First, reforms in 
this area are both resource-intensive and long term. They are also 
highly political, and success is impossible without sustained and broad-
based support. Second, incumbents with short time horizons, there-
fore with high discount rates, have little incentive to change the status 
quo. Experience in administrative reforms, such as the establishment 
of semiautonomous revenue authorities in a number of African coun-
tries, indicates that their success is limited and diffi cult to sustain (Fjeld-
stad and Rakner 2003). Third, fragmentation in administration of reve-
nues from the mineral sector, including the use of state-owned 
corporations as regulatory and revenue-collecting institutions, without 
institutional incentives or enforcement mechanisms for coordination, 
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inhibits successful tax administration reforms. Fourth, the lack of 
transparency in upstream contracting and signing of development 
agreements constitutes a major constraint to effective revenue admin-
istration.
Revenue Mobilization and Accountability 
Taxation is an important aspect of citizenship and governance. Individ-
uals who do not pay taxes are less likely to demand transparency and 
quality in government spending and hold the government accountable. 
Governments that do not derive a substantive part of their resources 
from their citizens are less likely to pay attention to citizen demands and 
preferences (Karl 1997; Moore 2004). They will have a higher tendency 
to distribute particularistic goods to reward core supporters and client 
networks instead of producing public goods that enhance collective wel-
fare (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004). 
Low taxation of the nonresource economy has been cited as one of 
the sources of poor accountability in resource-dependent countries. Karl 
(1997), Ross (2001), and Moore (2004), among others, have pointed to 
the fact that lower taxes reduce demands for democracy and vertical 
accountability. Also, reliance on rents tends to weaken agencies of 
restraint such as legislative, judicial, anticorruption, and ombudsmen 
institutions (Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth 2002), which are frequently mar-
ginalized in decision making concerning the sector (Ross 2008). Fur-
thermore, in low-governance, resource-dependent countries, transfers 
and subsidies are often used to depoliticize groups, erode social capital, 
and neutralize demands for accountability (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; 
Soares de Oliveira 2007; Ross 2008). 
In many low-governance countries tax collection could be signifi -
cantly improved. However, the concentration of ownership and the high 
profi tability of extractive activities provide a combination of surplus 
and relative administrative ease, which in turn reduces pressures for 
accountability (Chelliah 2006). To the extent that a government derives 
large mineral rents or controls resource production directly, it may be 
able to avoid the politically sensitive task of taxing its population 
 (Dunning 2008a) and may be able to make transfers to large segments 
of the population to secure the legitimacy of the regime (Anderson 
1987; Crystal 1995). These political incentives reduce the urgency of 
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either diversifying the tax base (Ross 2001) or making long-term invest-
ments in institutional capacity of tax administration, hence non-
resource revenue mobilization tends to be lower than its potential. 
Additionally, a weak tax administration can easily be manipulated by 
the incumbent administration or captured by private interests. 
Key Technical Issues in Natural Resource 
Revenue Policy and Administration 
A wide-ranging theoretical and empirical policy literature succinctly 
reviewed here provides guidance on fi scal regimes for the extractive 
sector. This section focuses on revenue policy and administration in the 
extractive sector. The quality of revenue administration is a key factor 
in how successful a fi scal regime will be in the long run in leveraging 
natural resource rents for development. Over the short term, adminis-
trative capacity puts critical constraints on policy choices. Countries 
can relieve these constraints by investing in better administrative capac-
ity, but they fi rst need to identify incentive-compatible policies to 
 promote such reforms. 
Technical, Economic, and Administrative Characteristics 
of Natural Resource Sectors 
The distinctive features and challenges of natural resource extraction 
affect the design of fi scal regimes for the sector. These characteristics 
also make it diffi cult for governments to achieve credible commit-
ments on tax policy. Fiscal regimes affect the cost-benefi t calculus 
developers face as they make decisions on the profi tability of extract-
ing a nonrenewable resource: high royalties or input taxes tend to turn 
 natural resources into waste because indirect taxes and fees cut into 
the bottom line of extractive operations, and hence fi rms may simply 
walk away from mines with low-grading resources. The inherent high 
volatility and uncertainty of extractive industries sharply increase risks 
for investors and make revenue fl ows unpredictable for host govern-
ments. Prices, generally determined in the world market, are highly 
cyclical. Uncertainty in both production and prices translates into 
potentially high variability of profi tability for fi rms and revenue intake 
for governments.
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Extractives industries require long-term planning on the part of 
both government and companies. Extracting nonrenewable resources 
requires high frontloading of investments that are irreversible and 
highly specifi c to the industry. Extraction is characterized by high eco-
nomic and technological complexity and associated economic and geo-
logical risks for investors and governments that cannot be fully foreseen 
during the time contracts are being negotiated (Osmundsen 2010). Sig-
nifi cant exploration expenditures and risks precede startup; explora-
tion expenses occur long before taxable income is available or even a 
decision to mine or extract oil is made. 
The intertemporal dimension of extraction is the central issue con-
cerning both the effi cient extraction path as well as the amount to be 
extracted in each time period. The time profi le is important because an 
increase in the current extraction rate reduces the size of resource stock 
remaining in the ore body or petroleum reservoir in the future. Thus, 
there is a cost, referred to as the user cost, associated with extraction. 
Producers follow the “optimization principle” by maximizing the cur-
rent value of projects in which the marginal revenue is the difference 
between the market price and the marginal cost of extraction. The inves-
tor may not assume the user cost, and thus can ignore it. However, gov-
ernment and society must face this cost, and they can force investors to 
assume it by imposing a tax on extractives and thereby capturing part of 
the resource rent. 
Asymmetric information on geological reserves and production costs 
is another signifi cant problem in the sector because petroleum and min-
ing companies have incentives for strategic reporting and a much greater 
organizational capacity than that of developing countries’ tax adminis-
trations. The high degree of vertical integration of these industries and 
the concentration of capital and knowledge in a relatively small number 
of companies creates a great capacity imbalance. In addition, ownership 
in extractive industries tends to be concentrated in a small number of 
companies that have strong selective incentives to organize and articu-
late demands (Woolcock, Pritchett, and Isham 2001). 
Fiscal Instruments for Extractive Industries 
This section examines the key instruments for mineral revenue mobili-
zation: how they operate; their performance in economic, equity, and 
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potential revenue terms; and their cost of administration. Each alterna-
tive is presented from the perspectives of both government and inves-
tors, and the respective advantages and disadvantages for each are 
examined. Governments mix instruments in order to balance the trade-
offs between effi ciency and effectiveness in revenue raising or between 
revenue adequacy and variability. They also can resort to fi scal and 
nonfi scal instruments to collect natural resource rents. The most com-
monly used fi scal systems are taxes and royalties in mineral-rich coun-
tries (Otto and Andrews 2006) and concessions and production-sharing 
contracts in oil producers (van Meurs 2008). Nonfi scal alternatives 
include auctioning of exploration and extraction rights, production-
sharing, and equity participation. Figure 4.1 summarizes the modality 
of oil sector fi scal regimes worldwide. Production-sharing contracts 
and concessions are the prevalent instruments used to mobilize reve-
nues from the oil sector. (Annexes 4.1–4.3 present details on the oil and 
mineral fi scal regimes in the countries studied for this volume.)
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Auctioning exploration and extraction rights allows governments to 
obtain upfront payments. Investors can bid cash payments, work pro-
grams, royalties, and shares of profi t (Sunnevag 2002). Cash payments or 
bonuses may be very substantial in some cases. In countries with reliable 
geological information and fully competitive settings, this instrument 
has a neutral impact on extraction choices and is the most effi cient way 
to capture the expected rent (Brosio 2006; Tordo 2007). Nonetheless, 
confi dent estimates of the resource value and an adequate number of 
bidders are diffi cult to secure in countries with low state capacity and 
weak governance. In the absence of adequate information, bidding can 
trigger renegotiations or expropriation, especially when resources turn 
out to be substantially higher or lower than the expected amount 
 (Garnaut and Ross 1975; 1983). While auctions may potentially help 
reveal the true value of natural resources and maximize government rev-
enue in low-income economies (Collier 2010b), in practice, and as a 
result of the same uncertainty, bidders are often more cautious in their 
offers, while governments focus on bonus bids to the detriment of future 
charges (Cramton 2007; Boadway and Keen 2010).
State equity in projects, whether as a share of the investment cost or 
as a give-away as predetermined in contracts, allows governments to 
obtain part of the return to capital from the projects. When the govern-
ment pays a share of the investment cost, it is entitled to receive returns 
to capital and the equivalent of the resource rent. When the government 
receives the equity without charge, its revenues include part of the inves-
tor’s return to capital and the tax on the resource rent (Brosio 2006). 
However, state participation can reduce the risks of expropriation and 
improve the government’s access to information and control over extrac-
tion operations (Osmundsen 1998). The disadvantages of this alterna-
tive are not only that the government bears greater economic risks, but 
also that it faces a confl ict of interest, because it is a shareholder and the 
regulator at the same time.
Production-sharing contracts often involve payment of a propor-
tional share of physical output or the value of production. The share can 
be fi xed or progressive, gross or net of costs. In each case, as table 4.1 
illustrates, production-sharing agreements are equivalent to different 
tax and nontax instruments. These arrangements are generally revised as 
production progresses over time (Blake and Roberts 2006). 
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Given the volatile conditions that characterize the sector, in principle, 
petroleum and mineral tax systems should be fl exible, neutral, and stable 
(Tordo 2007). Fiscal regimes should provide governments with an ade-
quate share of increasing profi ts, not introduce distortions in the profi le 
of investments; they also should be effi cient and provide a predictable 
framework for investors. The fi scal instruments most commonly used 
for extractive industries include specifi c and ad valorem royalties, corpo-
rate income tax, presumptive income tax, resource rent tax (RRT), and 
property tax, as well as other taxes such as value-added tax (VAT) and 
import and export duties (Boadway and Flatters 1982; Nellor 1987; Otto 
2001; Sunley, Baunsgaard, and Simard 2003). The incentives created by 
the various tax and royalty instruments and their effects on the extrac-
tion profi le of a resource body are presented in table 4.2. 
The “per-unit royalty,” or “specifi c royalty,” may be assessed either on 
the extraction of the ore or on its fi nal mineral content. That is, it may 
be imposed as a specifi c royalty on a particular mine or well or may be 
in the form of an export tax on the commodity produced. The advan-
tage of this type of tax is its administrative simplicity. It does not dis-
criminate between economic rents across nonrenewable resources and 
provides a steady source of revenue to the government irrespective of 
the fi nancial performance of the projects. It is an attractive instrument 
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for the government because the revenues begin to fl ow the moment the 
extraction of the resource begins. If the unit tax remains constant in 
nominal terms, however, and there is infl ation in the economy, the pres-
ent value of the tax per unit will be lower in the future. 
A per-unit royalty has a number of effects. First, it changes the extrac-
tion profi le, which is accompanied by a deadweight loss because the 
extraction profi le becomes suboptimal and therefore the total wealth 
from the mine or fi eld goes down. Second, the low-grade part of the 
resource is left in the ground because extraction costs have gone up, an 
effi ciency loss called “high grading.” A per-unit tax on the ore or reser-
voir affects the quantity and grade of ore extracted in different time 
 periods. In order to lower the burden of tax, companies shift the extrac-
tion of high-grade ores from present to future or vice versa, depending 
on whether the discounted prices fall or rise over time. Generally, fi rms 
determine the cutoff grades on the basis of multiple factors, including 
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commodity prices, extraction and processing technology, and royalties, 
which leads directly to increased marginal cost of extraction. From the 
investor’s perspective, the specifi c royalty acts like an added cost of 
extraction irrespective of the profi t level, thus the investor would increase 
the cutoff grades so that the low-grade mines or reserves would not be 
utilized. High grading thus causes additional reduction in the value of 
the resource and adds to the ineffi ciency burden of the tax.
The “ad valorem output tax” or royalty is a fi xed proportion of the 
price of the mineral produced (or the value of the resource) and has an 
effect similar to the per-unit output tax or severance tax on the extrac-
tion profi le in that it increases the cutoff grades. The tax has the same 
administrative advantage as a per-unit tax on the output, except for the 
determination of the “arms-length” price of the output: if information 
on market pricing is available, the rate should be adjusted for the differ-
ence in quality of the resource and the transportation and other costs. 
The effects of ad valorem royalties are also similar to those of the 
per-unit tax; that is, they will weight the extraction profi le from present 
to future, or the other way around, depending on whether the dis-
counted prices fall or rise over time (Rowse 1997). This tax will act as an 
added cost on the extraction of the resource and there will also be high 
grading. Moreover, investors do not like royalties for several reasons. 
The royalty payment is not linked to profi ts and its payment is due even 
if the operations are incurring losses. This may force investors to leave 
the marginal quality resource in the ground, exacerbating the practice 
of high grading. In addition, the royalty payment cannot be claimed as 
tax credit in the home country. Yet governments prefer royalties because 
they provide a steady source of revenue and are relatively simple to 
administer. 
Generally, the natural resource sector is subject to the same corpo-
rate income taxes as any other industry. Sometimes, however, especially 
in the oil sector, governments impose a higher tax on natural resource 
profi ts than the normal corporate income tax rate. In this way, the gov-
ernment attempts to capture the bulk of the resource rent. The income 
tax is levied on profi ts and as such creates no distortions in the extrac-
tion profi le or high grading related to taxes on output. However, the 
administration of corporate income tax is complicated. In addition to 
price of output and cost of inputs, various deductions allowed under 
128 Rents to Riches?
the income tax law must be computed to estimate the taxable income, 
including the costs of exploration and development. Determining explo-
ration costs is a complex process, in particular when exploration contin-
ues during extraction operations. In this case, the accounting procedure 
used to compute these costs becomes signifi cant because the overall 
viability of the project can be affected by whether immediate expensing 
of all capital expenditure is allowed, or an accelerated depreciation is 
permitted, or different assets are treated differently. Generally, the explo-
ration and development costs are not deducted from revenues all at once 
but are depreciated, commonly about fi ve years for exploration and 
10 years for development costs. Investors prefer income taxes because, 
unlike other taxes, they can be credited back in home countries. On the 
other hand, with this type of tax, government revenues become uncer-
tain and there is no guarantee that the government will collect any rev-
enues from a given project.
Investors tend to have an advantage over the host government because 
companies have better accounting expertise and can reduce the amount 
of taxes they pay, while most developing countries have very little capac-
ity to oversee the tax (Boadway and Flatters 1982). The resource-owning 
country faces several issues in applying an income tax, including the 
uncertainty of collecting it (Land 1995; Baunsgard 2001; Davis, Ossowski, 
and Fedelino 2003; Deacon and Mueller 2004). First is the problem of 
“transfer pricing,” which frequently happens when the resource extract-
ing fi rm is a subsidiary of a foreign multinational company.2 To prevent 
transfer pricing, the host government must have legal and administra-
tive mechanisms in place to scrutinize and adjust the expenses and 
deductions claimed by the fi rm. Second, “debt-equity ratio” becomes 
signifi cant in determining the tax base, as interest payments are deduct-
ible and excessive debt would seriously erode the tax base. The investor 
may often borrow funds from the foreign parent company at a high 
interest rate in order to increase the debt-equity ratio. To protect the tax 
base, the government may set a limit on debt fi nancing in order to restrict 
interest deductibility. The third issue is the treatment of taxes paid in the 
host or producing country, which is important for the investor. Nor-
mally, tax credits are available for income taxes paid in the producing 
countries provided there are tax treaties between the host country where 
the fi rm is operating and the home country where the parent company 
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is registered. If no such arrangement is in place, the investor may become 
subject to double taxation. 
Furthermore, the provision of “ring fencing” of projects for purposes 
of income taxation is a constraint for the investor. Ring fencing is a gov-
ernment’s effort to limit the extent to which income, deductions, and 
losses across projects can be combined by the same taxpayer. In the 
absence of this provision, a fi rm that undertakes a series of projects will 
be able to deduct exploration and development expenditures from each 
new project against the income of extraction of a resource that is already 
in operation and making profi ts. Without a ring-fencing arrangement, 
the government would fail to collect taxes. A too-restrictive arrange-
ment, on the other hand, would discourage further investment. There-
fore, a properly designed ring fencing regime becomes crucial for the 
host government (McLure 1994).
“Royalty plus income tax” is simply a combination of the output tax 
and profi ts tax. Royalty is calculated on the basis of the rate applied to a 
quantity of ore or output, and the taxable income for the profi t tax is 
estimated by netting out the operating cost and royalty payment from 
total revenues. The government can choose to keep a relatively low rate 
of royalty in conjunction with the normal corporate income tax. It 
ensures that some revenues begin to fl ow to the government from the 
very outset without causing excessive ineffi ciency or burden on the 
investor. The royalty would have an impact on the extraction profi le and 
cutoff grades as outlined earlier and will cause both high grading and 
deadweight loss (Boadway and Flatters 1982).
“Windfall taxation” is a common fi scal instrument applied to extrac-
tive industries. Variable rates may be employed in the case of all the taxes 
in the fi rst three categories, namely, per-unit royalty, ad valorem royalty, 
and profi ts tax. The motivation for governments to introduce windfall 
taxation instruments is to either maintain a certain level of tax revenues 
or share in the “windfall” gains. These variable taxes may be structured 
in a variety of ways according to output prices, current profi ts, rates of 
return, or any other economic variable. Thus, different rates of royalty 
are applicable in different price ranges of mineral, oil, and gas, or levels 
of profi ts accruing to the investor. This type of royalty will lead to high 
grading and reallocation of the extraction profi le, resulting in welfare 
losses. Variable rate income taxes will encourage the fi rm to reallocate 
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the extraction from periods of high marginal tax rates to periods with 
lower marginal rates. Two forms of variable taxes are most common 
(Otto and Andrews 2006). First is the variable royalty in which the rate 
of tax changes with price, which evolved during the commodity boom of 
the 1970s. As the price of a commodity rises, the government captures 
more revenue. Second, on the income tax side, an additional profi ts tax 
or resource rent tax is used where a dual income tax rate is applied, 
increasing the overall government’s take.
Capturing resource rent tax from the sector has been a favorite rec-
ommendation to increase governments’ revenue mobilization in the 
natural resource literature.3 Resource rent tax is an “additional profi ts 
tax,” the goal of which is that government taxes windfall gains at a higher 
rate than the normal rate of return (Daniels, Keen, and McPherson 
2010). The resource rent tax is imposed only when the accrued cash 
fl ow from the activity is positive. The negative cash fl ow in the early 
years of the project is accumulated using an interest rate that equals 
the investor’s cost of capital. This tax would yield any revenues only in 
the later years of the resource extraction. A resource rent tax does not 
introduce any economic distortions since it is simply a variation on 
the normal corporate income tax, which is also neutral with respect to 
production profi le. 
Theoretically, the resource rent tax is attractive because it does not 
give the government any incentive to change the tax regime when the 
sector makes high profi ts. The investor is paying this additional tax only 
on return that is over and above the opportunity costs of the investor. 
The tax would then reduce the uncertainty for the investor and ensure 
the stability of the contractual arrangements between the two parties. Of 
course, the rate of this additional profi ts tax and the threshold when it 
will become operative should be defi ned in advance to avoid any gam-
ing behavior on the part of the investor or the government. However, it 
is not appealing to host governments, particularly to those with inher-
ently high discount rates, because governments will not receive reve-
nues until the project turns a profi t, and it requires long-term invest-
ments in the institutional capacity of revenue administration agencies 
for its effective implementation. Thus, it is usually used in combination 
with a royalty and a normal corporate income tax, which frontload 
parts of the revenues. 
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In practice, the resource rent tax tends to be a weak revenue instru-
ment in developing countries, yet it has been introduced in many reforms 
because it is considered a best-practice element. One problem relates to 
the proper design of the tax, mainly the choice of discount rate or the 
rate of resource rent tax. It could also be simply a problem of the tax 
department’s administrative capacity. Most of the time, resource-rich 
countries struggle to collect a decent amount of corporate income tax 
because of its administrative complexity, so trying to collect this addi-
tional profi ts tax would add to the diffi culty. Often, profi ts tax becomes a 
point of consideration for keeping a comparatively low income tax and 
royalty rate as a result of tax competition among resource-dependent 
developing countries. In light of this situation, a combination of income 
tax and ad valorem royalty may be a better alternative for the government 
from the revenue perspective.
The use of property tax is not very common, although some local 
governments use it to enhance their revenue base (Otto 2001). It is dif-
fi cult to calculate the tax base, and the tax may have undesirable eco-
nomic impacts on resource extraction, such as discouraging landholding 
and potentially leading to faster extraction, because it constitutes a fi xed 
cost. In practice, two types of property tax bases may be employed. The 
fi rst is a tax based on the net present value of the resource body, in which 
the property tax is levied on the present value of the mine or fi eld. The 
estimation of cost is an important factor in this approach and compli-
cates the calculation of the tax base. Also, the base would change from 
year to year as the extraction proceeds. The second type of property tax 
is based on the revenue from the resource body, in which case a percent-
age of the revenue generated by the mine or fi eld would constitute the 
base for property tax. This type is simpler to estimate because the cost 
aspect does not need to be considered. Since the tax is applied to the 
amount of resource body remaining in the ground, there will be a ten-
dency on the part of investors to accelerate the extraction of the resource 
so that the tax base gets depleted and the tax burden is reduced. The 
extraction profi le becomes suboptimal and results in a welfare loss. 
The sale of minerals, oil, and gas should be subject to the normal 
consumption taxes, specifi cally a value-added tax (VAT). A problem with 
this tax is that because most natural resource products are exported, 
it raises the question of whether the country should follow a normal 
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consumption-based VAT regime, which incorporates a destination prin-
ciple that rates exports at zero tax, and hence would fail to collect reve-
nue on a large portion of the resource base. In this case, exports are not 
taxed and investors are entitled to a refund of the VAT paid on the inputs. 
Thus the host country would need to have the administrative capacity to 
issue timely refunds; if refunds are delayed, they lock up the investor’s 
capital, which can cripple the industry. In contrast, export duties consti-
tute an effective instrument that can capture rent from hard-to-tax sectors 
such as agriculture. These, however, have been gradually phased out, and 
mineral, oil and gas sectors are generally not subject to exports tax. 
Other fi scal instruments that governments can use include license 
fees and signature, discovery, and production bonuses. The natural 
resource sector is subject to different types of license fees, such as pros-
pecting license, retention license, and special mining license, although 
these licenses may not be a major source of revenue. In many govern-
ments, the energy and mining ministry retains these fees along with the 
royalty payment, while the tax revenues accrue to the tax administration 
and the fi nance ministry. These license fees are meant to provide an 
incentive to the investor to conduct exploration on a specifi ed area 
within the licensed time period. Similarly, governments in many coun-
tries require payment of signature and discovery bonuses before the 
development of an oil or gas deposit, as well as a production bonus before 
starting extraction or when production reaches a certain level. 
There are several tax incentives applicable to mining, oil, and gas that 
are meant to encourage additional investments that otherwise might not 
be made. Most resource-dependent developing countries provide tax 
incentives in order to attract capital investment for extraction of natural 
resources. Although there is no clear evidence that providing tax incen-
tives has an impact on the overall level of investment, such incentives 
constitute a signal that governments are willing to forgo revenues in 
order to attract new projects and provide material compensation for the 
higher risk. Some countries offer outright fi scal tax holidays for limited 
periods or a reduced rate of corporate income tax for the life of the 
extraction of the resource body, but these instruments prove to be inef-
fective and have become less common. Such tax breaks may be reserved 
only for encouraging investments in special sectors of the economy or in 
particular regions of the country. Some countries allow for tax credit 
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available from one project to be applied to tax liabilities from another 
project. Another type of tax incentive is to provide extractive companies 
with a depreciation allowance at a higher rate than that permissible 
under the normal rules of depreciation, reducing tax liability during 
early years and improving project viability. Accelerated depreciation also 
encourages fi rms to invest in capital assets with longer life, since they can 
claim higher depreciation allowance and have a higher level of tax sav-
ings. Immediate expensing provides the largest tax savings, therefore 
encouraging higher investment, because it deducts the full amount of 
the depreciation in the fi rst year of production. The government does 
not collect any tax revenues under this regime. Immediate expensing is 
generally offered on exploration and development costs. Sometimes, 
more liberal “loss carryforward” rules are applied, including a loss car-
ryforward provision for an unlimited period of time. Besides, most 
countries either exempt imported machinery, equipment, and materi-
als used in the extraction of natural resources from import duty and 
VAT, or give a duty drawback or impose a lower tariff rate. Finally, some 
countries also permit a “depletion allowance” on natural resources to 
compensate fi rms for the loss of the resource caused by extraction. How-
ever, such an allowance will erode the tax base, in which case the cutoff 
grade will be lowered and recoverable reserves will increase.4 Its impact 
on the extraction profi le and cutoff grade is therefore just the opposite of 
specifi c royalty and ad valorem royalty. 
In sum, the various tax alternatives not only create different incentives 
for extraction and grade selection, which may result in deadweight loss, 
but they also affect the variability or uncertainty of government revenues 
(see table 4.2) and the level of risks or opportunities for corruption. 
Impacts of Alternative Tax Regimes on Government Revenues
The uncertainty of the revenue stream to the government imposes a cost 
on the economy because it contributes to an unstable and unpredictable 
fi scal policy, making such taxes less desirable than those with less vari-
ability of government revenues. From this point of view, the output-
related taxes are preferable to income-based taxes.
A per-unit royalty or ad valorem royalty on output is dependent 
only on the quantity and price of the output, thus creating the least 
variable or uncertain revenue stream. Moving to a variable royalty 
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clearly increases the extent of variability or uncertainty. Income tax rev-
enues depend not only on the quantity of resource extracted and the 
price of output, but also on the prices of inputs and cost overruns, thus 
the revenue stream from income taxes has higher variability. The vari-
ability of a combination of income tax and royalty, then, lies between 
that of variable royalty and income tax, and is moderate compared with 
a pure income tax. When additional tax on profi ts or resource rent taxes 
are employed, the result is more than one tax rate, making the revenue 
stream more variable or uncertain. The property tax is a function of rev-
enue from the extraction of the resource and its variability is similar to 
that of ad valorem royalty. 
Administrative and Compliance Costs of Alternative Tax Regimes 
The different taxes imposed on a resource body differ not only in their 
impact on the extraction profi le, the variability of the revenue streams, 
and the value of the mine or fi eld, but also in the cost of administering 
them. These administration costs have two components. First is the cost 
of collection, or administrative cost, representing the public sector cost 
incurred by the government’s revenue department in administering 
existing tax laws. It includes wages and salaries, accommodation and 
transportation, investigation of tax evasion/tax avoidance and enforce-
ment, and maintenance of a legal system for adjudication of disputes. 
The other administration component is the cost borne by the taxpayer 
or the private sector in meeting the legal requirements of the tax system. 
This cost includes the expense of keeping records, accounts, and other 
necessary data, research related to acquiring the knowledge of legal obli-
gations and penalties, payments to professional advisors for tax advice, 
and other incidental costs. The administrative and compliance costs 
together  constitute the costs of taxation. 
Tax and nontax instruments need to be evaluated not only to con-
sider the different trade-offs between effi ciency and effectiveness in 
raising revenue and between economic effi ciency and revenue adequacy 
and variability. It is also important to consider their suitability to the 
existing state capacity and the specifi c political economy context of 
developing countries, which will be discussed in more detail later in 
this chapter.
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Corruption Risks 
Fiscal corruption5 is a major concern for all countries. Indeed, a num-
ber of studies indicate that systemic tax evasion and corruption in tax 
administration results in only a fraction of taxes that would be due 
being collected by the government (Alm, Bahl, and Murray 1991; 
 Cobham 2005). For resource-dependent countries, fi scal corruption 
can be a particularly damaging phenomenon. Not only do these coun-
tries rely heavily on taxes from extractive industries to fi nance budget-
ary needs and development projects, but also the likelihood of fi scal 
corruption is higher given that signifi cant rents can be dissipated by 
companies from bribing tax offi cials or underreporting their income 
from the sale of resources  (Kolstad and Wiig 2009).
Fiscal corruption occurs because of problems between principals 
and agents. The government (the principal) has imperfect information 
about whether the tax bureaucrats and collectors they hire (the agents) 
are honest or dishonest. Furthermore, the government is unable to 
monitor the behavior of tax bureaucrats, collectors, and taxpayers. 
Consequently, rampant tax evasion and collusive activities between 
collectors and payers can emerge, where bribes are paid in exchange 
for underreporting taxable income (Flatters and MacLeod 1995). In 
addition to these principal-agent problems, other factors lead to fi scal 
corruption such as an overly complex tax policy or tax administration 
regulations. In this respect, bribery may be used as a quick solution to 
overcome a diffi cult and onerous system of paying taxes. Additionally, 
fi scal corruption may result if the government is unable or unwilling to 
impose strict penalties on tax collectors for corrupt behavior or to sanc-
tion companies that pay bribes or underreport their income (Tanzi 
1998; Imam and Jacobs 2007).
Corruption reduces the government’s ability to collect revenue, pre-
vents the government from fulfi lling public spending obligations, 
increases income inequality, and encourages corruption in other areas. It 
also has broader societal effects, specifi cally, in damaging the level of 
trust in the government and undermining its legitimacy (Fjeldstad and 
Tungodden 2001). These risks are higher in resource-dependent coun-
tries that are reliant on tax revenues derived from extractive industries 
because of the sizable rents at stake.
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While preventing fi scal corruption is always a challenge, making the 
tax system simpler and more transparent reduces the risks of corruption 
and increases taxpayer compliance. A clear and simple system prevents 
tax collectors from taking it upon themselves to interpret tax laws and 
regulations; it also prevents companies from taking undue advantage of 
loopholes or exemptions. Standardization of tax procedures can also 
prevent companies from using bribes as a means of avoiding a lengthy 
and complicated process to determine tax liability. 
Among fi scal instruments, per-unit royalties are least susceptible to 
fi scal corruption because they require a relatively low level of admin-
istrative capacity and are usually straightforward in how they are cal-
culated from a company’s total production. This recommendation is 
consistent with studies that show that corruption affects direct taxes 
more than indirect taxes (Ghura 2002; Tanzi and Davoodi 2002). 
Indeed, profi t-based taxes (royalty or otherwise) invite more room for 
corruption and therefore require more monitoring by the government. 
However, the government must balance its concern for revenue genera-
tion with its need to prevent fi scal corruption. Where royalties and 
indirect taxes are deemed ineffi cient and do not maximize revenue over 
the long term, other means of combating fi scal corruption should be 
explored.
Centrality of Tax Administration 
The central problem in low-capacity, low-governance, resource-rich 
countries is that tax administration is the crucial constraint on revenue 
collection, no matter what fi scal regime design is instituted. In real terms, 
“tax administration is tax policy” (Casanegra de Jantscher and Silvani 
1990) because tax administration has ultimate discretion over interpre-
tation of tax laws and determination of tax liability. The manner in 
which tax policy is applied in turn tends to create further delays and 
distortions that will affect investment and production decisions. Tax 
administration is also an area most vulnerable to corruption. 
Most low-income countries have a need for improvement in their tax 
administration capacity, which in turn can yield substantial increases in 
public revenues from natural resources and from the nonresource econ-
omy. Yet these investments must be sustained at odds with short-term 
time horizons and the prevailing political and economic incentives. Most 
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resource-dependent countries have an overall low to moderate state 
effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue, 
falling much behind countries of similar GDP (Karl 1997; Knack 2008). 
The number of tax administration agents per thousand inhabitants is 
lower on average in these countries, but the cost as a percentage of the 
revenues collected is also lower on average (Rozner 2009). These fi gures 
are symptomatic of the relative ease of collection efforts that resource 
rents offer, but in the long run it reduces the need for other taxes and 
lowers domestic tax effort.
The present quality of implementation and enforcement of fi scal 
regimes is the result of past investments in building institutional and 
technical capacity of tax administration and the level of professionalism 
of the civil service. Because of the technical and economic complexity of 
extractive industries, an effective tax administration requires capable, 
independent bureaucracies with specialized personnel. The main chal-
lenge of capacity-building efforts lies in attracting and retaining quali-
fi ed professionals. Salaries are generally low and noncompetitive, result-
ing in considerably high turnover, especially in highly technical areas. 
Many experienced agents are routinely hired by the same companies that 
they monitor, which gives companies additional advantages in maneu-
vering around the tax system. 
Taxing extractive industries typically involves multiple actors, includ-
ing sector ministries, mineral commissions, customs, and tax collection 
agencies. In settings where interagency coordination and alignment of 
incentives are poor, revenue collection is consequently lower. Institu-
tional duplication and fragmentation increase the cost of controlling 
and scrutinizing adherence to rules by tax agents for the legislature and 
fi nance ministry. The country’s form of government and the formal and 
informal distribution of governmental functions will determine how 
fragmented the implementation of taxation will be. In addition, there 
may be bureaucratic and organizational incentives and agendas that 
increase the transaction costs associated with natural resource taxation 
policy. Lack of coordination between different agencies and between 
levels of government often refl ects the noncooperative nature of the 
political system (Haggard and McCubbins 2001). 
In many cases where the lack of capacity has compromised the effec-
tiveness of revenue collection, governments resort to state-owned 
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enterprises, which are generally better capacitated than tax agencies, to 
mobilize taxes from extractive activities, for example, as in state-owned 
oil and gas companies YPFB in Bolivia and Petroecuador in Ecuador. 
However, this dual role often compromises the performance of such 
entities by distracting them from their core functions (McPherson 2003; 
Marcel and Mitchell 2006), while diverting the limited resources avail-
able for tax administration to SOEs and away from revenue collection 
agencies. Similarly, governments generally use large extractive companies 
as collection agents for vendors and employees. As large employers and 
buyers of various services and supplies, mining and petroleum companies 
withhold personal and profi t taxes from their employees and providers 
(Price Waterhouse Coopers 2010). This contributes to the formalization 
of the sector, but without proper monitoring of the resources that compa-
nies owe to government, it can lead to revenue dissipation. 
In situations of extreme weakness in revenue administration, govern-
ments also resort to bundled deals that completely bypass tax collection 
and public expenditure management. While reducing the transaction 
costs for the government, these contracts create additional risks because 
mining and oil companies engage in operations that are not typically cov-
ered by mining or hydrocarbon laws, for example, in the development of 
major infrastructure facilities (roads, railways, power generation), as well 
as processing plants and local community development. In some cases, the 
concessionaires are also the suppliers of goods and services for projects. 
The countries studied for this volume show variation in the geo-
graphical coverage and capacity of government, but there is less varia-
tion in the effectiveness of revenue administration agencies, which are 
typically low capacity. With the caveat that failures in tax collection 
derived from low government capacity are not independent of the pre-
vailing political and institutional incentives, the most common prob-
lems observed in these cases are described as follows. 
Countries’ low capacity in capturing revenues from the extraction of 
natural resources is usually the result of their inability to determine the 
amount of rents generated by private producers, and, in particular, to 
accurately assess their production costs. Such failure is particularly stark 
in countries such as DRC, where it is estimated that the government col-
lects less than 20 percent of the mining royalties to which it is entitled 
(World Bank 2008b). Lack of real-time information on prices and the 
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inability to accurately assess grades severely limits tax collectors’ ability 
to correctly determine the revenues and fees that apply to an operation, 
especially in the mining sector. In many cases, such as DRC, Ghana, 
Niger, and Lao PDR, the government has almost no independent capac-
ity to assess quantity or grades of extracted resources or their market 
prices, and it must rely almost exclusively on the information provided 
by extractive companies (Ayee et al. 2011; Barma, Fritz, and Rex 2010; 
Chevallier and Kaiser 2010; Yungu, Chevallier, and Viñuela 2010).
In most countries, tax agencies are signifi cantly under-staffed and 
under-resourced. For example, in Timor-Leste the Petroleum Tax 
 Division—which handles all receipts from royalties and profi t taxes on 
oil, license application fees, income from sales, income tax, and supple-
mental petroleum tax, together accounting for 98 percent of the regular 
budget—has only two permanent staff and fi ve temporary employees. 
This unit relies heavily on international seconded staff (public servants 
on loan) from Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Norway and it also 
outsources all audit services. Efforts by bilateral donors to build capacity 
in this unit have been continuously undermined by the low salaries 
offered to Timorese employees and high personnel turnover (Anderson, 
Barma, and Porter 2010). In addition, the unit has to work within an 
extremely complex regulatory framework that encompasses four differ-
ent legal regimes and an increasing fl ow of resources, but has no in-
house legal advisor. Nigeria’s Federal Inland Revenue Service has a total 
of 130 auditors, but only 20 have attended some form of oil and gas 
training. The Vientiane capital tax offi ce, the largest tax offi ce in Lao 
PDR, has just 8 percent of its staff assigned to and capable of auditing; in 
comparison, most modern tax administrations typically assign about 30 
percent of their staff to tax auditing. In Zambia, the mining tax unit 
(MTU) was established in 2008 as part of the large taxpayers unit, but its 
capacity is overstretched because it must audit the entire mining sector, 
including small mines. Currently the MTU has six auditors dedicated to 
nine large mines and numerous small mines. Critical issues include the 
absence of specialized sector audit training (for example, to handle 
transfer pricing), ineffi cient tax-type auditing focus, and lack of an inte-
grated rules manual for sector auditing.
In countries where fi scal administration is divided between govern-
ment and state-owned corporate entities, tax agencies often have far 
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fewer resources than state-owned enterprises. In Angola, for example, oil 
revenue collection is carried out by Sonangol, the Ministry of Petroleum, 
and the Ministry of Finance through the Tax Directorate. In contrast 
with the fi rst two, the Tax Directorate faces great human resource defi -
ciencies; the Ministry of Finance does not have enough accountants, 
managers, and, more generally, fi nancially literate personnel (Hansen 
and Soares de Oliveira 2009). Because of these defi ciencies, the govern-
ment must rely on international audit companies to carry out most of its 
work and it has little capacity to direct assignments.
Similarly, the confi dentiality of contracts and signing bonuses com-
plicates tax collection. In Ghana, licenses are commonly allocated through 
an administrative process and contracts are not publicly disclosed (Ayee 
et al. 2011). Such a system provides opportunities to hide benefi ts and 
evade taxes in cases where tax collectors may have diffi culty in assessing 
tax obligations. Opaque contracts are also prevalent in Niger, with simi-
lar consequences to Ghana for the administration of taxes and other rev-
enue dissipation (Yungu, Chevallier, and Viñuela 2010).
Problems of coordination between various collection agencies that 
derive from institutional and bureaucratic incentives also create 
opportunities for rent dissipation. Coordination is essential to account 
for all rents generated in a given sector and prevent strategic reporting 
by the companies, as illustrated by the problems of interagency com-
munication in the case of Ghana (Ayee et al. 2011). Coordination 
across levels of government entails particular diffi culties in resource- 
dependent settings. For example, DRC not only has a complex taxa-
tion system with more than 40 different fees, but also has different 
agencies at the different jurisdictions collecting them. As a result, tax 
mobilization is low and mired with corruption risks (Chevallier and 
Kaiser 2010). Another tax administration problem is that weak con-
trol of borders and partial territorial coverage of tax collection agen-
cies allows for signifi cant smuggling of resources out of the country 
without any payment to the government. This problem is particularly 
acute in DRC and Nigeria, where highly organized illegal groups 
“export” a sizable part of the production (Chevallier and Kaiser 2010; 
Gboyega et al. 2010). Moreover, the smuggling of oil and minerals in 
these countries fi nances separatist groups and fuels violence in the 
producing regions. 
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Additionally, the cases in the study provide several examples of open 
confl ict of interest that create obstacles for effi cient tax mobilization, 
such as legislators serving on boards of extractive companies, public 
 offi cials and employees that own shares in projects, public offi cials and 
legislators that trade minerals or own refi neries abroad, and high- ranking 
public offi cials on the payrolls of these enterprises. The majority of these 
problems emerge from the broader institutional defi ciencies in extrac-
tive industry governance, and in tax collection in particular, and the lack 
of incentives to improve overall performance. These confl icts of interest 
also have an adverse effect on the implementation of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) because they hinder the disclo-
sure of receipts from the sector; and they are refl ected in a lack of politi-
cal commitment, inadequate funding, delays in companies and collec-
tion agencies releasing information, and the inability of citizens to access 
information and mobilize for greater accountability. 
Political Economy Settings and Dynamics 
As stated by Bates (1989), “taxation inherently implies politics.” Govern-
ments face competing objectives in selecting fi scal instruments. On the 
one hand, governments seek to reduce revenue variability and the polit-
ical costs associated with fi scal volatility; on the other hand, they want 
to maximize the share of the resource rents over time and be able to 
internalize social and environmental costs associated with these activi-
ties. While pursuing these sometimes rival objectives, governments in 
developing countries with scarce domestic capital also need to create 
incentives that attract foreign investment to develop the sector. Differ-
ent tax regimes favor some goals over others, as explained in the previ-
ous section. 
Figure 4.2 provides a stylized overview of the determinants of fi scal 
regimes and the way they are sequenced. The geological and institutional 
characteristics of a given country—including the type and quality of the 
resource endowment, the level of institutionalization of agreements and 
their enforcement, the distribution of power, and the legacies of previ-
ous policies—interact and condition a government’s overarching policy 
priorities, risk profi le, and time horizons. In turn, these three character-
istics affect the choice of fi scal and nonfi scal instruments, how stable 
142 Rents to Riches?
these regimes are, and how much governments are willing to invest in 
tax administration. An important caveat is that institutional factors are 
likely to be endogenous to the country setting, meaning that the level of 
institutional capacity is a legacy of the country’s historical trajectory and 
cannot be treated as an entirely separate causal factor. 
The political economy typology introduced in chapter 2 categorizes 
government types as patrimonial rule, hegemonic government, clientelist 
pluralism, and programmatic pluralism (see table 2.2). Table 4.3 presents 
the incentives that affect fi scal regime choices and outcomes associated 
with each of them. These settings are characterized by their tendency and 
ability to enforce intertemporal commitments and by the extent to which 
the political system is broadly inclusive. Given the specifi cities of resource 
taxation set out earlier in this chapter, intertemporal aspects of the polit-
ical economy context are likely to signifi cantly shape the choice and 
potentially the performance of fi scal regimes. Settings with high discount 
rates are likely to see greater instability in the fi scal regime, which in turn 
will affect the potential risk perceived by extractive industries.6 This sec-
tion will examine the impact of these political economy contexts on 
resource taxation, time-horizons, and government risk profi le. 
Natural resource management institutions are embedded in a coun-
try’s broader political and economic context. Many of the vulnerabilities 
and policy failures of the revenue mobilization link of the value chain 








•   Level of stability of fiscal
    regimes
•  Choice of tax instruments
•  Level of investments in tax
    administration capacity
level of investments




•  Priotization of objectives
•   Time horizons/discount rates
•  Risk profiles
•  Features of natural
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•  Institutions enforcing
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•  Distribution of power
•   Policy rigidities
Source: Authors.
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Table 4.3. Political Economy Contexts and Fiscal Regimes
Political 
Inclusiveness
 Credibility of Intertemporal Commitments




Patrimonial rule: Individualized 
political authority; crony hierarchy; 
few restraints on power.
  – High discount rate
  – Risk averse
  – Narrow distribution of rents
• Extremely short time horizons 
create pressures to revise fi scal 
regimes, frontload revenues, 
disincentivize investments in 
institutional capacity, and reduce 
risk-sharing to the detriment of 
long-term fi scal stream. 
• Limited inclusiveness reduces the 
space for collective action and 
demands for good governance.
Hegemonic government: Institutionalized 
one-party regime; either predatory or 
benevolent.
  – Low discount rate
  – Risk taking
  – Narrow distribution of rents
• Longer time horizons create a relatively 
more stable fi scal environment. It is in 
the best interest of the ruling elite to 
maximize income over time and 
therefore share the risk in the 
development of extractive industries.
• Limited inclusiveness leads to a 
narrower distribution of rents, which 







Clientelist pluralism: Political 
competition based on extensive use 
of clientelism/patronage
  – High discount rate
  – Risk averse
  – Broader distribution of rents
• Short time horizons due to low 
institutionalization and electoral 
cycles create pressures to revise 
fi scal terms and frontload revenues, 
creating suboptimal outcomes in 
investment and production.
• Revenues are more broadly 
distributed, but patronage and 
earmarking remain signifi cant.
Programmatic pluralism: Electoral 
competition based on programs; 
horizontal and vertical accountability
  – Low discount rate
  – Risk taking
  – Broader distribution of rents
• Longer time horizons create a stable 
fi scal environment leading to long-term 
investments and contracts. 
• Nonetheless, broader political 
inclusiveness creates a greater space for 
collective action for good governance 
and mitigating informational 
 asymmetries.
Source: Authors.
arise from internal and external resistance to reform and a lack of insti-
tutional technologies to secure cooperation between political forces to 
sustain tax policy across different governments. Status quo tax policy 
distributes resources to political economy winners in the sector. In turn, 
these benefi ciaries actively mobilize to sustain the policy status quo 
with positive reinforcement and to put in place roadblocks against 
reforms. 
As the study sample cases reveal, countries in which domestic politi-
cal forces cannot sustain agreements over time tend to mobilize fewer 
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resources from the sector and are associated with more informal (and 
frontloaded) rent extraction. Price and production changes aggravate 
cooperation problems by generating strong incentives to change fi scal 
terms as social expectations and the political costs of taxing other sec-
tors or individuals rise during boom times. At the same time, contract 
negotiations, regulation of the sector, and tax administration are highly 
politicized and confl ict of interests abound, while formal regulations 
are often ignored. 
Intertemporal Cooperation 
In environments where cooperation is possible across time or electoral 
cycles, policy changes tend to be incremental and are completed through 
compromise. Actors that interact repeatedly in institutionalized arenas 
have longer time horizons and invest resources in creating policy capa-
bilities, such as tax administration capacity (Stein et al. 2008). More 
inclusive and competitive systems also make greater use of voluntary 
tax compliance, since government legitimacy is higher (Levi 1988; de 
Juan, Lasheras, and Mayo 1994; Alm 1996; Pommerehne and Weck-
Hannemann 1996; Feld and Frey 2002). In these cases, the tax base is 
broader, administration cost is lower, and, consequently, total revenues 
are higher (Kenny and Winter 2006; Winer and Hettich 2006). 
Professional bureaucracies can limit the scope of opportunistic poli-
cies and enhance trust in commitments by ensuring the implementation 
of policy agreements over time (Huber and McCarty 2001). They reduce 
the incentives to change fi scal regimes by effi ciently maximizing revenues 
within the framework of existing regimes. A capable tax administration 
also improves the position of the government with regard to other actors. 
Lastly, countries with politically competitive systems, where institutional 
technologies are available to enforce intertemporal agreements, provide 
the most stable fi scal environment for the development of extractive 
activities and the greatest level of effi ciency in public spending. Fiscal and 
electoral rules in countries like Chile and Trinidad and Tobago are stable 
and provide incentives for political groups to enter into agreements and 
sustain them across political cycles and changes in government.
Political systems in which there is fair electoral competition, but 
where political forces do not engage in long-term agreements, are gener-
ally associated with the extensive use of clientelism to mobilize support. 
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Patronage links are strong and embedded in political parties, regional 
networks, and business conglomerates. Parties are weakly institutional-
ized and rely on personalistic strategies rather than competing on the 
basis of programs. Electoral rules are often the object of choice and 
manipulation, as shown in the cases of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mongolia. 
Legislative coalitions are generally short-lived and incur signifi cant costs 
that create pressures to expand fi scal spending. In countries with such 
weak coalitions, sudden changes in revenues can have signifi cant politi-
cal costs. As time horizons are relatively short, discount rates are high 
and incentives to invest in institutional capacity are low, while formal 
regulation is often ignored. Politicians in such cases frequently use pop-
ulist promises and sovereignty narratives to increase taxation or nation-
alize companies during boom times. In other cases, parties face credibil-
ity problems in committing to politically costly reforms, as was the case 
with the Mexican government and the national oil company PEMEX. 
The problems of time inconsistency are common in these settings.
DRC and Niger offer examples of countries with noninclusive polit-
ical systems in which intertemporal cooperation is weak. In these pat-
rimonial settings, policy makers have short time horizons and systemic 
instability is prevalent as power continues to be highly contested. As a 
result, decisions in the sector lead to frontloading of revenues through 
signing bonuses and bundled deals as well as the renegotiation of con-
tracts. In such contexts, price shocks generate additional instability. 
For example, Niger has had four coups and fi ve constitutions since 
independence in 1960, closely following the uranium boom and bust 
cycle. Because of fragmentation in the party system, power holders 
need to balance coalitions from different regional and ethnic group-
ings while securing the support of the military. Adding to this fragile 
situation are recurring confl icts between the central government and 
armed rebel groups over natural resources in the province of Agadez. 
Sharp price and production changes have reshaped the distribution of 
power and destabilized coalitions, and may continue to do so (Yungu, 
Chevallier, and Viñuela 2010). In DRC, the ruling coalition derives its 
support from the eastern provinces in a context of regional and ethnic 
fragmentation and frequent interference from neighboring countries; 
and the smuggling of mineral resources has fueled inter-regional 
 confl ict.
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Noninclusive political systems in which one political force is hege-
monic and where established mechanisms determine succession in 
power and enforce intertemporal agreements, as in Angola and Lao 
PDR, are better placed to provide a stable fi scal environment for inves-
tors, choose tax instruments that maximize revenues over time, and 
attract foreign capital to explore new areas. Nonetheless, the concentra-
tion of power in the executive often implies that rents are diverted 
downstream or extracted through informal channels. A portion of the 
rents is distributed to key groups that support the ruling government, 
such as Luanda’s urban classes and the military in Angola or party cad-
res in Lao PDR.
Government Discount Rate 
Actors with long time horizons will be more likely to engage in farsighted 
agreements than actors that are trying to maximize short-term political 
benefi ts to the detriment of policy effectiveness. Time horizons affect 
discount rates. The government’s discount rate refers to the degree to 
which it cares about the future. Governments are said to have high rates 
of discount when the risk of being removed from offi ce is high. The 
implication for the level of taxation is that governments that are guided 
by short-term considerations will raise taxation of the sector in the 
short-term using the available mechanisms and invest less in building 
taxation capacity in the long run. 
Democratic and authoritarian regimes (Levi 1988; Olson 1993) with 
suffi ciently short time horizons will plunder society by attempting to 
extract the maximum in taxes, break contracts, and engage in confi sca-
tory policies because they do not bear the long-run economic conse-
quences of such choices. They will also have incentives to increase debt 
and use infl ationary policies (Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini 1992). 
The more likely it is to be replaced by a party or faction that has very dif-
ferent priorities, the less the incumbent government’s incentive to create 
taxation capacity and the greater its incentive to acquire debt as a way of 
tying the hands of the next administration (Sachs and Roubini 1989; 
Grilli 1990). Governments with high discount rates not only seek to take 
a higher share of resource rents, but also are likely to prefer instruments 
that frontload revenues, such as royalties. In turn, these instruments 
affect the production time profi le of mines and fi elds. In summary, 
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short-term horizons are associated with faster rates of resource extrac-
tion and frontloading of taxes (Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006) and 
underinvestment in the long run.
Government Perceptions of Risk 
Governments willing to take greater risks use neutral taxation instru-
ments and nonfi scal alternatives, such as equity participation and 
 production-sharing, in order to mobilize revenues. Conversely, risk-
averse governments tend to resort to instruments like royalties that 
reduce revenue variability and frontload taxes. Different resource pro-
fi les—shaped by the type of resource, the quality and accessibility of the 
endowments, the history of the sector, and the availability of accurate 
geological information—in combination with the international mar-
ket, price conditions, and technology determine the economic risks 
associated with the exploration and extraction of natural resources 
(Nellor and McKee Sunley 2003).
 On the other hand, numerous political risks are associated with 
high dependence on rents from natural resources. First, there is a 
potential for loss of support from the communities affected by the 
social and environmental negative externalities associated with the 
extraction of minerals. In some cases, these tensions can coincide with 
other grievances and lead to civil confl icts. In most cases, the produc-
tion of natural resources kindles demands for vertical distribution of 
the rents with the producing regions (Kaiser and Viñuela 2010). Sec-
ond, if governments derive their support from the use of patronage 
networks and the distribution of resources to key groups, the revenue 
volatility associated with changes in prices and quantity of production 
can affect their ability to distribute those benefi ts and may destabilize 
the regime. As well, low tax rates during boom periods can create per-
ceptions among citizens and international observers that companies 
are the only ones benefi ting from the high prices and may create pres-
sures to adjust the rates (Osmundsen 2010).
Institutional and Policy Rigidity 
The durability of policies depends on the simultaneous creation of 
institutional mechanisms that lock in these reforms. Policies promote 
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their own survival if they introduce simultaneous institutional and 
organizational changes that discourage future efforts to overturn them 
(Patashnik 2008) and that provide self-enforcing incentives (North and 
Weingast 1989). Tax administration reforms and institutional changes 
may dislodge the bureaucratic or regulatory structures that produced 
the same outcomes that the reform attempted to change. Policy changes 
may alter transaction costs and shift the control over a given policy to a 
different governmental venue in which pro-reform coalitions enjoy 
privileged access. Policy stability can be achieved by delegating its 
implementation to an independent technical agency. While delegation 
has its problems, there are instances in which the cost of those problems 
is smaller than the cost of partisan or factional policymaking. An inde-
pendent tax administration provides assurance that the government 
will uphold its end of the bargain and encourage reluctant investors 
and policy makers alike to take the risks and bear the costs necessary to 
achieve mutual gains.
Nevertheless, tax administration reforms face several challenges 
that include feedback effects, path dependencies, and institutional 
rigidities. Policies produce feedback effects on politics. They distribute 
resources and create incentives that affect choices that then shape 
those same policies in return (Pierson 2005). Organizations and groups 
that emerge as a response to a policy and that receive substantial ben-
efi ts from fi scal arrangements are likely to use those resources to resist 
change and are often well placed to block reforms. In addition, reform 
choices are made within the context of existing institutions and orga-
nizations that can create path dependencies and inertia. Past decisions 
on ownership, organization of the sector, and tax administration con-
strain in signifi cant ways policy options in the present (Jones Luong 
and Weinthal 2001).
Policy Implications: Building Credibility in Tax Collection 
While the theoretical economic impact of individual tax types is suffi -
ciently clear, no optimal one-size-fi ts-all fi scal regime appears to exist. 
Throughout the world, tax policy is not based on technical modeling 
alone—rather, it is a function of a mixture of politics, economics, and 
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institutional technologies. As Bird (2008, 2) succinctly states, fi scal 
regimes are shaped “not only by ideas and vested interests but also by 
changing economic conditions, administrative constraints and techno-
logical possibilities, and especially, the political institutions within 
which these factors are at play.” Different types of regimes and institu-
tional confi gurations can be recommended depending on the country’s 
specifi c context. Practices in taxation of natural resources vary widely, 
even in developed countries. In low-income, developing countries, tax 
competition to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), “herd” behavior 
in copying tax regimes from other countries in the region, and advice 
by international experts or donors are all factors that contribute to the 
way fi scal regimes are set. 
As a result, paradoxically, developing countries often have more com-
plex regimes than countries with higher capacity. In recent years, devel-
oped countries have strived to simplify their tax systems (Otto and 
Andrews 2006; van Meurs 2008), whereas low-capacity, weak-gover-
nance countries do just the opposite—or at least refuse to follow the 
trend. They tend to introduce relatively complex regimes, particularly if 
their royalty base is designed for one of the hard-to-tax resources such as 
metals. In those cases, the design defeats the very objective of relying on 
royalty as the simple, effi cient revenue-raising instrument at the expense 
of economic effi ciency. The fact is that these developing countries are 
still struggling to defi ne a fi scal regime that fi ts their core objectives and 
adapts to existing administrative capacity and institutional arrange-
ments, as well as the political landscape determining the effi cacy of sec-
tor regulation and revenue collection. 
The political and institutional features that infl uence tax policy 
also interact with specifi c characteristics of the extractive sector and 
the volatile price environment, creating a time consistency problem 
between long-term investments and short-term political commit-
ments. In the absence of a third-party referee, low- and middle- income 
countries that lack formal or informal institutional mechanisms to 
enforce intertemporal commitments among domestic stakeholders 
face the greatest challenge in building credibility as reasonable tax col-
lectors. The policy swings that result from price volatility, electoral 
and political cycles, and the absence of executive constraints increase 
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the perceived risks for investors. Tax policy instability (or low credibil-
ity) means that governments need to offer lower takes and compen-
sate for the higher risk to attract investment. Such commitments tend 
to be inherently diffi cult to enforce after prices increase and invest-
ments are sunk.
Consequently, recommendations for tax policy must consider the 
use of fi scal and nonfi scal instruments, along with determining the 
level of taxation of the industry. Governments should initially tailor 
rates to economic, geological, and technological conditions, and then 
gradually change to a neutral and stable tax system (Osmundsen 2010). 
However, it is worth noting that meddling with fi scal regimes too 
abruptly and too frequently would be detrimental to the credibility of 
governments and that investment would decrease as a result. Studies of 
FDI and the politics of taxation indicate that when revenue intakes are 
too low and tax administration capacity is rudimentary, it is possible to 
achieve a “quick win” without dampening investment incentives by 
simplifying the tax regime. Once credibility has been established, the 
government could incrementally increase its take and adjust the instru-
ments to make them neutral or progressive. 
Figure 4.3 charts a path to achieving credible fi scal reform. The policy 
and administration interventions along the 45-degree line would allow 
governments to obtain a fair share of the rent and at the same time create 
a favorable environment for investment. A hypothetical ideal path begins 
with a low equilibrium (low government revenue intake and low invest-
ment), where a government may start adjusting the level of revenue 
intake by relying on revenue-neutral policy measures or gradual enhance-
ment of collection enforcement. As the government learns more about 
taxing resource rent, it introduces more neutral or progressive elements 
in the country’s fi scal regime, creating the path (bolded line) parallel to 
the 45-degree line. The distance between the fi scal path and the 45-degree 
line represents the “credibility gap”; once it is “fi lled,” the government 
may safely uptick its revenue intake without sacrifi cing the robust level 
of investment through deepening tax policy and administration 
reform. 
In the absence of third-party institutions that penalize governments 
for changing tax rules, countries can only improve their reputation as 
reasonable tax collectors by accepting a reasonable tax burden and 
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short-term losses of tax revenues while engaging in long-term reforms. 
Ultimately, the main constraint on rulers’ pursuit of wealth for them-
selves is the threat of declining revenue caused by capital fl ight or 
reduction of economic effort. However, there are political and electoral 
costs associated with tying the government’s hand that leaders will 
weigh. Box 4.1 shows that countries that have been successful at adjust-
ing their rates while prices are high succeeded because of how they 
did it, including letting investors know that these actions would pre-
vent further adjustments or changes in the model of ownership or 
nationalization. 
“Good Fit” Fiscal Regimes 
The recommendations presented in this section are based on the coun-
try’s ability to sustain commitments in tax policy over time, which affects 
its overall credibility, as well as the degree of inclusiveness of its political 
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Box 4.1 Responses to the Mineral Price Boom 
During the last mineral price boom (2004–08), Chile, Mongolia, Peru, and Zambia increased their 
level of taxation. However, their responses and level of success varied. Chile introduced a profi t-
related royalty in 2005, after many years of imposing only a fl at income tax. Unable to increase 
investment in state-owned CODELCO, the Chilean government started allocating unexplored 
areas to private investors, offering them below-average tax rates. With the government having 
built credibility as a restrained tax collector, private companies did not resist the measure. 
Peru sought to avoid modifying its mining legislation by creating a “voluntary contribution” 
scheme related to prices in 2006. Companies adhered to the scheme as a preventive measure 
against more aggressive tax reforms. 
Mongolia’s Parliament passed a law that created a windfall tax in 2006, but its stability clauses 
effectively restrict its application to only one mine. However, this tax is likely to negatively affect 
future investments. 
In a similar manner, Zambia introduced a windfall tax in 2008, which was quickly withdrawn. 
After two decades of low investment in the copper industry, the Copperbelt was privatized in the 
mid-1990s. At that time, buyers used their leverage to obtain low tax rates and a broad stabilization 
clause. As copper prices quadrupled from 2003 to 2008, the Zambian government came under 
domestic and international pressure to raise tax rates. In 2008, it increased tax rates, annulled sta-
bilization agreements, and introduced a windfall tax. Nonetheless, soon after passing the reform, 
the government reversed the measure, responding to the pressure of international investors.
Sources: Navia 2009; Finch 2009.
system, that is, how many groups or political parties have a say in the 
decision-making process. In addition, the degree of certainty about geo-
logical prospects is considered (Mazaheri 2010). Table 4.4 displays the 
recommended fi scal and nonfi scal instruments for natural resource–
dependent countries along these three dimensions, with the assumption 
that high administrative capacity is likely to be the exception rather than 
the norm, even in advanced countries. 
For each of the four political economy settings, there are fi scal instru-
ments that can contribute to minimizing corruption risks and maxi-
mizing revenue, given the existing tax administration capabilities and 
incentives to invest in strengthening capacity and the degree of geo-
logical maturity, while improving the fairness of the country’s share 
and building in mechanisms that allow both investors and government 
to regularly revise agreements in light of major shifts in the market 
environment. In doing so, these proposed policies provide minimally 
acceptable government performance without signifi cantly hindering 
economic and political development (Grindle 2007).
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Table 4.4. “Good Fit” Fiscal and Nonfi scal Instruments for Resource-Dependent Countries
Political inclusiveness
Credibility of intertemporal commitment




With certain geological prospects:
• Contract out audit capacity
• Production-based royalties combined with windfall royalties
• Use of stability clauses with built-in regular revisions
With uncertain geological prospects:
• Contract out audit capacity
• Production-based royalties combined with windfall royalties
• Use of stability clauses with built-in regular revisions
Hegemonic government
With certain geological prospects:
• Enclave tax administration capacity
•  Production-based royalties combined with windfall royalties or 
sliding scale royalties, production-sharing
With uncertain geological prospects:
• Enclave tax administration capacity
•  Production-based royalties combined with windfall royalties or 
sliding scale royalties
• Use of stability clauses with built-in regular revisions




With certain geological prospects:
•  Contracting out in the short term and gradually building audit 
capacity through broader coalitions
•  Progressive income tax or profi t-based tax, price-based 
windfalls, sliding-scale royalties
• Use of stability clauses with built-in regular revisions
With uncertain geological prospects:
•  Contracting out in the short term and gradually building audit 
capacity through broader coalitions
•  Production-based royalties combined with windfall royalties, 
production-sharing, equity-sharing
• Use of stability clauses with built-in regular revisions 
Programmatic pluralism 
With certain geological prospects:
• Auctions, progressive income tax or profi t-based tax
With uncertain geological prospects:
• Auctions, progressive income tax or profi t-based tax
• Use of stability clauses with built-in regular revisions
• Targeted tax incentives 
Source: Authors’ compilation, adapted from Mazaheri 2010.
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Variation along each of the dimensions of credibility of commit-
ments and political inclusiveness yields different recommendations 
for resource-dependent countries. The government’s ability to credi-
bly commit to policies and contracts over time is of special concern to 
companies and investors. When governments have the reputation of 
breaking commitments and reversing policies, companies will need 
governments to signal commitment. Stability clauses—which can 
take a variety of forms, including fi xed tax rates over a specifi c time 
period or adoption of a rule-based guarantee of the fi scal terms under 
signed development agreements—are the most commonly used 
instrument to assure companies that their investments are secure and 
that contracts will be honored. Transparent stability clauses, espe-
cially when subject to third-party arbitration, tend to be most credi-
ble to investors.
Similarly, governments may need to provide extra reassurances to 
investors when geographical prospects are uncertain. For countries with 
newly discovered natural resources that have not yet proven their 
reserves, or whose resources are in hard-to-reach regions surrounded by 
poor infrastructure, investors assume greater fi nancial risk and thus 
expect to be better rewarded. Governments can provide a range of tar-
geted tax incentives that help compensate for this risk, such as acceler-
ated depreciation in combination with prolonged loss carried forward 
for allowance and reinvestment tax credits. 
On the other hand, when geological prospects are more certain, a 
government may resort to auctions as a way to allocate resources and 
generate revenues (Cramton 2007). However, this is typically recom-
mended only when the government has some degree of credibility, 
because auctions need to be conducted in a transparent and accountable 
atmosphere where clear, formal rules are effectively honored and where 
corruption is far from being endemic. In order to maximize their take, 
governments need to invest in gathering suffi cient geological data to 
draw blocks and mining areas and set the terms of the auction. Although 
using auctions when geological prospects are unknown can be a way for 
poor countries to obtain revenue up front and to reveal the true value of 
reservoirs and basins, there is always a risk of collusion among private 
operators and the risk that investors will capture a higher share of the 
actual value of the resources over time.  Nonetheless, there is also a risk 
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that a resource project will not be profi table over time; therefore, royal-
ties or production-sharing arrangements can be used alongside auctions 
to help governments gain a certain amount of revenue while sharing 
part of the extraction and production risks. It should be noted, however, 
that this is very much dependent on the country-specifi c context and the 
relative bargaining power between government and investors, and that 
economic effi ciency dictates that risk should be borne by the party that 
is best suited to assume it.
Production-sharing or equity-sharing arrangements should be consid-
ered when the government has low administrative capacity but possesses 
some degree of credibility. The government’s credibility is important in 
this regard because production-sharing and equity-sharing arrangements 
necessitate stable contracts and predictable policy making from the gov-
ernment over time. The benefi ts of these arrangements are numerous, 
most signifi cantly that the government retains ownership of the actual 
resources being extracted.
Linking Transparency to Credibility, Reputation, and Signaling 
Increasing the transparency that surrounds policy making and reve-
nue fl ows can also contribute to building credible commitments and 
solving the time consistency problem in tax policy. For governments 
whose power is not formally limited and for whom the use of third-
party enforcers is not feasible, increasing transparency can corre-
spondingly increase the perception of government credibility. In 
general, transparency allows agents to better understand whether 
deviations from expectations are the result of opportunism or sto-
chastic shocks, a central  concern in models of accountability (Alt 
2002). Policy makers that support reform can create new institutions 
to signal commitment or to lock in policies against future incumbents. 
Politicians can be persuaded to undertake reforms that signal com-
mitment if they believe that investors will react positively, as institu-
tional change can take place when actors with power perceive that 
their interests can be better achieved through alternative sets of rules 
(Geddes 1994).
A government can improve its credibility by creating institutions 
that give various interests a say in policy making and increase the 
 constraints on its power. Institutions that introduce checks and 
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 balances and mechanisms to enforce agreements between domestic 
actors can create those constraints. Constraints on rulers increase 
investors’ confi dence that the policy environment will not change rad-
ically once they have made specifi c and irreversible investments. Lon-
ger investments tend to increase investors’ attention to political stabil-
ity. In addition, political constraints are expected to reduce rent-seeking 
and the diversion of resources from growth promoting investments in 
infrastructure and human capital (Heinsz 2000). Furthermore, demo-
cratic institutions can indirectly reduce the compliance costs and the 
costs of enforcement associated with taxation, which would increase 
revenues (Levi 1988). Building a reputation of abiding by contracts 
has positive externalities for other sectors and can attract FDI into 
nonmineral sectors. 
If institutions benefi t both the government by increasing revenues, 
and investors by increasing productivity or welfare, then the bargain 
is self-enforcing and thus credible (North and Weingast 1989; Acemo-
glu and Robinson 2001; Escriba Folch 2003). In addition, govern-
ments can use contractual devices, such as stability agreements, to 
reduce investors’ perceptions of risk; over two-thirds of developing 
countries offer this kind of incentive (Baunsgard 2001; Boadway and 
Keen 2010; Daniels, Keen, and McPherson 2010). Nonetheless, their 
effectiveness may be reduced when prices surge beyond the normal 
range of variability and when a third-party arbitrator is effectively 
nonexistent.
Investing in Tax Administration 
Tax farming, or privatization of revenue collection, would raise both 
revenue collection levels and credibility, and concomitantly would 
increase transparency in the tax system. However, few countries apply 
this technique. While the concept is sensible for a country like Timor-
Leste, recently independent and now engaged in state-building, donors 
may be cautious in using it across countries without weighing its costs 
and benefi ts. The recent experience of Mozambique, where agents of 
the consulting fi rm Crown Agents were delegated to collect customs 
duties, caused concern about the sustainability and cost of such an 
arrangement—both fi nancially and in terms of opportunity costs for 
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building domestic capacity and fundamental domestic revenue admin-
istration reforms. In Mozambique, while revenues collected were 
increased, the contract proved to be very expensive for the government 
and the transfer of skills was limited (Fjeldstad and Rakner 2003).
Tax administration reforms are centrally important for appropriately 
implementing tax policy and signaling the government commitment 
that in turn enhances credibility. A number of countries, particularly in 
Africa and Latin America, have embarked on fundamental organizational 
restructuring by creating semiautonomous revenue agencies. The reforms 
aim to improve transparency, integrity, and effi ciency. International 
experience indicates that the success of such innovative institutional for-
mation and tax administration reforms in general depends primarily on 
political will.7 Nevertheless, political will is either lacking or nonsustain-
able in resource-dependent countries because of the long-term nature of 
the investment required.
Thus, facilitating cooperation and creating incentives for policy mak-
ers to enter into long-term, credible commitments over fi scal policy are 
the central challenge of improving tax administration capacity. Develop-
ment partners can provide domestic actors with information and 
resources to help them resolve their present problems of collective action 
and intertemporal enforcement. Donor interventions must rely on the 
premise that, in order to achieve signifi cant changes in tax administra-
tion policy, broad pro-reform coalitions of government offi cials, civil 
society, and private investors must emerge in order to overcome the 
powerful vested interests of the groups that benefi t from the status quo. 
Tax administration improvements have the potential to create positive 
spillovers in addition to increasing revenue collection by creating the 
basis for broadening the tax base that in turn triggers benefi cial strength-
ening of accountability links. 
Political Risk Mitigation 
Among numerous examples of third-party enforcement mechanisms 
are adherence to international arbitration agreements, bilateral invest-
ment treaties with independent dispute-resolution mechanisms, and 
multilateral agency enforcement. Empirical evidence in the area of 
natural resource extraction suggests that international third-party 
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enforcers have been moderately effective in limiting government dis-
cretion in making changes to fi scal terms, and yet they have been 
largely ineffective at deterring renegotiation when resource prices 
dramatically increase (Manzano and Monaldi 2008). Indeed, the ideal 
third-party enforcers should be domestic rather than international 
institutions. 
Nonetheless, there is a role for development partners in helping coun-
tries attract investment and mitigate risk (Mazaheri 2010). By offering 
countries political risk insurance for investments in mining and oil proj-
ects, alongside dispute resolution services, instruments like the World 
Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, which offers political 
risk insurance, have helped countries like Ghana, where the concerns of 
investors in the Jubilee oil and gas fi eld were successfully alleviated. Such 
instruments allow countries to attract investment without forgoing rents 
and thus narrow the fi nancing gap.
Conclusion 
Defi ning and implementing a good fi t fi scal regime for the mineral sector 
are critical to ensuring that governments obtain a fair share of revenue 
and create an environment conducive to investment. But establishing 
such a regime is diffi cult because of a number of technical, economic, and 
political factors. The interaction of these factors leads to the set of issues 
observed in resource-dependent, low-income, and weak-governance 
countries: suboptimal, complex, and contradictory conceptual frame-
works for the design of fi scal regimes; low incentives to invest in revenue 
administration reforms; and perpetuation of time inconsistency and 
problems of commitment. In the maze of such problems, it is important 
to understand that there is no one-size-fi ts-all approach to defi ning a 
good fi t fi scal regime. 
Progressive, profi t-based taxes, in theory, are the fi rst best fi scal instru-
ments, helping achieve higher revenues, effi ciency, and fl exibility. But 
wide variations in underlying political economy drivers, weak revenue 
administration capacity and governance, and institutional fragmenta-
tion in sector regulation and revenue collection mean that the fi scal 
regime must be tailored to each country’s circumstances. Therefore, 
broad guidelines are needed to establish good-enough fi scal regimes 
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based on three dimensions: extent of certainty of geological prospects, 
administrative capacity, and government credibility. 
Fiscal regime reforms in resource-dependent countries must be 
examined in the broader context of tax administration performance. In 
essence, the institutional and organizational dimensions of fi scal policy 
directly affect the level of government take and the effectiveness of the 
fi scal incentives that governments use to attract investment and generate 
revenues. Small improvements in performance can yield substantial 
increases in revenue fl ow, creating positive feedback and helping actors 
interested in channeling those resources through formal avenues, such as 
the revenue authority, to mobilize support for broader reforms.
Moreover, a more effi cient and effective revenue administration 
would play a central role in improving the enforcement of tax policy 
over time and would enable the adoption of more progressive and fl ex-
ible tax policy elements such as windfall royalties, which could mitigate 
the risks of reneging stability clauses. Nonetheless, it needs to rely on a 
broad political consensus with regard to sustaining investment in capac-
ity and introducing institutional and legal provisions that advance coor-
dination with other collecting agents. 
Transparency, credibility, and commitment and how they are se -
quenced play a key role for successful design and implementation of 
low- transaction-cost, good-enough fi scal regimes for the extractive 
sector. Solving the problems of collective action requires reducing 
information asymmetries and introducing institutional technologies 
that lengthen time horizons and improve cooperation. External sup-
port to improve collective action among domestic actors and stake-
holders for good governance constitutes a promising avenue for action 
that should be at the core of development partners’ engagement in 
resource-dependent countries. 
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Annex 4.1. Royalty Practices in Selected Countries 
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Annex 4.2. Mining Effective Tax Rate
 % of revenues 

























Source: Otto and Andrews 2006.  
Note: Cases studied for this volume are indicated with a darker bar. The effective tax rate is the proportion of the present value of the income generated by some hypothetical project 
that is taken in tax, or “tax take” (Otto and Andrews 2006).
COW = contract of work.
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Annex 4.3. Petroleum Total Government Take 
% of revenues

















































Source: Tordo, Johnston, and Johnston 2009.
Note: Cases studied for this volume are indicated with a darker bar. The government take is the host government’s share of pre-taxed revenue streams associated with a particular project 
expressed as a percentage (see Tordo, Johnston, and Johnson 2009, chapter 6). AIOC = Azerbaijan International Operating Company; ZOCA = zone of cooperation area. 
 Taxing Resource Wealth: The Political Economy of Fiscal Regimes 163
Notes
 1.  The discussion focuses on taxation and the fi scal regimes of extractive indus-
tries, but does not cover fi scal regimes for small-scale and artisanal mining or 
renewable resources such as forestry.
 2.  Transfer pricing may be initiated by: (1) buying materials or leasing capital 
goods and equipment from the parent company at above-market price, (2) bor-
rowing from a parent company at excessive interest rates, and (3) charging 
excessive management or consultancy fees and overhead costs. 
 3.  For a general understanding of this tax and an example of the computations 
involved, see Garnaut and Ross (1975). 
 4.  The two types of depletion allowance are cost, in which a fi xed nominal allow-
ance per ton of ore extracted is given, and percentage, in which a fi xed percent-
age of current revenue is allowed to be deducted as a compensation for resource 
exhaustion. Both act as a subsidy and increase the per-unit revenue received by 
the investor.
 5.  This section draws on Mazaheri (2010).
 6.  Instability can also reduce rent-capture by the state in the short term and can 
enhance the profi tability of the extractive industry investor (Guidolin and La 
Ferrara 2007).
 7.  See, for example, Bird (2008); Das-Gupta and Mookherjee (1998); Kidd and 




Resource-dependent countries face the fundamental challenge of how to 
reinvest part of the large rents they receive from extractive industries 
into productive assets that replace the depleted nonrenewable natural 
capital, while at the same time smoothing spending across price cycles 
and minimizing the negative effects of resource revenues on other sec-
tors. To diversify their economies and become less dependent on natural 
resources, capital-scarce developing countries must leverage those invest-
ments to alleviate infrastructure constraints on other sectors of the 
economy and attract investments towards broader job creation and eco-
nomic development. 
Translating natural resource rents into public infrastructure presents 
fi scal management challenges on both macro and micro levels that affect 
the quantity and quality of these resource fl ows and how they contribute 
to the long-term objective of public asset creation and preservation. On 
the macro side, revenue volatility and the pressures created by large 
export revenues on the exchange rate are associated with three major 
problems for macroeconomic and fi scal stability. First, public invest-
ment is a discretionary form of spending, thus it is typically more sensi-
tive to cuts than recurrent expenditures such as public sector wages and 
transfer programs, to which cuts would generate concentrated opposi-
tion. Second, revenue and expenditure volatility affect the predictability 
and sustainability of capital spending implementation. Volatile capital 
Investing Resource Wealth: 
The Political Economy of Public 
Infrastructure Provision
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budgets can create problems of credibility in negotiating public works 
contracts, especially given the longer lead times and implementation 
associated with the infrastructure project portfolio. Third, large public 
investment fl ows into the nonresource economy, especially with regard 
to the construction sector, can overwhelm prevailing construction capac-
ity and temporarily infl ate overall price levels of key tradable and non-
tradable inputs.
On the micro side, the particular challenges associated with creating 
and maintaining public infrastructure assets require attention to the 
institutional modalities and capabilities by which the overall project 
portfolio is implemented. Past efforts to build public investment man-
agement (PIM) systems and improve their functioning, that is, “invest-
ments to invest,” upgrade the modalities that can be used to create phys-
ical assets and thereby enhance a country’s PIM effi ciency, or capacity to 
absorb larger budgets and to scale up investments. In addition to stan-
dard project execution through the government budget, a variety of pub-
lic-private-partnership modalities are pertinent to resource- dependent 
settings, including drawing in the more readily available implementa-
tion capacity of domestic and international providers of capital works. 
Yet public-private partnerships also require a sound regulatory frame-
work and assurances of “value for resources” in contracts with private 
sector agents. 
Public investment management is subject to particular political econ-
omy challenges. The creation of assets involves deferring benefi ts, because 
the return for a public asset is likely to be realized several years in the 
future rather than in the present budget or electoral cycle. The benefi ts 
from public infrastructure are broad and nonrival, making it diffi cult for 
politicians to take credit and reducing the incentives for preservation of 
those assets over time. Moreover, creating and maintaining infrastructure 
is complex and incurs high transaction costs compared with other forms 
of public resource allocation. Building viable infrastructure requires 
effective management of planning, prioritization, and project contract-
ing from implementation through completion as well as operation. At 
any given time, numerous different public sector agencies will be consid-
ering, resourcing, implementing, completing, and using a portfolio of 
hundreds, if not thousands, of projects. These project cycles often take 
years to complete, and the long-term value of physical infrastructure is 
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highly contingent on recurrent spending on maintenance. Efforts at asset 
creation and preservation, even by committed policy principals, can be 
subject to various vulnerabilities. 
The challenges of managing a coherent and sustainable public invest-
ment portfolio are compounded by the specifi c problems observed in 
resource-dependent developing countries, which typically confront a 
plethora of needs and political pressures generated by the weakness of 
other economic sectors. Especially in boom periods and at the early 
stages of resource production, rents become highly visible and social 
expectations rise. Large rents provide public offi cials with the opportu-
nity to increase their political capital by delivering infrastructure proj-
ects and resources to their constituents and coalition members. This 
results in strong incentives to concentrate decisions about rent alloca-
tion at the highest levels of government and to bypass the regular budget 
cycle and procedural rules. The emphasis is usually put on the creation 
of new infrastructure to the detriment of maintenance investments and 
the rehabilitation of existing assets. Because of the uneven geographic 
distribution of natural resources, earmarking large shares of royalties to 
producing regions introduces additional challenges and distortions in 
the allocation of fi scal resources across jurisdictions. Subnational gov-
ernments are not as well-positioned to smooth spending and manage 
investments and do not generally have incentives to coordinate with 
other regions and levels of governments in their investment decisions. 
Such earmarking arrangements are often the result of political bargains 
and historical legacies of the ownership of and rights to natural resources 
that are very diffi cult to change. Finally, in settings with low institution-
alization, in which elites face diffi culties striking and sustaining political 
bargains, public offi cials highly discount the future and have little incen-
tive to defer present consumption in favor of saving or investment, or to 
build the capacity of their PIM systems. In turn, the resulting weak plan-
ning and implementation capacity of public agencies feeds back into the 
incentives to bypass government systems and increase opportunities for 
rent-seeking behavior.
Public investment can refer broadly to allocations to both economic 
and social infrastructure (fi gure 5.1). Resource-dependent countries may 
also include investments that are directly associated with the resource 
sector itself. The ultimate effects of investments depend on the quality of 
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the projects selected, the effi ciency (or value for money) with which they 
are implemented, and how they are operated and sustained. But public 
investment should also be understood in terms of its function as politi-
cal currency. The investment budget itself is often a preferred channel 
for strategic distribution of rents or patronage targeted to a range of 
salient constituencies. 
The concept of investment (or development) expenditure includes, in 
addition to fi xed assets, other spending items that generate benefi ts over 
more than a year.1 The boundary between investment and noninvest-
ment expenditures is not as clear-cut as the distinction between the bud-
get categories of capital and current expenditures and is more diffi cult to 
operationalize. This chapter considers investment expenditures specifi -
cally as investment in productive physical assets.2 This defi nition includes 
their sustained operation, which may or may not be associated with civil 
works. Alternatively, “saving” will be used to denote the build-up of 
fi nancial assets (whether in a country’s central bank, special accounts, or 
other mechanisms such as a sovereign wealth fund). 
The policy choices made by natural resource–endowed countries with 
respect to public investment are nested in a wide array of issues concern-
ing the overall process of public fi nancial management and budgeting. 
Fundamentally, downstream management concerns the deployment of 
rents across the polity and economy over time. A crucial dimension that 
resource-endowed countries must manage is the temporal dimension of 
these rent fl ows. Countries must weigh decisions on intertemporal 
Figure 5.1. Scope of Public Investment
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social infrastructure:
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 consumption versus saving, while considering politically charged, 
present-day demands as well. Given that subsoil assets are being 
depleted in this  process and that rent values are uncertain owing to 
price volatility, sustainability is an overarching criterion for assessing 
the success of resource-dependent countries in this aspect of the extrac-
tive industry value chain. Resource-dependent countries often also 
allocate rents to subsidies and transfers; one option for resource-de-
pendent settings may be handing out rents to citizens and potentially 
taxing them back (see box 5.1). 
Figure 5.2 depicts the overall set of decisions a resource-dependent 
country must make when allocating resources derived from the extraction 
of subsoil assets. Strategic choices for resource-endowed governments 
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Box 5.1 Transfer Programs in Resource-Dependent Countries 
Increasingly, the direct distribution of rents to citizens has been seen as an attractive spending 
option for resource-rich settings. Direct distribution to citizens has been advocated in the case of 
Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003) and Iraq (Birdsall and Subramanian 2004). Arguably, 
money would be better spent (or saved) in the hands of households. In addition, this type of 
direct spending mechanism also promises to strengthen the state-society compact; Devarajan et 
al. (2010) suggest that such a distribution can in turn be partially taxed back, strengthening the 
accountability linkages between state and society and buffering revenue volatility in comparison 
to direct taxation.
The Alaska Permanent Fund, created in 1976 as an amendment to the Alaskan constitution, 
is the most frequently cited example of direct distribution of resource revenues to citizens. The 
size of the annual dividend has increased so that today about US$1 billion is distributed annually 
(based on assets of US$26.5 billion in 2000) to 600,000 citizens—directly accounting for about 
6 percent of total household income in 2000 (Goldsmith 2002). One reason for the creation of 
the fund was the sense that politicians in Alaska squandered resource revenues in the late 
1960s. 
To date, there has been limited uptake of such schemes in developing countries. One excep-
tion is the Motherland Gift Fund in Mongolia, which pays dividends from the country’s mining 
revenues to its citizens (Finch 2009). In practice, however, many resource-dependent countries 
use resource rents to fi nance large transfer programs, even if they are not explicitly linked to 
resource wealth. Iraq’s public distribution system directly provides packages of food to all citizens, 
although there have recently been efforts to improve targeting. Mexico has instituted a number 
of conditional cash transfer programs (for example, the National Solidarity Program, PRONASOL), 
which have been funded in part from natural resource rents. In many Middle Eastern countries, 
subsidized housing and employment, likewise funded by resource revenues, have been integral 
parts of the prevailing political compact (Eifert and Gelb 2002). In short, governments endowed 
with natural resource rents have provided wealth transfers to citizens in a variety of different 
ways. 
Major transfer programs raise a number of macro-fi scal as well as microeconomic issues. To 
avoid large volatility and potential pro-cyclical effects, transfer programs should be stabilized with 
respect to actual rent revenues. Akin to fi scal transfers to subnational governments, transfers to 
citizens should have some degree of predictability. Institutional arrangements should be such that 
central governments cannot simply alter transfer entitlements on an ad hoc basis, at the same 
time maintaining requisite fl exibility for effective macro-fi scal management. Depending on the 
magnitude of transfer programs, policy makers should also be concerned with the likely spending 
behavior of citizens on the basis of these transfers and the possible effects on prices. Will they 
tend to consume these transfers directly, fueling possible Dutch disease effects? Will households 
tend to use them to fi nance private investments or just to accumulate fi nancial, land, or housing 
assets? 
Finally, effective distribution of direct transfers requires mechanisms to guarantee benefi ciary 
identifi cation and payment mechanisms. Technological advances, which make biometric identifi -
cation of cash transfer benefi ciaries cost-effective, offer promising entry points for states inter-
ested in implementing these arrangements (Gelb and Decker 2011). For example, biometric identi-
fi cation through mobile devices is part of the design of the new social security payment system 
in Timor-Leste.
Source: Authors. 
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center on how much to consume or spend now (for example, on recurrent 
salaries or subsidies) versus how much to save or invest. A fundamental 
question concerning the use of natural resource rents is whether the gov-
ernment is tilting the balance to saving and investment, or is mainly using 
rents in the form of current consumption.3 
A key policy question is how ambitious resource-dependent govern-
ments should be in ramping up specifi c types of investments at any 
 particular time. Given resource price and depletion prospects, a key 
annual, medium-term choice for resource-dependent countries is whether 
to follow expansionary or prudent resource management. The Perma-
nent Income (PI) Model emphasizes that expenditures should be cali-
brated on the basis of expected revenues over time, hence recommending 
that governments should accumulate fi nancial assets that will generate a 
more predictable and sustained future income stream. Liquid fi nancial 
assets (including sovereign wealth funds) serve both as a vehicle of stabi-
lization and as a means of saving in the face of volatile resource prices and 
production. This relatively conservative approach has often been advo-
cated by international fi nancial agencies including the  International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. If an economy’s absorptive capacity 
is weak, excessive domestic spending may create infl ationary pressures, 
driving up costs and crowding out other domestic industries. Neverthe-
less, other models contend that capital-scarce developing economies 
could create potentially very high economic and social returns by rapidly 
ramping up investments in both hard and soft domestic infrastructure 
(Collier, van der Ploeg, and Venables 2009).
This chapter examines public investment in the context of down-
stream public expenditure management. The focus is on critical issues 
of policy design and implementation for public investment, leaving 
out a number of other downstream matters beyond the scope of this 
volume, such as policies to smooth public spending and increase eco-
nomic  diversifi cation. The next section describes three paradoxes in 
effective public investment management that are specifi c to resource-
dependent settings.  Following that is a synthesis of good practice tech-
nical guidance on budget allocations and the actual project cycle. How 
the prevailing political economy context affects policy choices on the 
quantity and  quality of public investment then follows. The next 
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 section identifi es the implications for prioritizing and sequencing 
potential remedies for better public investment management, given the 
regime’s objective function and its administrative capacity, followed by 
concluding recommendations. 
Paradoxes of Public Investment
The promise of a country’s natural resources being used to build mod-
ern infrastructure is one of the facets of extractive-led development that 
is most likely to capture the imagination of politicians and populations. 
Especially in capital-scarce developing economies, domestic capital cre-
ation promises high economic and social returns compared with other 
resource allocation options.4 From a normative point of view, moreover, 
it is diffi cult to contest the desirability of more effective public invest-
ment. However, the case studies for this volume highlight that, in prac-
tice, resource-dependent countries confront a number of challenges that 
often make translating this desire into practice more tenuous. One such 
challenge is coping with inevitable fi scal shocks, particularly when stabi-
lization mechanisms across commodity cycles are weak. 
Resource-dependent countries frequently make manifestly subopti-
mal policy choices with respect to public investment. Closer inspection 
reveals that project selection and implementation are often poorly 
aligned to developmental objectives. In most cases, when adverse fi scal 
shocks occur, the public investment portfolio is adjusted in an ad hoc 
fashion. Even if assets are created, they may not be sustained because of 
inadequate use and maintenance. Administrative capacity for public 
investment tends to be weak compared with other areas of public fi nan-
cial management. A pervasive question is whether resource rents should 
be earmarked to the location of extraction and what type of effi ciency 
trade-offs this may pose. 
These patterns can be summarized in three paradoxes that affect how 
natural resource revenues are distributed to the citizenry through public 
investment for physical asset creation and preservation, as follows:
•  Resource rents offer the prospect of investing heavily in physical 
infrastructure that would generate high returns in capital-scarce 
countries, but such countries often fail to invest proactively in the 
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processes and systems needed to yield the very best projects as a result 
of political incentives and the features of the sector.
•  Investment in public infrastructure is one of the policy tools that 
resource-dependent countries can use as the basis for economic diver-
sifi cation and reduced cyclicality; nonetheless, public investment 
tends to be highly pro-cyclical, thus unsustainable. Failure to main-
tain projects generates repeated “build, neglect, rebuild” episodes.
•  A benevolent national planner would ideally allocate resource rents to 
fi nance the highest-return public investment projects, regardless of 
their geographic location; but political economy dynamics often mil-
itate toward earmarking investments to the location of resource 
extraction or fragmenting them across various narrower political 
constituencies.
Key Technical Issues in Investing Resource Rents 
in Infrastructure Assets
Public infrastructure asset creation and preservation involves a series of 
macro-fi scal as well as micro- or project-level choices and challenges. 
Classical public expenditure management (PEM) focuses on three 
 levels of policy choices: (1) macro-fi scal management, (2) allocation 
choices (for example, investment versus consumption spending, sec-
toral prioritization), and (3) operational effi ciency. Much of the public 
expenditure literature focuses on aggregate-level spending choices (for 
example, see Ossowski et al. 2008; Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy 2010), 
including revenue management institutions. Capital formation will 
hinge on the portfolio of existing and new projects. At the micro level, 
the decisions and actions regarding how each project is managed and 
maintained will affect the existing and prospective value of a country’s 
public capital stock. 
The enabling environment of the two overarching levels of aggregate 
macro-fi scal and allocation choices will fundamentally condition what 
happens at the level of sectoral or territorial project portfolio segments.5 
Predictable capital resource allocations for ministries, agencies, subna-
tional governments, or communities can set strategic plans by which to 
steer the prioritization, completion, and maintenance of infrastructure 
assets. But since investment spending is typically one of the most highly 
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discretionary expenditure items during annual budget preparation and 
execution, these resource allocations will also be the most vulnerable to 
the high fi scal volatility associated with resource-dependence. Conse-
quently, asset creation and preservation will be particularly exposed to 
the volatility of resource-related revenues unless the investment budget 
is adequately insulated or the revenues smoothed. Given the prevalence 
of contracting and physical works in capital spending, delays in execu-
tion will also make it more challenging to effectively calibrate allocation 
disbursements with execution. Delays in mega-projects, which are either 
complex or large relative to a country’s budget, can have signifi cant 
effects on overall budget credibility.
Countries with short-term or ad hoc fi nancial management modes 
are likely to accentuate potential fi scal boom-and-bust cycles associated 
with resource dependence, with particularly adverse effects on saving. A 
typical risk for resource-dependent countries is failing to accumulate 
assets when rent fl ows are buoyant, then subsequently failing to maintain 
assets when rent streams are adversely affected by price and production 
patterns.6 At the extreme, projects may grind to a halt as governments 
resort to cash rationing in bust cycles to favor more immediate needs in 
other sectors. Delays in project execution may also compel governments 
to reallocate these resources to other purposes in the context of the 
annual budget execution cycle, which in turn may ratchet up other claims 
on resource revenues in the future and further crowd out investment 
spending  envelopes. 
The term “absorptive capacity” is frequently used to capture the mac-
roeconomic, public fi nancial management, and broader governance 
challenges of scaling up public investment in resource-dependent set-
tings. It is important to unbundle the concept of absorptive capacity 
in order to understand its effects on asset creation and preservation. 
The prevailing market structure and the extent to which various 
inputs to public investment are tradable determine the cost of proj-
ects and the degree to which public expenditures will create infl ation-
ary pressures.7 
The term “investing to invest” has emerged to describe the variety of 
capacity-building measures—including strengthening aspects of public 
fi nancial management ranging from budgeting to procurement or con-
tract management—by which resource-dependent governments can 
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improve their ability to enhance their capital stock (Collier 2010a). A key 
message of this chapter is that for these settings, the barriers to greater 
asset creation and preservation are not resource constraints per se, but 
rather the institutional mechanisms and capabilities by which public 
investment is prioritized, sequenced, and implemented. 
A public investment management regime comprises the choices 
made in regard to the three levels of questions shown in table 5.1.8 The 
question of “where to spend” encapsulates the key downstream choices 
for using natural resource rents: (1) spending on consumption, includ-
ing direct transfers, (2) spending on investment, that is, improving the 
domestic public capital stock, and (3) accumulating fi nancial savings, 
including the use of sovereign wealth funds (state-owned funds that 
invest a country’s fi nancial assets). The policy literature on public 
fi nancial management (PFM) provides a range of recommendations 
on optimal choices and processes for effectively managing public 
resources, including in resource-rich settings (Dabán and Hélis 2010). 
Countries have a range of spending choices within the particular spec-
trums of  consumption and investment expenditures. The presence of 
signifi cant natural resource rents can raise the fi scal space of public 
investment in resource-dependent settings by a number of GDP per-
centage points compared with the baseline relative to nonresource tax-
ation. Consequently, in capital-scarce, resource-endowed economies 
(which are in turn likely to be associated with low levels of income and 
institutional quality), public investment may play a prominent role in 
Table 5.1. Key Policy Choices for Resource-Dependent Countries
Policy areas Policy planning questions Policy alternatives
Macro-fi scal  management 1.  How much to spend and 
save (and where to save)
Fiscal stabilization and saving 
mechanisms and strategies.
Resource allocation 2. Where to spend Investment versus  consumption. 
Sectoral and spatial allocation of 
capital spending.
Operational  effi ciency 3.  How to spend effectively 
and effi ciently
Choice of modalities and 
institutional processes 
for project design, selection, 
implementation, and operations 
and maintenance.
Source: Authors. 
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enhancing nonresource growth prospects (Collier, van der Ploeg, and 
Venables 2009).
The quantity and quality of the public physical assets a country pro-
duces is determined by the intersection of a set of aggregate top-down 
budget allocation processes and bottom-up project selection, imple-
mentation, and completion incentives and capabilities. The budget 
allocation process typically engages executive, legislative, sectoral, and 
subnational actors. Given the multi-dimensionality of the process, the 
approach of this chapter is to focus on some key observed aspects of the 
trade-off between the quantity and quality of public investment across 
resource-dependent countries. 
Concerns about the optimality of public investment are not restricted 
to resource-dependent settings.9 But the fact that capital spending is 
being fi nanced by the drawdown of a nonrenewable resource raises spe-
cial concerns. The example of Nauru, a country that exhausted its sig-
nifi cant phosphate resources in about four decades, demonstrates that 
societies need to worry about what happens when the resource runs out 
and no longer generates direct economic benefi ts. Moreover, the volatil-
ity of resource rents over time has especially pronounced effects on how 
investments are implemented in practice. Resource rents would appear 
to be a particular blessing because they provide resources to invest with-
out having to tax current economic activity.10 Yet, using rents rather than 
recurrent taxation runs the risk of reducing downward accountability 
(as discussed in chapter 2), leading authorities to pay more limited atten-
tion to private sector feedback. 
This section provides technical guidance regarding the three levels of 
public expenditure management shown in table 5.1, namely, what or 
how much to spend, where to spend, and how to spend. While each of the 
three levels is analyzed in sequence, there may be interdependencies and 
overlaps; for example, how much to spend may be informed by  decisions 
about where to spend. Similarly, rather than borrow, governments could 
fi nance infrastructure by resorting to public-private  partnerships backed 
by future returns from the depletion of resource endowments.
How Much to Spend 
Table 5.2 synthesizes key policy issues, guidance, and typical recommen-
dations for improving aggregate downstream fi scal management in 
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 natural resource–dependent settings. A central question for resource-
dependent countries is how expansionary fi scal policy should be during 
commodity booms. The responses of many developing oil economies to 
the oil-shock in the 1970s shows that many governments erred on the 
side of optimism, wasteful spending, and macroeconomic policy at odds 
with diversifi ed economic growth (Gelb and Associates 1988). At the 
extreme, countries like Nigeria borrowed against anticipated future 
oil revenues and invested those resources poorly at home; as a result 
Nigeria was saddled with large fi nancial debts and limited productive 
assets in return. Advanced countries are not exempt from the economic 
problems associated with commodity booms. The experience of the 
Netherlands in the 1970s inspired coining of the term “Dutch disease,” 
whereby appreciation of a country’s real exchange rate due to a sharp 
rise in commodity exports interacts with a booming resource sector and 
expansive fi scal policies to adversely affect the competitiveness of other 
sectors and infl ate the domestic cost of nontradable goods and services. 
The key message from the technical literature for policy makers in 
resource-dependent settings is to delink expenditures from annual 
Table 5.2. Policy Recommendations: How Much to Spend and Where to Save
Common problems Technical policy guidance Policy tools/entry points
Spending too much too 
soon, imprudent fi scal 
policy, and propensity to 
greater indebtedness
Follow sustainable levels 
of consumption on 
the basis of long-term 
price and production 
patterns
•  Coherent, participatory 
national development 
strategy
•  Natural resource 
accounting/
estimation of genuine 
savings
•  Permanent Income Model 
•  Fiscal transparency 
measures
Pronounced revenue 
volatility and pro-cyclical 
fi scal policy (following 
boom and bust price cycles)
Develop counter-cyclical 
fi scal policy (smooth spending 
across price cycles)
•  Fiscal rules and 
stabilization mechanisms 
(including sovereign wealth 
funds) 




Save in foreign fi nancial 
capital assets
•  Sterilization of revenues
•  Close monitoring of fi scal, 
monetary, and exchange rate 
indicators
Source: Authors.
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resource revenues and to adopt a longer-term and typically more 
restrained annual spending profi le (Brahmbhatt and Canuto 2010; 
 Brahmbhatt, Canuto, and Vostroknutova 2010).
Determining how much to spend should ideally be couched in terms 
of a broader developmental vision, and it requires strategies for stabiliz-
ing revenues, countering Dutch disease, and meeting the goals of asset 
accumulation and expenditure smoothing.
Development Strategy and Vision. For any country to benefi t from its 
resource endowments, it must start by articulating an overarching devel-
opment strategy and determining options for fi nancing it. Beyond 
 quantitative targets, countries may have visions of modernization more 
ambitious than the basic poverty-reduction and welfare-enhancement 
objectives articulated in the Millennium Development Goals. The lead-
ership of Timor-Leste, for example, envisions the country becoming an 
oil-services-based hub. Leaders in oil nations like Kazakhstan aspire to 
rapid modernization and regional respect. For Angola, hosting the 2010 
Africa Cup in soccer represented a major milestone in its postconfl ict 
transition and spurred major infrastructural investment in sports arenas 
and ancillary infrastructure. Major infrastructure projects are frequently 
a key element of this broader vision. 
Stabilizing Revenues and Saving. Stabilization and saving are often referred 
to in tandem, but in principle refer to two different objectives. Stabiliza-
tion is in effect a form of self-insurance that allows for a transfer of 
resources between price booms and busts (De Ferranti et al. 2002). Com-
modity price uncertainty remains a major facet of how  stabilization and 
saving mechanisms are implemented in practice.  Historically, the prices 
of commodities like oil have followed a “random walk” (Gelb and Grass-
man 2010). While mounting prices are often seen as harbingers of a new 
“super cycle” that will raise the long-term price level of a particular 
resource, the reality is that resource prices have a high degree of volatility 
and uncertainty, while production levels and annual budget cycles for 
most countries are usually unresponsive to price. Financial saving refers 
to the build-up of (typically international) assets with the objective of 
securing a fi nancial return. 
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The Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) links stabilization and sav-
ing by emphasizing the achievement of stable fi scal results by building 
up fi nancial assets through a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) or similar 
mechanism that allows targeted expenditure patterns to be maintained 
through commodity boom and bust cycles.11 Besides precautionary 
motives for stabilization, the basic PIH model highlights critical aspects 
of the intertemporal and intergenerational dimension of extractive 
industries. On one hand, saving mechanisms can store wealth for future 
generations. On the other hand, the saving rate net of natural resource 
capital depletion also provides a framework to assess the sustainability 
of the long-term expenditure path (World Bank 2006a; 2011a) and pro-
vides an anchor for the development of a vision. The “Hartwick rule” 
emphasizes the translation of depletion proceeds into fi xed capital for-
mation (Hartwick 1977; Hamilton and Ley 2010). Recently, in contrast 
to the PIH, other models have emphasized the potential benefi ts of gen-
erating economic growth returns by investing in a country’s domestic 
capital stock (Collier, van der Ploeg, and Venables 2009) or of repaying 
debt. The prospects of this model depend critically on a country’s 
absorptive capacity and the potential for public investment to generate 
growth in the nonresource economy. 
At the implementation level, a key question is whether special fi scal 
institutions like SWFs actually make a quantifi able difference in fi scal 
policy. Evidence about the actual effects of SWFs on fi scal policy is mixed 
(Gould 2009; Crain and Devlin 2002; Ossowski et al. 2008;  Bagattini 2011). 
Therefore, an important question regarding stabilization or saving funds 
is whether they achieve the medium-term objectives set for them across 
major resource revenue cycles, and what potential anchors are likely to 
contribute to their success in a given political setting. For  example, Nige-
ria’s Excess Crude Account accumulated in excess of US$20 billion in 
2007, but fell to less than a tenth of that in 2010. In 2011, the account was 
due to be replaced by three separate funds: Future Generations Fund, 
Nigerian Infrastructure Fund, and Stabilization Fund. The establishment 
of these new funds raised the question of whether special purpose or ear-
marked funds are potentially more durable from a political economy 
point of view than are general purpose saving or stabilization funds, 
because stronger constituencies or arguments exist to maintain them. 
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Policy guidance on special saving accounts, or SWFs, has focused 
mainly on the features and rules that better allow countries to smooth 
spending across boom and bust cycles. Less attention has been paid to 
how the design of these funds should address other goals, such as enhanc-
ing transparency and accountability in the management of resource 
rents. One example where fi scal transparency requirements have ade-
quately been incorporated in a fund’s design is the Development Fund 
for Iraq. Since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, most of the coun-
try’s oil revenues have been paid into New York–based banks. While 
withdrawals are regulated through the budget process, the fund has 
independent audit procedures, providing greater transparency and 
stronger core internal audit capabilities. 
Countering Dutch Disease Effects. Deciding how much to spend at any 
given time must take into account the risk of overheating the economy 
as a result of excessive domestic spending of rents, incurring a bout of 
Dutch disease, wherein a rapidly appreciating exchange rate caused by 
increasing commodity exports adversely affects nonresource sectors. 
Although Dutch disease can usually be countered by sterilization of rev-
enues, it should be noted that different types of public spending may 
have different effects on the domestic economy. A country’s absorptive 
capacity, hence the extent to which it may be vulnerable to overheating 
as a result of expenditure, depends on a number of factors, including 
productive opportunities at the margin, the ability of the public sector to 
adequately manage additional investments, and the economywide effects 
of scaling up spending in public capital investment. In some cases, the 
sequence of projects might be critical in alleviating infrastructure needs 
(for example, constructing new ports and highways), thereby allowing 
for greater public investment later on. For example, in 2007–09, Angola’s 
port infrastructure was not up to the task of supporting the country’s 
burgeoning import demand for materials to reconstruct the infrastruc-
ture that was severely damaged during the country’s prolonged civil war. 
With ships waiting for weeks to disembark, prices of cement and other 
tradables were subject to further rapid infl ation. An early investment in 
improving ports would have allowed the country to more rapidly and 
economically scale up infrastructure projects as part of the reconstruc-
tion efforts. Similarly, the use of foreign contractors would have limited 
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Dutch disease concerns by reducing the pressure on domestic labor and 
capital that other modalities of public investment create. 
Expenditure Smoothing and Asset Accumulation. An increasing number 
of resource-dependent countries have sought to implement stabilization 
and saving strategies (Ossowski et al. 2008). While fi scal policy tended to 
be more prudent in the 2005–08 commodity boom than in the 1970s, 
stabilization and saving policies in practice have had various degrees of 
success. Although one option has been special fi scal institutions (Dabán 
and Hélis 2010), the literature notes that their adoption has often been 
symptomatic of the deeper challenges in many developing economies 
when attempting to insulate the budget from revenue volatility and 
maintaining stable fi scal policy (Heuty and Aristi 2009).
Many resource-dependent countries continue to be overly optimistic 
about future resource prices. This optimism often generates a cycle of 
over-expansive fi scal policy, with costly adjustment implications. When 
prices, and consequently revenues, go bust, countries must resort to a 
variety of adjustment strategies, ranging from borrowing, to curtailed 
capital expenditures, even to rapid accumulation of arrears, as observed 
in 2008 across the developing world. Periodic revenue increases may 
continually increase spending liabilities as a result of a voracity effect 
(Tornell and Lane 1999). 
Politicians with short time horizons apparently have not adequately 
internalized these risks, even in terms of their own prospects. Especially 
in new resource producers, policy learning across resource cycles has 
been insuffi cient to demonstrate the need to consider risks and to miti-
gate the political costs of differing consumption. In settings in which 
time horizons are narrow and institutions enforcing political agreements 
and facilitating cooperation are absent or weak, incumbent policy  makers 
will choose to frontload spending, even if their preference is to smooth 
spending over time, because they cannot trust the next government to 
maintain the saving mechanisms that they have introduced (Alesina and 
Tabellini 1988; Dixit, Grossman, and Faruk 2000; Humphreys and 
Sandbu 2007). As a result, overspending arises when commitments with 
other political groups are not credible. 
In addition, given various spending pressures and the inherent uncer-
tainty of commodity prices, accumulating and investing the fi nancial 
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assets derived from extractive industries entails asymmetrical political 
risks. The responsible offi cials will receive little credit for saving resources 
if prices do not fall during their administration (Eifert, Gelb, and 
Tallroth 2002). Conversely, if prices fall and there are enough resources 
to cover the losses, these offi cials can potentially benefi t from enormous 
political gains. Particular attention must therefore be paid to the institu-
tional mechanisms that modulate aggregate spending, in particular 
investment spending, in terms of the effects on political incentives.
Particularly for low-income and low-capacity settings, both the tech-
nical and political feasibility of developing and communicating an ade-
quate macro-fi scal strategy remain a central challenge. Simple fi scal rules 
to determine annual resource rent transfers to the budget (for example, 
a particular reference oil price) may be one strategy. However, even a 
well-designed permanent income model is subject to uncertainty about 
proven reserves, projected returns on fi nancial assets, and resource price 
developments. The perception that further resources are yet to be discov-
ered heightens political perceptions of a larger fi scal space. Timor-Leste 
employs a Norwegian-style fi nancial fund to ensure intergenerational 
saving. Yet the underlying fi nancial assumptions of its petroleum fund 
have not been subject to broader political scrutiny, even when withdraw-
als from the fund have been accelerated. 
In the same way, when prices rise signifi cantly above some reference 
price, or new fi nds are made, countries may be likely to loosen the initial 
fi scal envelopes and ratchet up expenditure allocations. But models 
that incorporate notions of future growth prospects need some empiri-
cal measure or judgment about the absorptive capacity of the public 
 investment system. As public spending expands, many developing 
 countries have had problems actually executing their full development 
budget, which has led to the reallocation of this “surplus” to more recur-
rent types of spending.
There is no single model for optimizing various performance dimen-
sions, such as fi scal sustainability, adaptability in the face of shocks, effi -
ciency, and equity. Political agreements affect both the formal and infor-
mal dimensions of budget processes and broader public investment 
outcomes (Hallerberg, Scartascini, and Stein 2009). For example, after 
several price cycles Nigeria’s Excess Crude Account mechanism has 
been able to stabilize annual revenue fl ows to the budget, due to policy 
 Investing Resource Wealth: The Political Economy of Public Infrastructure Provision 183
 adjustments that include arriving at a credible coordination policy with 
state governments. Similarly, Botswana and Chile have been able to 
introduce budgetary restraints that allow them to weather oscillations in 
the budget as a result of more structured executive-legislative interac-
tions and the development of their political party systems. 
Where to Spend
Spending priorities in the allocation of public resources and actual spend-
ing depend on the annual budget process and how the budget is executed. 
Decisions to be made within the aggregate fi scal envelope include (1) 
how much to allocate to current versus capital expenditures, to opera-
tions and maintenance, and to various priorities, sectors, and ministries; 
(2) how to allot resources across government levels, either through cen-
tral allocations or transfers to subnational governments; as well as (3) 
how to allot resources across space, notably as it is associated with loca-
tions of extraction. Table 5.3 summarizes what are generally considered 
best-practice recommendations on the allocation of investment. Deter-
mining where to spend requires the strategic prioritization of spending 
and a strategy for spatial allocation of fi scal resources.
Strategic Prioritization through Medium-Term Expenditure Frameworks. 
Strategic public investment priorities for sectors of greatest develop-
mental need are an important starting point for implementing a national 
development plan or vision, especially in capital-scarce economies. 
Spending priorities ideally should be aligned to a multiyear estimation 
of resources and costs of existing policies. This is usually carried out 
under a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), a tool for link-
ing policy, planning, and budgeting (most often over a three-year term). 
A country uses this multiyear approach to improve its macroeconomic 
balance, allow for more effi cient allocation of resources between and 
across sectors, and improve the predictability and credibility of funding 
of expenditures (World Bank 1998).12 
Decision making will follow both formal and informal rules (Alesina 
and Tabellini 1988; Alt 2002; Dixit, Grossman, and Faruk 2000). The 
structure of the political system will dictate how many actors and stages 
are to be involved in the budget and planning process and in which 
 arenas decisions are to be made (Hallerberg, Scartascini, and Stein 2009). 
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Institutions—such as electoral rules (Cox 1997; Haggard and McCub-
bins 2001) and the confi guration of political party systems and coali-
tions (especially the spatial distribution of votes and party support and 
social cleavages represented)—are additional considerations that funda-
mentally shape the distribution of resources.
On the executive side, strong and capable central fi nance agencies, 
such as fi nance ministries and planning ministries, are critical in set-
ting the aggregate annual and medium-term expenditure ceilings and 
the overall budget for different line agencies. Legislative bodies are 
likely to pay particular attention to sectoral capital budget envelopes as 
Table 5.3. Policy Recommendations: Where to Allocate Investment Spending
Commonly observed problems Technical policy guidance Policy tools/entry points
Prevalence of consumption and 
subsidies over investment
Extend planning horizons •  Mechanisms and institutions 
that follow medium- and 
long-term planning frameworks 
(e.g., Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework) 
Poor prioritization, weak 
expenditure analysis, and poor 
policy design
Prioritize sectors and regions 
based on the returns to public 
investment projects/public 
expenditures
•  Strengthening of sectoral 
expenditure analysis and 
planning 
•  Performance measurement 
framework benchmarking 
Low credibility of intergovern-
mental transfers and horizontal 
imbalances 
Allocate responsibilities for 
tax collection and revenue 
smoothing to the central 
government and share 
expenditure responsibilities 
transparently
•  Transparent design of intergov-
ernmental fi scal relations tied 
to stabilization instruments
Unsustainable and ineffi cient 
allocation of resources by 
subnational units
Internalize subsidies in the 
intergovernmental fi scal 
transfers
•  Earmark savings deposits and 
withdrawal of wealth fund 
to subnational units
•  Deduct subsidy from vertical 
transfers
Fragmentation of public 
investment programs and capital 
expenditures
Incentivize cooperation in 
capital investments that have 
regional spillovers across levels 
of government and across 
subnational units
•  Matching grants and perfor-
mance-based transfers for 
regional programs
Rent-seeking and corruption Conduct cost sector analysis 
transparently
•  E-procurement and demand-
side mobilization
Source: Authors.
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part of the annual budget process, especially in systems with single-
district plurality systems; for example, in Mongolia legislators have 
actively participated in the selection of individual projects. Typically, 
line agencies and subnational entities will be asked to prioritize actual 
projects, which are then reconciled with the respective spending enve-
lopes. Individual ministries’ ability to actually manage expenditures 
might also infl uence budgetary allocations. Donors also play a signifi -
cant role in prioritizing the projects they support or in building up the 
capacity of particular ministries. In Timor-Leste, donors’ engagement 
in the education system meant that public investment management 
capacity in the education ministry was signifi cantly higher than in 
other ministries. 
Given that capital spending is typically one of the most discretionary 
forms of public spending (for example, relative to government salaries), 
it may also be particularly vulnerable to periodic fi scal adjustments. 
Adjustments may come from pressures to meet other forms of consump-
tion spending (including transfers), as well as in response to the 
 challenges frequently seen in executing investment budgets. The credi-
bility of the investment budget will be dependent on both commitment 
control mechanisms and the ability to implement investment spending. 
Signifi cant cost overruns also skew actual investment spending by par-
ticular agencies, distorting both initial provisions and subsequent allo-
cation priorities to complete these projects.
Spatial Allocation of Fiscal Resources. Natural resource extraction, par-
ticularly oil, tends to be geographically concentrated, often located in 
remote and poor regions far removed from the relative economic 
vibrancy of a national capital and other commercial centers.13 The 
assignment of resource rents to producing regions presents a number of 
political and economic challenges, in such areas as ownership rights, as 
well as the extent to which resource rents are assigned to and reinvested 
in the areas that produce them. While ownership of natural resources is 
usually vested in the central state, some federal countries, such as Argen-
tina, Australia, Canada, India, and the United States, assign various 
degrees of ownership to subnational entities. 
The public fi nance literature warns against signifi cant derivation-
based resource revenue sharing in developing countries for a number of 
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reasons (Kaiser and Viñuela 2010). First, derivation-based assignments 
can cause signifi cant interregional inequalities and deprive the central 
government of considerable fi scal resources. Second, subnational gov-
ernments tend to be less well placed both to mobilize revenues from the 
sector and to manage the macro-fi scal risks associated with the high 
volatility of natural resource rents, in part, because they often have a less 
diversifi ed revenue base. Third, large earmarking of resource  revenues to 
subnational governments reduces the ability of the central government 
to steer national public fi nancial management. Finally, subnational gov-
ernments, for a number of reasons, may be poorly placed to ensure the 
quality of public spending. National governments may prefer to com-
pensate regions of resource extraction through vertical (for example, 
national or deconcentrated) spending channels. Yet, subnational actors 
may fi nd such approaches unsatisfactory and push for more institution-
alized mechanisms for benefi t sharing.
Importantly, benefi t-sharing arrangements vary according to whether 
transfers are assigned to subnational governments primarily on the basis 
of fi nancing service delivery responsibilities, to compensate for the nega-
tive externalities of extractive industries, or in response to heritage claims 
that underscore the need to compensate regions for their depleted natural 
capital (Bahl and Tumennasan 2004). National conceptions of resource 
ownership tend to focus on the fi nancing of subnational service delivery 
needs, and they earmark expenditure assignments to specifi c sectors like 
education and health. Also, there may be compelling grounds to compen-
sate regions for additional social and environmental costs or negative 
externalities generated by mining and petroleum operations, such as 
cleaning polluted sites and providing additional social services (McLure 
1983). Compensating for the externalities of extractive activities, however, 
requires having some measure of what these costs are and, if resource rev-
enues are earmarked for these purposes, ensuring that related fi nancing is 
adequate and predictable. In this case, specifi c care must be taken to ensure 
that signifi cant changes in prices do not adversely affect these transfers, 
and that the revenue and additional cost profi les (for example, as related 
to the life cycle of a mine or fi eld) are aligned. Lastly, ownership and heri-
tage arguments make the case for translating resource rents into physical 
or fi nancial assets in the location of extraction either through national or 
subnational governments.
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The introduction of a center-subnational, benefi t-sharing arrange-
ment may be driven by the need to mitigate regional confl ict threats. By 
increasing development at the local level (Bakke and Wibbels 2006), 
reducing discretion and ambiguity of natural resource rents (Herbst 
2001; Bird and Ebel 2006), and providing citizens with opportunities to 
shape policies (Brancati 2009), revenue-sharing mechanisms have the 
potential to solidify national unity and diffuse separatist sentiments. 
Resource  extraction companies will also see the delivery of tangible 
local benefi ts as a critical element of their local license to operate. In 
addition, decentralization can enhance local autonomy and provide a 
setting in which minorities can enjoy self-rule at the regional level 
(Jeong 2002). Alternative regional arenas favor intra-group competi-
tion, which in turn reduces power struggles at the national level (Horow-
itz 2002). But subnational governments may become important actors 
in the so-called voracity effect (Tornell and Lane 1999), where demands 
on resource rents are increasingly ratcheted up across political stake-
holders over the annual budget process, and thereby contribute to 
unsustainable fi scal policies. 
How to Spend
While the previous two sections covered aggregate spending and alloca-
tion choices, this section now examines public investment at the micro 
level. A weak public investment management system is one of the most 
critical constraints to effective capital formation in developing countries. 
As previously argued, dependence on natural resource rents poses spe-
cial challenges to public investment management, summarized in table 
5.4. First, the volume of public investment made possible by natural 
resource rents may overwhelm existing capabilities both to generate and 
to maintain and operate projects. Revenue volatility has the tendency to 
periodically disrupt the fi nancing of the public investment portfolio 
across the board and for specifi c agencies. This disruption in turn under-
mines annual budget credibility and distorts behavioral incentives across 
the bureaucracy. The prominence of investment through quasi-fi scal 
channels, such as national oil or mining companies, is a feature specifi c 
to resource-dependent settings. Resource-for-infrastructure (RFI) deals 
are also increasingly emerging as an important public investment modal-
ity in resource-rich settings. 
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Table 5.4. Policy Recommendations: How to Invest
Commonly observed 
problems Technical policy guidance Policy tools/entry points
Weak public investment 
(appraisal, selection, and 
implemen tation)
Invest or contract in 
capacity to institute a
standard process of project
appraisal, selection, and 
implementation 
Strengthening all linkages of 
project PIM value chain, 
including project appraisal, 
selection, and implementation
Ineffi cient quasi-fi scal 
activities
Reducing quasi-fi scal 
activities and channeling 




Poor integration of capital, 
recurrent, and donor 
funding
 Integration of current/
development budgets;
 use of country systems
Assistance with budget 
integration and performance-
oriented budgeting
Bundled extraction and 
public investment projects
Disaggregated and 
transparent analysis of 
VFM compared with public 
investment
 Assistance with analyzing 
and negotiating bundled 
projects; third-party monitor-
ing of bundled contracts
Source: Authors.
Note: VFM = value for money.
Determining how to spend requires attention to the minimum 
requirements of public investment management systems, a consideration 
of nontraditional execution modalities, and a balanced approach to the 
trade-offs between quantity and quality of public investment.
Investing to Invest: Minimum Requirements of Management Systems. The 
public investment management diagnostics framework by Rajaram et al. 
(2010) sets out eight minimum stages to ensure that a public investment 
project emerges as a productive and sustainable public asset (see 
 fi gure 5.3). A technical assessment of the prevailing functionality of the 
PIM system across different sectors and modalities is an important start-
ing point for identifying the weakest links for asset creation and preser-
vation and for putting priorities on the table. The framework echoes 
many of the themes brought forth by the natural resource management 
value chain approach discussed in chapter 1. First, there are likely to be 
technical issues and challenges in each of the links (for example, effective 
 procurement), and, in turn, the performance of each link will be condi-
tioned by political economy factors at the policy and bureaucratic levels. 
Second, a variety of institutional options may enhance functionality 
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along particular links; for example, governments may choose to contract 
out project evaluation skills while strengthening in-house capacity over 
time. Third, signifi cant interdependence is likely to exist between differ-
ent parts of the framework: a poorly prepared project is likely to pose 
problems during implementation and even the best-prepared and best-
implemented project that suffers lack of maintenance will rapidly depre-
ciate. In the standard government execution of projects, diverse actors 
and agencies are likely to be involved, highlighting the need to carefully 
consider the range of institutional bottlenecks and potential remedies 
that will enhance the likelihood of success for individual projects; but, 
most importantly, the overall portfolio must add up to more than the 
sum of its parts, especially for network infrastructure. 
Selecting good projects through effective economic appraisal is an 
important starting point for creating assets. While a benevolent social 
planner in a unitary state would prioritize projects with the highest 
national returns, varying social preferences and types of capital spend-
ing are likely to add complexity to managing a country’s public invest-
ment portfolio across agencies or levels of government. Especially as the 
scale and complexity of public investment increase, these processes may 
grow increasingly strained. The institutional setting also matters a great 
deal for both the projects that are selected and the types of checks and 
balances countries have imposed in this regard. As the case of Angola 
illustrates, a rapid scaling up of investment can overwhelm existing 
 systems. Adverse fi scal shocks can further disrupt the overall public 
investment management portfolio. Ensuing project implementation 
delays and arrears can in turn impose signifi cant costs and erode quality 
(Kaiser and Gazel 2010). Governments wishing to rapidly scale up invest-
ment may see little point in making requisite investing to invest efforts, 
especially as these reforms are perceived by incumbent offi cials to be 
complex or subject to delayed payoffs. Thus, there may be incentives to 
engage in quick fi xes, including special implementation bodies that 
bypass core bureaucratic capability.
Sectoral specialization, combined with associated roles and responsi-
bilities, means that project portfolios are typically segmented across line 
agencies and across expenditure envelopes. One key dimension of het-
erogeneous preferences could be across spatial or territorial lines.14  While 
central fi nance agencies may seek to set minimum standards across all 
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projects, the task of monitoring and enforcing these standards can be 
demanding in the context of more limited capacities. Another important 
dimension for project prioritization and resourcing may center on 
achieving an effective balance between investments intended to support 
the extractive industry versus broader public infrastructure. This may be 
especially pertinent for mining, where extraction may be associated with 
a large infrastructure footprint.
Chapter 3 focused on managing upstream bargains between the state 
and resource investors. An important challenge for creating credible 
and effective contracts is mirrored downstream in the implementation 
of capital spending. While less pronounced, some of the dynamics are 
still prevalent. A public works contractor bidding for a large infra-
structure project is likely to factor in a signifi cant premium for the risk 
that it will be subject to arrears or nonpayment if the government does 
not manage its fi nances well and for the risk that it might face time-
inconsistent behavior from the government and frequent contract 
renegotiation.
Nontraditional Execution Modalities. The Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative (EITI) has emphasized extractive revenues reaching the 
treasury, and traditional on-budget PIM has focused on executing those 
resources through the budget. However, increasingly in many low- 
income, resource-dependent countries a signifi cant share of public 
infrastructure formation is conducted through alternative channels, 
including parastatals, notably national oil companies (NOCs) and 
 national mining companies (NMCs), and public-private partnerships 
such as resource-for-infrastructure (RfI) deals.15 NOCs and NMCs have 
received growing attention as vehicles through which developing host 
countries can capture a greater share of extractive industry benefi ts 
(including learning and monitoring effects). However, there is signifi -
cant variance across countries in the mission statements, transparency, 
and corporate governance of these parastatals, as well as the nature of 
the relationship between government and the companies. As part of 
more diverse national missions, parastatals may be asked to leverage 
their fi nance and capacity to generate public infrastructure.16 
Resource-linked public-private partnerships, and RfI deals in particu-
lar, raise a number of concerns about contract design and above all 
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implementation, including value of resources, local content, public good 
value and sustainability of investments or assets, and risks of obsolescing 
bargains. RfI contracts are typically structured around some mix of mon-
etary payment (for example, signing bonuses or access to some subse-
quent revenue fl ow) and an infrastructure asset (typically provided against 
some concessional or nonconcessional credit line). China has become an 
important global player in such RfI deals; in this model, the infrastructure 
asset is provided by Chinese companies, selected by the Chinese govern-
ment with no objection by host governments (see box 5.2). The design of 
the deal determines the mix of risk and reward for governments and 
investors over the life of the project, as well as the extent to which the main 
foreign contracting agency and implementing partner are required to 
deliver a certain quality of infrastructure asset. As with any extractives 
contract, these agreements may also be associated with a range of obso-
lescing bargain challenges (Hogan and Sturzenbegger 2010), raising ques-
tions of how best to structure these contracts from the perspectives of 
governments, companies, and the public interest.17 
The fact that RfI deals are implemented parallel to country PFM/PIM 
systems brings both advantages and risks. “Turnkey” delivery of infra-
structure may be faster and more effi cient than delivery in weak institu-
tional settings, and contractors may feel more confi dent of getting paid 
against resource access. Yet, such deals raise numerous concerns. Manag-
ing monetary and physical resources through parallel systems may make 
them more opaque and susceptible to private appropriation. Bypassing 
country systems may lead to a further neglect of domestic capacity-
building and a failure to draw in domestic labor and linkages with other 
sectors. Extractive operators have the most direct interest in maintaining 
infrastructure while production is ongoing, but limited interest in doing 
so beyond this point. 
Quantity versus Quality of Public Investment. Resource-dependent coun-
tries manifest a signifi cant degree of heterogeneity in both the quantity 
and quality of their investment in physical assets. Regarding the set of 
cases analyzed for this volume, as table 5.5 shows, investment levels have 
tended to vary signifi cantly, both in nominal terms and as a share of 
overall GDP. Whereas scaling up of public investment levels is driven by 
reconstruction efforts in post-confl ict settings, such as Angola, DRC, 
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Box 5.2 Chinese “Resource for Infrastructure” Deals
In recent years, China has been playing a growing role in fi nancing infrastructure in 
developing countries using resource-for-infrastructure deals, particularly in sub-Saha-
ran Africa. More than 35 African states have signed contracts on infrastructure fi nanc-
ing with China, chiefl y in power generation and roads. The projects are mainly fi nanced 
by the China Export-Import Bank on terms that are marginally concessional, and the 
fi nancing is tied to use of Chinese construction fi rms. There is no conditionality with 
respect to domestic policies.
In the various cases in which infrastructure fi nance is packaged with natural 
resource development, the money is never directly transferred to the government; 
instead a Chinese construction fi rm is awarded the infrastructure contract, and at the 
same time a Chinese petroleum or mining company is awarded rights to begin produc-
tion. The China Ex-Im Bank fi nances the infrastructure construction and repayment is 
in the form of oil or minerals produced directly by the Chinese extractive company. 
This approach, which has been used in the past by Western oil companies, is mainly 
used now for countries that cannot provide adequate fi nancial guarantees to back 
their loan commitments.
A number of issues arise with respect to these contracts:
•  In principle, the government needs to compare the costs and benefi ts of such a 
deal with an unbundled (standard) public investment contract and a separate 
resource extraction contract—in the same way that a public-private partnership 
contract typically requires use of a public sector comparator. It seems possible 
that in some countries with weak PIM systems, such projects might introduce a 
welcome element of competition for standard public investment.
•  There is a lack of competition from other providers of such bundled contracts, 
reducing assurance of the competitiveness of the deals.
•  The fi nancial terms of the deals can be diffi cult to estimate, because they 
depend in part on the implicit price for the oil (or other natural resource).
•  It is not clear the extent to which the government is able to ensure that the 
infrastructure is built to prespecifi ed standards and that environmental and 
other standards are met.
•  There are issues about the capacity of the host governments to adequately 
analyze, price, negotiate, and implement such complex projects.
Sources: Foster et al. 2008; Doemeland et al. 2010.
and Timor-Leste, during the recent commodity price boom public 
investment allocations have been considerably higher precisely in the 
resource- dependent countries that face greater challenges smoothing 
revenue volatility. Similarly, Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy (2010) fi nd 
that public investment grew on average by 9 percentage points of GDP 
for 31 oil producers during the 2003–08 oil-price boom and that fi scal 
adjustment has been particularly pronounced in lower-middle and low-
income countries. 
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Public capital spending as percentage of GDP (%)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Africa
 Angola 3,340 8.9 12.1 14 13.1 12.5
 DRC 150 — 2.4 3.7 9.3 —
 Ghana 630 12.4 14.4 15.7 12.6 12
 Niger 330 10.6 11.6 10.3 10.3 10.7
 Nigeriaa   1,170 3.0 3.7 3.7 4.2 4.7
East Asia and Pacifi c
 Lao PDRb 760 6 6 4.8 4.5 4.9
 Mongoliac 1,670 —  — 11.7 8.7 7.7
 Timor-Leste 2,460 8.9 12.1 14 13.1  —
Latin America and the Caribbean
 Bolivia 1,460 10.2 11.8 11.9 9.8 10.8
 Chiled 9,370 11.8 2.1 2.3 3.3 2.7
 Ecuador 3,690 4.7 6.9 13.0 11.0 —
 Mexico 9,990 3.2 3.6 4.4 5.1 5
 Trinidad and Tobago 16,590 3.9 5.8 6.6 4.9 —
Source: International Monetary Fund Article IV Reports, GNI (USD Atlas Method) from World Bank Development Indicators 
2010.
Note: a. Nigeria excludes state and local government; b. Lao PDR and Trinidad and Tobago refl ect non-CY FY; c. Mongolia 
includes net lending; d. Chile excludes net capital transfers (incl. CODELCO); e. Mexico includes PEMEX capital  transfers.
— = not available.
The link between infrastructure spending and outcomes is diffi cult to 
measure. Figure 5.4, for example, illustrates a simple correlation between 
recent annual investment levels relative to GDP and a proxy of infra-
structure outcomes, drawing on broad rankings by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF). This simple cross-country analysis reveals a negative 
relationship between the volume of investment resources and the quality 
of the public infrastructure. These fi ndings could mean that countries 
with lower infrastructure quality are spending more to make up for this 
gap, or that their quality of infrastructure spending is poor.18 A number 
of the resource-dependent countries in this scatterplot stand out for 
their relatively high levels of investment by this measure, poten-
tially afforded to them by the additional fi scal space afforded by resource 
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resource-dependent countries are indicated by a diamond.
rents.  Especially in the public sector, investment fl ows are often not a 
good proxy for incremental stock additions in actual assets (Pritchett 
2000). Given the complexities of public investment management and the 
construction sector, careful attention must be paid to diagnosing the 
nature of investment leakage or waste. Corruption may also take very 
different forms, refl ecting either a simple markup or a more corrosive 
failure to adhere to minimum construction standards.
The comparative literature on investment levels in weak governance 
settings also highlights various dimensions of the trade-off between 
quantity and actual quality of spending. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) 
fi nd that higher levels of public investment and lower operations and 
maintenance (O&M) (as a share of GDP) are associated with higher 
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corruption, controlling for income levels.19 Keefer and Knack (2007) 
fi nd that higher public investment is associated with more limited 
checks and balances. Delavallade (2006) suggests that the social sectors 
may offer less opportunity for embezzlement, hence higher country 
corruption appears to skew spending away from social expenditures 
(health, education, and social protection) and toward other public ser-
vices, fuel, and energy. De la Croix and Delavallade (2009) show that 
more predatory rent-seeking governments tend to invest more in hous-
ing and physical capital than in health and education.
Political Economy Settings and Dynamics
Political economy dynamics fundamentally condition how resource 
rents are used across time and the effi ciency of the resulting capital 
spending.20 Few public offi cials in resource-dependent countries will 
contest the benefi ts of economic stabilization and long-term investment 
in infrastructure and diversifi cation.21 However, their institutional incen-
tives may be imperfectly aligned to those objectives, since they are sub-
ject to countervailing pressures that result from the high visibility and 
concentration of rents, short time horizons, electoral and coalitional 
incentives, the need to compensate producing regions, the mix of private 
and public goods that a government uses to reward supporters, and the 
volatility of revenues.
Chapter 2 highlighted two key political economy dimensions— 
intertemporal credibility and inclusiveness—that underlie the political 
economy dynamics in resource-dependent countries and affect the like-
lihood those polities will be able to transform resource rents into public 
goods or physical asset creation. Intertemporal credibility refers to the 
ability of politicians, bureaucrats, and other societal actors to commit 
collectively to achieving a particular outcome over time. Inclusiveness 
refers to the extent to which a broader set of societal interests are consid-
ered in decisions. The intersection of these two dimensions yields four 
political economy settings, which are presented in table 5.6 in terms of 
the range of symptomatic outcomes hampering public investment in 
sustained asset creation and preservation.
Ideally, countries would fall under the programmatic pluralism cate-
gory, where intertemporal credibility and political inclusiveness are fairly 
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Table 5.6. Political Economy Contexts and Downstream Dynamics
Political 
inclusiveness
Credibility of intertemporal commitment





Patrimonial rule: Individualized political 
authority; crony hierarchy; few restraints 
on power
•  Concentration of decisions about 
investment allocation at the highest 
levels of government
•  High vulnerability to revenue volatility 
translates to extremely low predictabil-
ity of resource allocations to public 
investment and intergovernmental 
transfers
•  High degree of private rent-seeking, 
narrow targeting of infrastructure and 
discretionary allocation of public 
investment following short-term 
coalitional incentives
•  Time inconsistency in public works 
contracting
•  Use of off-budget channels and 
weakening of the of PIM systems
•  Focus on asset creation and neglect 
asset preservation
Hegemonic government: Institutionalized 
one-party regime; either predatory or 
 benevolent
•  Concentration of decisions about 
investment allocation at the highest levels 
of  government
•  Moderate predictability in channeling of 
investments to asset creation and 
 preservation
•  Provision of narrow infrastructure for 
extractive industry development and for 
urban areas in longer-term interest, but 
less attention to broad-based public 
investment
•  Private rent-seeking (through both 
investment allocation and procurement), 
but more contained and institutionalized
•  Use of off-budget channels but some 
attention to strengthening of PIM systems






Clientelist pluralism: Political 
competition based on extensive use of 
clientelism/patronage
•  Incentives to concentrate investment 
allocation decisions in the executive 
and through constituency funds
•  Vulnerability to revenue volatility and 
resulting low predictability of capital 
budget allocations and intergovern-
mental transfers
•  Time inconsistency in public works 
contracting
•  Broader targeting of infrastructure 
projects
•  Private rent-seeking, as well as 
allocation distortions introduced by 
coalitional, electoral incentives, and 
earmarking of funds
•  Focus on short-term asset creation 
and neglect asset preservation, with 
electoral cycle infl uencing the timing, 
location, and type of investments
•  Fragmentation of investment 
portfolio across levels of government 
and regions
Programmatic pluralism: Electoral 
competition based on programs; 
horizontal and vertical accountability
•  Smoothing of spending and higher 
predictability of public investment 
budgets
•  Institutional mechanisms to encourage 
longer-term public investments with 
deferred benefi t stream and coordina-
tion across levels of government
•  Investments prioritized and allocated 
with a view to public (over private) 
good; strong enforcement mechanisms 
on procurement and transparency
•  Investment in and use of PIM systems 
and institutional learning
•  Attention to asset preservation and 
sustainability
Source: Authors.
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well institutionalized and political competition is based on the provision 
of public goods. In recent years, Chile and Botswana have transitioned 
into this quadrant. In such settings, public investment management 
institutions have been strengthened by long-term investments in capac-
ity and skills and by the consensus among policy makers regarding 
resource management policy and diversifi cation strategies. A large part 
of the population and political actors understand and support the poli-
cies tied to resource extraction, in particular the need for the govern-
ment to follow through on its policies.
The short time horizons of a fragile or unstable autocratic regime are 
likely to provide few incentives for signifi cant public investments or to 
maintain existing assets. These patrimonial regimes may seek only to 
support investment to the extent that it assists extraction. While DRC 
and Niger have vast infrastructure needs, the governments themselves 
have not been able to mobilize resources effectively for investment and 
they remain largely dependent on development aid. Robinson and 
 Torvik (2005) note the tragic case of Mobuto’s Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of Congo), where despite resource wealth, only 6,000 miles of 
functional roads were left in 1980 from the 90,000 miles existing at inde-
pendence from Belgium in 1960. DRC’s investment budget has become 
highly contested among the president, prime minister, ministers, and 
governors, nominally members of the same coalition. Rather than com-
ing to a consensus on targeting key infrastructure gaps, the provincial 
governments of the producing regions used the resources from new con-
tracts to buy farm equipment like tractors, which they then doled out 
across the country, with limited prospects of public use. While infra-
structure remains a central tenet of the DRC president’s political plat-
form, even he would fi nd it diffi cult to implement a signifi cant project 
through the debilitated government systems. 
Especially when the electorate and elites are fragmented and the pol-
icy coordination across political forces is weak, democracy and electoral 
accountability will not necessarily lead to the provision of more public 
goods, including the benefi t of effi cient public investment. Because of 
poor coordination and low credibility of commitments between political 
factions, politicians have short-term horizons, which means that they do 
not consider the full cycle of public investment projects in making spend-
ing decisions. In essence, politicians in clientelist democracies are not 
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credible in their promises to provide public goods to voters (Keefer and 
Vlaicu 2007); a politician may promise a bridge, but voters simply do not 
believe that he or she will be able to deliver it. Therefore politicians more 
narrowly target private goods, notably patronage or infrastructure proj-
ects directed to particular constituencies, frequently including their own 
ethnic group or clan, to gain support (Keefer and Vlaicu 2007). 
In these clientelist settings, it is particularly important to consider the 
overarching incentives embedded in electoral and party systems, along 
with other drivers of client politics (Keefer and Khemani 2009). For 
example, in Nigeria, despite concerted reform efforts under recent 
administrations, periodic reports of grand-scale and widespread petty 
corruption in infrastructure continue to raise concerns about the quality 
of public investment at both the federal and subnational levels. While 
the government of Nigeria has poured signifi cant amounts of resources 
into the oil-rich but restive Niger delta region, it has not been able to 
create a lasting public infrastructure footprint in the region. 
The low intertemporal credibility and coordination failures in patri-
monial and clientelist pluralist settings mean that government-wide 
“investing to invest” reforms tend to falter in the implementation link of 
the PIM value chain. For large-scale infrastructure projects, low inter-
temporal credibility is also likely to signifi cantly affect the risk premiums 
for contractors, as they fear obsolescing bargains. Rent-seeking is likely 
to be fragmented, which drives up costs, especially when contractors feel 
they cannot reach credible bargains against deliverables regardless of 
markups. These factors are likely to impinge on the quality of projects. 
Large-scale investment needs will not be met unless there is better coor-
dination among decision makers.
Hegemonic governments often present a more varied set of political 
economy dynamics. Since time horizons are longer owing to greater 
regime stability and intertemporal policy coordination, particular forms 
of investment, including those sustaining the extractives sector, may be 
consistent with the political economic equilibrium of these regimes. If 
the legitimacy of these regimes is linked to a narrative of modernization 
and development rather than repression and patronage, the drive for 
asset creation may be even stronger, as well as the desire to invest in 
country systems to enhance these objectives (Sarr and Wick 2010). The 
autocratic nature of these regimes, however, may result in an excessive 
200 Rents to Riches?
top-down focus on the hardware of development, engendering limited 
community ownership in the preservation of assets. In addition, since 
political inclusiveness remains low in these settings, public investment is 
vulnerable to being used as a conduit for channeling rents to elites, and 
rent-seeking through procurement systems is likely to present a chal-
lenge. But, depending on the size of the elite coalition (Bueno de  Mesquita 
2001), there is still a need to create a mix of public and private goods. As 
an example of a hegemonic regime, Angola’s ruling elite has emphasized 
a major national infrastructure push, but may not have paid enough 
attention to broad-based poverty reduction, instead directing public 
investment to meet the demands of infl uential urban elites. Even as 
Angolan offi cials recognize that they could broadly benefi t from more 
public infrastructure, their political incentives seem to align better with 
bringing narrow private benefi ts to their own constituencies. 
Policy Implications and Potential Interventions 
While political economy analysis can explain why countries have sub-
optimal outcomes in public capital formation, development practitio-
ners will be most interested in drawing operational policy implications 
regarding public investment management. The operational contribution 
of political economy analysis lies in acknowledging the effect of polit-
ical incentives on public investment outcomes and determining what 
 incentive-compatible interventions might improve the goal of public 
asset creation. Key measures will be needed to concurrently strengthen 
intertemporal credibility and political inclusiveness in order to enable 
asset creation and preservation. 
Three basic types of incentive-compatible interventions might achieve 
the objective of effective public asset creation, preservation, and  operation 
(as outlined in table 5.7). Some types of intervention are aimed primar-
ily at extending time horizons and policy coordination, thereby enhanc-
ing intertemporal credibility. These might include leveraging external 
anchors or partnerships, including those with the World Bank. A second 
type of reform emphasizes mobilizing stakeholders and enabling collec-
tive demand-side action in public investment policy and management, 
thereby broadening political inclusiveness. A third form of intervention 
is slightly different: it enclaves institutions and capacity in natural 
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Table 5.7. “Good Fit” Downstream Interventions for Resource-Dependent Countries










Patrimonial rule: Individualized political 
authority; crony hierarchy; few 
restraints on power 
•  Strengthen country systems while 
contracting out key services in the 
short term
•  Emphasize incremental asset creation 
through less complex, shorter term 
projects and maintenance
•  Ease information asymmetries 
through simple project design
•  Earmark capital budget ratios for 
preservation and for creation, 
emphasizing predictability of 
resource fl ows
•  Leverage extractive investor concerns 
around longer term license to 
operate for dual-use infrastructure, 
and leverage collective interests in 
resource corridors
Hegemonic government: institutional-
ized one-party regime; either 
predatory or benevolent
•  Strengthen country systems, while 
contracting out key services in the 
short term
•  Broaden inclusiveness of investment 
through subnational transfers
•  Emphasize checks on executive 
power to rein in rent-seeking
•  Consider RfI arrangements and 
parastatals for short-term larger 
infrastructure, with mechanisms for 
external transparency and emphasis 




Clientelist pluralism: Political 
competition based on extensive use of 
clientelism/patronage
•  Strengthen country systems
•  Institute earmarking rules for 
preservation and for creation
•  Emphasize checks on executive 
power to reduce rent-seeking 
and strengthen the capacity of 
oversight bodies to monitor the 
capital budget
•  Use matching grants to incentivize 
coordination across levels of 
government and regions and to 
reduce excessive fragmentation 
of public investment
•  Improve design and costing of 
projects fi nanced through constitu-
ency funds
•  Stimulate demand-side mobilization 
and ease information asymmetries 
through simple project design
Programmatic pluralism: Electoral 
competition based on programs; 
horizontal and vertical  accountability
•  Rely on core country systems, 
ongoing investing to invest
•  Use matching grants to incentivize 
coordination across levels of 
government and regions and to 
reduce excessive fragmentation of 
public investment
Source: Authors.
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resource management so that some functionality, albeit limited, is pos-
sible, even when the wider political economy dynamics are perverse. The 
need and scope for each of these types of strategies, whether by commit-
ted authorities, extractive companies, the broader private sector, civil 
society, communities, or development partners, will depend on the pre-
vailing political economy context. 
The principles for incentive-compatible improvements to public 
investment management in resource-dependent developing countries 
include extending time horizons and achieving collective action, pro-
moting demand-side inclusiveness, earmarking resources and enclaving 
capacity, prioritizing PIM system components, and using alternative 
implementation modalities. 
Extending Time Horizons and Achieving Collective Action
Ascher (2009) highlights a number of strategies that seek to lengthen 
the time horizons of policy makers, including lessening the perceived 
short-term losses of key stakeholders who will tend to focus discussions 
on shortsighted actions, carefully structuring multistakeholder pro-
cesses (including the use of commissions), and emphasizing the selec-
tion and incentive processes for leadership. Such principles may prove 
helpful in identifying incentive-compatible remedies to enhance asset 
creation and preservation. While they may fall short of full-fl edged sys-
tematic reforms in PFM and PIM systems, at the margin they promise 
to enhance the context-specifi c quantity and quality of public invest-
ment fl ows.
One example is the passage of Mongolia’s Fiscal Stability Law in mid-
2010. The relatively strong role of legislators in Mongolia has been asso-
ciated with a fragmentation of the public investment program into small 
projects, as each member has an incentive to channel resources back to 
his or her own geographic constituency (Hasnain 2011). Collectively, 
members realized that this type of individual maximization would lead 
to volatility in public investment budgets. Thus, legislators passed the 
Fiscal Stability Law, which restricted their funding for smaller invest-
ment projects and recognized the need for large infrastructure, includ-
ing developing new extractive industries in the southern Gobi Desert. 
Yet, the law involved some compromises. While a technically desirable 
option would have been to monopolize resource allocation in a single 
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agency, the political realities in Mongolia led to more diffuse control of 
the resource allocation process. Rather than try to reduce the level of con-
stituency fl ows, the reform placed the emphasis on improving local proj-
ects by setting up basic minimum standards and gatekeeping functions 
and incentivizing greater coordination. In order to remain politically 
feasible, such a system must demonstrate that it supports the completion 
of better projects, for which legislators can in turn take credit.
Promoting Demand-Side Inclusiveness 
The demand for public investment may be concentrated or dispersed 
across various actors in the system (including selected members of the 
executive, legislative, and subnational levels). Therefore, special atten-
tion must be paid to those actors in the state likely to make an effort to 
promote investment with a view to the public good and suffi ciently long 
time horizons. Where pressure groups may be particularly well orga-
nized (for example, transport or business associations), the private sec-
tor may exert concerted pressure to improve infrastructure. But many 
resource-dependent economies with weak nonresource sectors may fi nd 
it especially hard to break out of a low-level equilibrium where demand, 
hence supply, is weak. 
An emphasis on improving PIM processes can appear abstract to 
political constituencies. A more constructive entry point may be to focus 
initially on particular aspects of PIM functionality or programmatic, 
sectoral, or geographically salient outcomes. In Brazil, for example, the 
legislature has increasingly exerted pressure on the executive to complete 
projects as evidence of unfi nished projects has increased. Similarly, cam-
paign slogans in Peru’s resource-rich regions have  emphasized the 
importance of efforts to improve project completion rates. 
While simply fi nishing projects does not promise good projects, such 
entry points as improving the project implementation link may provide 
initial political momentum for further reforms. Extractive industries 
will often be a strong source of demand for the creation and initial main-
tenance of infrastructure, given its direct links to generating rents and 
profi ts. Prospective resource corridors may present signifi cant opportu-
nities for more inclusive, dual-use infrastructure. Tractable steps in this 
regard would be to “crowd in” demand from potential users as part of 
evolving spatial plans, which in turn would set the basis for longer-term 
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constituencies for maintenance. In the service delivery sector, public 
expenditure tracking surveys have gained some traction in illuminating 
gaps in frontline service delivery fi nancing fl ows. Capital expenditure 
tracking surveys could be used to monitor fi nancing fl ows to actual con-
tracts and physical works, starting with greater transparency at the 
 project site.22
In patrimonial and clientelist settings, the inability to adequately 
resolve intertemporal bargains affects large-scale infrastructure projects. 
Consequently, one option may be simply to emphasize smaller projects 
with shorter time horizons, including those depending on decentralized 
and community-level implementation. Countries with very weak human 
and institutional capacity may not benefi t from establishing full-fl edged 
country systems for large-scale investment. In attempting to fi nd a good-
fi t arrangement, less complex investments may be achieved by devolving 
block grants to communities and subnational governments, even if this 
action risks a large share of these resources being used for consumption. 
Such transfers should be complemented with incentives that help pro-
mote coordination across jurisdictions when projects have spillovers and 
thereby prevent excessive fragmentation of the investment portfolio.
The EITI has demonstrated the potential of a multistakeholder initia-
tive anchored in an international mechanism that helps mobilize domes-
tic actors for greater transparency in natural resource management. 
Along similar lines, the Construction Transparency Initiative (CoST 
2010) has now been piloted in eight countries.23 Drawing in government, 
contractors, and civil society, the initiative has demonstrated that, while 
the PIM process is complex and characterized by organizational diver-
sity, it enables greatly enhanced transparency and provides tractable 
benchmarks and greater disclosure of fi nancial and procurement 
 information. Growing international attention to expenditure quality 
may also motivate policy makers in resource-dependent countries to 
anchor demand and credibility for reforms in these types of initiatives, 
at least for particular segments of the investment portfolio. Such initia-
tives may be incentive-compatible in hegemonic settings to the extent to 
which they do not threaten major institutionalized rent-seeking, or in 
patrimonial and clientelist settings, where fragmented governing coali-
tions see them as an opportunity to lock in reform opportunities. Nev-
ertheless, in order for external accountability to be effective, greater 
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transparency of resource allocation and project outcomes must be 
accompanied by support for improving the capacity of civil society and 
oversight institutions to act collectively and demand that public resources 
are invested in assets that generate greater public benefi ts.
Earmarking Resources and Enclaving Capacity
Another set of options designed to remedy both intertemporal credibility 
issues and inclusiveness gaps may be to rely on parallel or nontraditional 
mechanisms for resource earmarking or enclaving of public investment 
implementation. Especially in large-scale contracts, construction compa-
nies may demand signifi cant risk premiums to contract with credibility-
weak governments. These premiums may be associated with a high cost 
of doing business (for example, the need for informal payments) but also 
the fact that companies may not get paid in a timely fashion for work 
completed. Angola, for example, was able to leverage signifi cant credit 
lines from Brazil and China to draw in international construction capac-
ity. However, inadequate revenue management by the Angolan govern-
ment during the 2008–09 commodity price bust put it signifi cantly in 
arrears in the face of fi scal sustainability and cash management concerns. 
One option to enhance intertemporal credibility may be to capitalize 
projects through multilateral development banks or escrow accounts 
with third-party procurement agents to ensure that showcase projects are 
implemented, while contractor premiums are reduced through risk miti-
gation and insurance.
RfI deals have emerged as a modality of infrastructure investment for 
both host governments and extractive companies, as previously discussed 
(box 5.2). For host governments, they allow subsoil asset value to be 
directly earmarked to infrastructure, while also buying in capacity to 
deliver infrastructure. For implementing contractors, RfI suggests that 
these contracts are backed by the resources (rather than the unpredict-
able annual budget) and the interests of the extractive company in main-
taining the bargain to extract resources. For companies, moreover, the 
tangible and visible infrastructure contributions may be an important 
part of the local license to operate. The time horizons of the extractive 
deal will typically exceed those of frontloaded infrastructure provision. 
In extreme cases of limited intertemporal credibility, however, compa-
nies under RfI will not be immune to obsolescing bargains. Claims that 
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these deals did not yield enough value for resources may also be used 
against the companies for political reasons. Therefore, it may be in the 
best interest of companies to draw in third-party honest brokers and 
ongoing monitors to provide greater transparency to these aspects of the 
contract. The contracts should also be structured fl exibly enough to 
respond to signifi cant changes, for example, in input costs or midterm 
design changes that host governments may request. Development part-
ners can play a role as third-party brokers to help to ease the information 
asymmetries in RfI in the extractive industries. By doing so, they can 
enhance time consistency, improve predictability, and reduce the risks 
investors face, thereby helping client countries get better resource extrac-
tion deals for themselves. 
Prioritizing PIM System Components
Signifi cant effort has been devoted in the past decade to strengthening 
core public fi nancial management systems in developing countries.24 
International development partners have also devoted increasing effort 
to strengthening public investment management systems in resource-
dependent settings.25 In light of the high rates of public investment 
spending in many resource-dependent settings, few technical advisors 
would contest the desirability of pursuing concerted reforms to PIM 
 systems as part of the investing-to-invest agenda. A more systematic 
technical analysis of key binding constraints to better projects or lower 
leakages needs to be complemented with a political economy perspective 
to identify the links of the PIM system that may be subject to signifi cant 
rent-seeking and hence particularly diffi cult to reform in a comprehen-
sive manner. 
The recognition that a full-fl edged strengthening of certain “must 
have” features of the PIM system may be politically infeasible does not 
preclude a number of possible engagement options. The fi rst such option 
is a two-track approach that progresses incrementally to a single system. 
Initially, a subset of priority projects could be subject to higher scrutiny, 
while others are allowed greater discretion. Such an approach could 
focus, for example, on a particular ministry or sector where incentives 
for outcomes seem to be particularly well aligned. A second approach 
might be to simply try to implement priority projects through special 
mechanisms, which would have signifi cant risks, since there are no 
 Investing Resource Wealth: The Political Economy of Public Infrastructure Provision 207
 guarantees that such special arrangements will be sustained over time or 
that these projects will be mainstreamed back into the public sector 
upon completion.
Technical strengthening can also be aligned with inherently political 
decision-making processes to yield better investment quality. Chile has 
been an early leader in establishing more systematic, centralized gate-
keeping and technical appraisal for its investment projects. Politicians can 
select between alternative infrastructure investments, but these have to be 
previously evaluated and incorporated in a bank of prescreened and uni-
formly costed projects. Similarly, Peru has managed to extend its national 
screening system (SNIP, the National Public Investment System) to sub-
national governments, including those benefi ting from a signifi cant infl ux 
of mining royalties. An alternative for contexts in which individual legis-
lators seek to add specifi c projects into the budget bypassing the public 
investment system, as in Mongolia (Fritz and Finch 2008), is to allow 
politicians to choose from a bank of prescreened projects (as is done in 
Chile). Over time, this system may change the incentives for representa-
tives to accommodate to these standards and make efforts to include well-
designed projects in the pool of projects they can include in the budget. 
The cases of Mongolia and Peru highlight the importance of balancing 
political with technocratic concerns, especially when decision-making 
tradition is not as highly centralized in the executive.
Even if leaders want to increase the output of public investment 
through better projects, it is not clear that they would be in a position to 
do so credibly. The returns from the investing-to-invest agenda may sim-
ply be too uncertain, diffuse, and time-inconsistent. A critical opera-
tional challenge for many resource-dependent countries is how to 
 progressively bridge these inconsistencies over time. A central part of 
this strategy is to emphasize the prospects for successful demonstration 
cases (that is, to fi nd if more good projects begin to drive out bad proj-
ects) and to emphasize learning by doing, rather than supply-driven 
capacity building support. In this case, capacity must itself be viewed as 
both endogenous and exogenous: leaders choose to build up capacity if 
it is in their interest in the medium to long term, but their policy choices 
will also be conditioned by the existing capacity in the short term.
The case of Timor-Leste illustrates that weaknesses in PIM capacity 
can reinforce the tendency for politicians to explore alternative public 
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investment modalities. Electricity provision, particularly in politically 
sensitive urban centers such as Dili, is a clear policy concern for the gov-
ernment, and the government attempted to address the electricity short-
age by purchasing a used Chinese power plant. Poor design planning and 
weak management skills delayed the implementation of the project and, 
as a result, a third of the country’s investment budget in 2009 stood to be 
unexecuted. The government arranged for the excess investment budget 
to be allocated to a wide range of small works programs to be distributed 
via an association of private construction businesses, instead of through 
regular public procurement systems (Anderson, Barma, and Porter 2010). 
Preliminary evidence thus suggests that the lack of a bank of prescreened 
projects and adequate implementation modalities meant that the gov-
ernment was constrained in its scope for investment instruments. 
Alternative Implementation Modalities
A central feature of DRC President Joseph Kabila’s 2006 electoral plat-
form and his ruling coalition has been the Cinq Chantiers, fi ve priority 
areas for public work (housing, water, electricity, health, and education) 
over the next fi ve years. However, constraints in capacity and coordina-
tion within the government have hampered its ability to deliver on this 
program. With the 2011 elections approaching, the government has 
relied on a major resource-for-infrastructure deal as a way to credibly 
deliver on some infrastructure promises while providing targeted trans-
fers to enhance its reelection prospects.26 DRC’s attempts to scale-up 
public investment show that in coalition or fragmented governments, 
obstacles to removing vested interests in the PIM system can be espe-
cially daunting. In this case, even if the executive had wanted to deliver 
high-profi le national infrastructure in advance of the 2011 elections 
through the standard PFM-treasury system, it would have been extremely 
diffi cult. DRC’s fragmented revenue agencies are able to capture only a 
fraction of revenues with existing production. Even if revenues could be 
brought to the treasury, the domestic PIM system today is so dysfunc-
tional that it is unlikely to deliver any tangible outcomes in a short period 
of time (Chevallier and Kaiser 2010). 
Therefore the DRC government resorted to an alternative modality. 
The country’s 2009 RfI deal was subject to signifi cant scrutiny, largely 
as a result of the country’s ongoing HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor 
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 Country) debt-relief initiative (Doemeland et al. 2010). It was modifi ed 
in scale to address international concerns about DRC’s future debt expo-
sures and the contingent liabilities inherent in the agreement.27 However, 
a key concern of development partners is that such a degree of external 
scrutiny is unlikely to be present in future negotiations. Whether these 
types of agreements are ultimately aligned to some sustained level of 
productive and sustained investment will also depend on the investor. In 
settings like DRC where elite motivations for longer-term public good 
provision are weak, longer term investors like China should be concerned 
both about obsolescing bargains and having a positive development 
impact on the communities where they operate. Therefore, reform 
efforts would ideally concentrate on aligning these interests to develop-
mental objectives.
The case of the DRC illustrates a stark choice between traditional 
public sector investment spending modalities and resource-for-infra-
structure deals. However, even in the context of the traditional PIM value 
chain, governments can make a series of important changes at the mar-
gin. These will be guided by achieving functionality, but also conditioned 
signifi cantly by time horizons and rent-seeking concerns, since most of 
the RfI contracts also involve considerably large cash bonuses at signing. 
Conclusion
This chapter has identifi ed the technical, political economy, and institu-
tional capacity challenges to enhancing productive public investment in 
resource-dependent developing countries. By examining the quantity 
and quality dimensions of public investment, this analysis has elucidated 
the trade-offs that must be made in order to provide productive physical 
assets, focusing on the project portfolio and its implementation. The 
chapter has also identifi ed the political economy factors that infl uence 
the incentives to invest in improving public investment management sys-
tems. Key dimensions in attaining more productive and effi cient invest-
ment projects in resource-dependent settings lie in both the political 
incentives and the time horizons to realize these projects, and also in 
improving the capacity to do so through careful attention to PIM system 
components. A countervailing factor clearly lies in the investment bud-
get’s attractiveness as a rent-distribution mechanism and its vulnerability 
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to corruption. Therefore domestic reformers and development partners 
must navigate the most promising paths to gain traction toward better 
projects in view of the prevailing political economy dynamics. 
This chapter also noted the need for more attention to public 
 investment outside mainstream channels, including investment through 
state-owned enterprises and public-private partnerships. For resource- 
dependent settings, especially those with weak administrative capacity, 
these modalities can serve as commitment devices to deliver infrastruc-
ture. A key challenge lies in proactively aligning incentives and capabili-
ties for citizens, governments, and the investors themselves to generate 
value for resources. RfI deals may be particularly attractive to investors 
in institutionally weak settings—the challenge is to encourage develop-
ers to see their engagement in these countries as a repeated game, where 
their reputation and future profi tability are affected by the initial quality 
and sustainability of the infrastructure that was provided.
The “investing to invest” agenda promises high returns for resource-
dependent countries—yet the case studies for this volume suggest that 
these prospective returns must also be tempered by a reality check. 
Reforms of public investment systems are complex and have tended to 
require strong champions supported by broad coalitions to achieve sig-
nifi cant and sustained improvement. 
Greater predictability with regard to fi nancing public investment can 
clearly be a critical ingredient for better public investment management. 
Consequently, measures that delink annual revenues from spending are 
a necessary ingredient for medium-term predictability in infrastructure 
envelopes. Although there has been a trend in international practice to 
counteract the traditional bifurcation of recurrent and capital spending, 
resource-dependent countries face the particular challenge of keeping a 
focus on net asset creation—hence, some particular focus on capital 
spending may be merited in these settings.
This chapter has laid out some of the core policy and capacity deci-
sions governments face in investing the proceeds of natural resource 
extraction. It is important to unbundle the concepts of absorptive 
capacity and public investment management, thus affording a better 
contextual understanding of the varying but often interdependent driv-
ers of investment quality and quantity. In moving down the extractives-
led development value chain, it is critical to examine the spending or 
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investment of wealth in terms of the tangible outcomes of asset cre-
ation and preservation, rather than investment fl ows as such. While 
investment fl ows and good process are clearly important ingredients, 
positive increases in the economic and socially productive public capi-
tal stock are the results that matter, combined with the value for 
resources. In this regard, the chapter has also underscored the critical 
intertemporal dynamics of mobilizing collective action for better 
investment.
Investing to invest, or capacity-building efforts to improve public 
investment management, pertains most to core country systems, but this 
chapter has also demonstrated that resource-dependent countries can 
resort to different modalities or technologies when seeking to scale-up 
public investment. Increasingly, in many cases, asset creation bypasses 
government treasuries, either due to direct links with extractives infra-
structure or through RfI deals. The caveats notwithstanding, RfI can 
serve as a commitment device in earmarking resource proceeds to infra-
structure, as well as contracting execution capacity, especially for new 
and fragile state producers. At the same time, so that governments even-
tually develop credible alternatives, particular care must be taken to 
ensure that the development of core country systems is not neglected, 
especially with the prospect of a more diversifi ed resource base and pro-
spective evolution of the political system. Enhancing asset creation 
through RfI will also require adequate mechanisms for sustained asset 
preservation and maintenance. Domestic and external pressure may 
serve as one lever to better align incentives for actual asset creation with 
the social license to operate.
A better public capital stock is one of the most promising avenues for 
transforming resource rents into sustainable development riches. Gains 
in this domain prove less ephemeral than pure consumption or even 
large accumulations of liquid fi nancial assets. The right balance between 
capital creation and preservation will be contextual, and it will also 
depend on the existing and prospective capital stock in place—a country 
with few roads has less maintenance to carry out. Ideally, the bulk of the 
conversion of rents to public capital would occur through the treasury. 
EITI has centered on making sure the revenues due a government from 
extractives companies do indeed reach the treasury. After this EITI stage, 
 however, effective budgeting and execution in public expenditure 
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 management are critical to achieving the conversion of rents into physi-
cal infrastructure in the most optimal intertemporal and distributional 
fashion. The case studies for this volume suggest that banking on full-
fl edged PFM/PIM reforms is often unrealistic, given the prevailing time 
horizons policy makers face. This underscores the need to identify, pri-
oritize, and sequence actions that promise to be most tractable and fea-
sible given the prevailing political economy context. 
Notes
 1.  In the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) cash framework, capital 
expenditures include payments for the acquisition of fi xed capital assets, which 
are goods with a normal life of more than a year and with more than a minimal 
signifi cant value. Acquisition of fi xed capital assets incorporates own-account 
capital formation, that is, construction by government itself of fi xed assets, and 
also includes major renovations, reconstructions, or enlargements of existing 
fi xed assets (as opposed to the costs of maintenance and repair of fi xed assets, 
which are defi ned as current expenditures). In the GFS accrual framework, cap-
ital outlays are transactions in nonfi nancial assets, and the focus here is on fi xed 
assets (produced assets used repeatedly in production processes that provide 
services for longer than one year).
 2.  Broader defi nitions of investment also focus on the creation of human capital. 
While the focus here is on physical infrastructure, given its particular technical, 
incentive, and institutional challenges, “soft” capital formation in such areas as 
education and health will depend on the building of schools and clinics. But it 
ultimately depends on how teachers, doctors, and nurses are actually deployed 
to increase the skill base and health of a population. The World Bank’s Wealth 
of Nations “green accounting” framework (World Bank 2011a), for example, 
explicitly accounts for education spending in its genuine savings estimates. The 
defi nition used here includes human development only to the extent of includ-
ing associated facilities such as schools and clinics, as well as the infrastructure 
to allow benefi ciaries to access these facilities. The notion of soft capital could 
also be broadened to a host of other types of “intangible” capital, including the 
quality of government administration. 
 3.  The channels by which public spending can affect present and future citizens’ 
welfare are diverse and complex and beyond the scope of this analysis. Using a 
dollar of oil proceeds to push an individual above the poverty line will have 
signifi cant social returns. But fl ooding the domestic market with imported food 
may kill the local agricultural sector and with it any existent diversifi cation. A 
well-targeted transfer may ensure that the child of a poor family is able to com-
plete her schooling, generating human capital. Transferring rents from the state 
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to households may allow the state to tax-back nonresource revenues, allowing 
for a variety of more effi cient household and fi rm-level investments, while also 
allowing the state to tax-back a more reliable and growing revenue base (see 
Devarajan, Le, and Raballand 2010). 
 4.  A domestic physical capital stock not only may yield higher economic, especially 
social, returns than fi nancial savings, particularly if this is complementary to 
“soft” human development capital formation, but also may be a more secure 
asset than the buildup of large liquid assets in settings with weak intertemporal 
credibility. A bridge once built promises to yield sustained benefi ts, while politi-
cians may quickly draw down a savings fund during a weaker price cycle or 
political campaign.
 5.  Resource-dependent settings will frequently be characterized by a relatively nar-
row nonresource tax base. Consequently, revenue base diversifi cation should be 
an important strategic objective for these settings. Increasing emphasis has also 
been placed on the accountability dimensions of state-society tax linkages, in 
the spirit of taxation engendering demands for societal representation. An 
assessment indicator for public infrastructure spending is how it serves as a 
potential input to sustaining and increasing the state’s future revenue base. 
Given that this link is typically weak in resource-dependent countries, it fails to 
act as a disciplining device on revenue mobilization and allocation to public 
capital spending.
 6.  Signifi cant macroeconomic policy guidance exists concerning savings and stabi-
lization for resource-dependent settings (Brahmbhatt and Canuto 2010), as well 
as mechanisms for resource revenue stabilization and savings (Ossowski et al. 
2008; Dabán and Hélis 2010; Villafuerte and Lopez-Murphy 2010). However, 
the success rate of many of these arrangements has been especially low in insti-
tutionally weak settings. Consequently, greater attention must be given to fi nd-
ing ways to anchor their actual implementation more effectively with regard to 
the prevailing political economy context. One tangible anchor may actually be 
fi xed asset creation. Fiscal stabilization rules may target some baseline price (for 
example, longer-run price moving average) to set annual resource revenues for 
budget assumptions. If price (and production) exceeds these values, it builds up 
stabilization funds. This was essentially the logic of the pact by which Nigeria’s 
federal and state governments pooled revenues until recently in the Excess 
Crude Account. Longer-term savings objectives, frequently linked to asset 
appreciation and other strategic objectives (such as other resource access), may 
also drive countries to establish SWFs. A central question for fi scal policy mak-
ing is where resource-related fi scal rules target overall spending and savings 
aggregates or whether they seek to earmark some level of resource rents for 
capital expenditures. 
 7.  A stark illustration of problems associated with absorptive capacity was seen in 
Luanda, Angola’s main port, as vital shipments lingered for months at sea 
owing to capacity bottlenecks, stalling reconstruction and leading to spiraling 
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construction prices. Since capital spending envelopes are normally more dis-
cretionary than other forms of public spending, such as wages, entitlements, 
and debt servicing, they tend to be prone to high degrees of volatility and lack 
of annual predictability. Limited execution of capital spending envelopes may 
be a result of top-down fi scal constraints or cash management or bottom-up 
problems of failing to implement projects on time.
 8.  These three questions serve as the analytical basis for the World Bank’s Public 
Expenditure Review framework (Pradhan 1996).
 9.  Across developed and developing country settings there has been a resurgent 
interest in public investment. Public investment levels in Europe and the United 
States have trended downward somewhat in recent years to the 2 to 3 percent of 
GDP range (Mehrotra and Välilä 2006). The recent fi nancial crisis has also seen 
renewed attention to leveraging public investments in the context of fi scal stim-
ulus measures. The experience of Latin America in the 1990s raised concerns 
about potential public underinvestment in the face of debt-induced budgetary 
constraints. Decreased public investment fl ows have been associated with sig-
nifi cant infrastructural defi cits (Calderón and  Servén 2004). At the same time, 
there are also concerns that public investment may crowd out private invest-
ment in the face of weak institutional quality (Cavallo and Daude 2008). In 
OECD countries, but also in developing countries, multimillion-dollar, mega-
sized projects have also become an increasingly prominent, and frequently 
problematic, aspect of public investment initiatives (Flyvbjerg, Bruzeliua, and 
Rothengatter 2003). 
 10.  The available pool of rents will depend on the quantity of extraction, the price, 
and the nature of the fi scal or rent-capture regime. One typically observed mea-
sure is receipts to the treasury. Sarr and Wick (2010) use a measure based on the 
quantity of resources extracted and the difference between the resource price 
and the extraction cost.
 11.  Other options could include hedging revenues against price changes, as Mexico 
has done recently. Politically, these mechanisms may be diffi cult to implement 
for policy makers, as the political costs and benefi ts may be misaligned (Eifert 
and Gelb 2002). Finance ministers may typically get few plaudits for having got-
ten hedging right, but are usually chastised for wasting potential gains through 
hedging.
 12.  Budget credibility is defi ned as actual spending relative to planned 
expenditures.
 13.  As the World Development Report 2009 (World Bank 2008d) highlights, policy 
makers would be ill-advised to try to equalize economic activity, for example, 
through targeted investments to lagging regions. Rather, they should focus 
on providing some basic standard of service delivery across the country. In 
resource-rich settings, this raises a particular set of questions as to how public 
investment from nonrenewable resources should best be targeted from a growth 
perspective. 
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 14.  Heritage and ownership arguments about subsoil assets typically mean that the 
extractive industry’s local license to operate (and potentially the government’s 
overall political legitimacy) will hinge on ensuring that rents and investment fl ow 
back to the citizens of the extracting localities. Doing so will require effective 
coordination of fi scal and public investment policy across national and subna-
tional levels, as well as careful attention to the absorptive capacity and gover-
nance quality at the national, subnational, and community levels. A national 
benevolent planner would ideally allocate resource-rent-fi nanced public invest-
ment projects to the highest return projects, regardless of their geographic loca-
tion. For example, Collier (2010a) suggests that it might be more effi cient for 
Nigeria to allocate investment funds to Lagos rather than divert them to other 
parts of the country with fewer growth prospects. However, there are a number 
of economic and political reasons for earmarking investments to the location of 
resource-extraction. Subnational governments frequently demand a share of 
rents to compensate for the drawdown of their subsoil heritage. Political pres-
sures, including violent confrontation, to allocate resources for investment and 
associated decision prerogatives to regions with resource extraction can be sig-
nifi cant. Subnational entities also demand to be compensated for additional costs 
emerging from resource extraction (for example, pressures on existing infra-
structure, the environment, and social services). Finally, subnational actors asso-
ciated with resource extraction sites will argue that higher levels of government 
tend to neglect the interests of resident populations, and hence demand greater 
control over associated rent fl ows. Cases like DRC, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria 
illustrate the pressures and contestation for subnational benefi t sharing, which 
has in turn posed further challenges to coherent public investment spending.
 15.  Growing recourse to this modality is associated with Chinese engagement with 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America (Foster et al. 2008), and early successful 
examples have also seen RfI deals referred to as the “Angola model.” Interest-
ingly, Japan appears to have used a similar model in the 1970s and 1980s with 
respect to Chinese coal and oil resources (Brautigam 2010). 
 16.  The signifi cant politicization of República Bolivariana de Venezuela’s national 
oil company PDVSA has compromised its core mission of maintaining 
upstream functionality owing to various downstream social mission expecta-
tions (Corrales and Penfold 2001).
 17.  The DRC’s recent US$3 billion-plus deal with Chinese interests that centered on 
access to copper deposits was notionally on budget but otherwise it completely 
bypassed standard government systems, including those for procurement. 
Angola was able to quickly draw in signifi cant Chinese as well as Brazilian con-
struction capacity for postconfl ict reconstruction against oil production. A Nige-
rian deal with a Korean contractor was abrogated, but the courts subsequently 
ruled against the government.
 18.  Note that the data refer to relative levels, and not absolute fl ows, of investment, 
and they also do not control for cross-country differences in public investment 
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cost levels. In practice, a 5 percent public investment rate for DRC versus Chile 
will imply signifi cant higher absolute spending levels in the latter, and of course 
will be vastly different in terms of the starting capital stock.
 19.  Using data for 1980–95.
 20.  In a similar vein, Benitez, Estache, and Søreide (2010) highlight how private 
political agendas frequently can skew outcomes in infrastructure provision and 
regulation, in a way that seems underappreciated in the mainstream policy advi-
sory community, which advocates greater efforts to tailor politically viable solu-
tions to sector, time, and location.
 21.  There is a long-standing literature and wide evidence on the link between public 
investment growth and poverty reduction. Recently, Haque and Kneller (2008) 
provide an empirical study suggesting that corruption in a country heightens 
public investment level but lowers its impact on growth. Anderson, de Renzio, 
and Levy (2006) survey the impact of public investment in poverty reduction. 
Easterly, Irwin, and Servén (2008) highlight the longer-term growth risks of 
curtailing public investment in the face of fi scal adjustment.
 22.  Increasingly, online systems linked to geographic information systems (GIS) 
and procurement systems, coupled with access to information laws, provide 
additional technical opportunities for greater transparency. 
 23.  The countries are Ethiopia, Guatemala, Malawi, Philippines, Tanzania, the 
United Kingdom, Vietnam, and Zambia.
 24.  The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) initiative (www
.pefa.org) has generated an estimated 200 in-depth country performance assess-
ments, of which an increasing number are repeat assessments. A large number 
of these have also covered resource-dependent settings.
 25.  Notable examples include the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Mongolia, 
Timor-Leste, and Vietnam.
 26.  A wide-ranging literature exists on electoral budget cycles in both democratic 
and mixed autocratic regimes. Depending on the context, public investment 
may be increased in advance of the elections to distribute greater private goods 
or to signal that the government is interested in the longer-run welfare of the 
country. The extent to which this translates into productive investment will 
depend on the credibility of incumbents to see the projects through after the 
election, as well as whether winning opposition groups will also complete or 
abandon the projects of the previous government.
 27.  The agreement holds DRC’s government liable if a minimum return is not 
achieved on the project.
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Bonanza: source of wealth, profi t, or good fortune; origin (Spanish): fair 
weather, prosperity; from Latin, bonus = good.
—Oxford English Dictionary 
Middle-income and developing countries have been awash in resource 
discoveries in recent years. The prospect of oil in Cambodia appears to 
offer the country a renewed stream of resource rents in the wake of sig-
nifi cant forest depletion in the past decade. Ghana seeks to become an 
oil exporter in addition to being a world-class mining country. Brazil is 
poised to become a major international oil exporter on the basis of fi nds 
in its pre-salt region. Uganda and potentially Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) are likely to benefi t from oil and gas fi nds in the Lake 
Albert region. Iraq’s rebounding oil production promises to move it up 
the global producer league. And reports of vast mining potential in 
Afghanistan have raised the inevitable question of whether a prospective 
resource bonanza in such a fragile setting could ultimately be the source 
of its salvation.
The notion of a “bonanza” evokes the promise of prosperity associ-
ated with natural resource fi nds and, as resource discovery and extrac-
tion push into frontier areas of the globe, the prospect of turning resource 
rents into riches holds great hope for a growing number of low-income 
countries. Yet, for every nation that has successfully created sustain-
able development riches out of resource wealth, there abound scores of 
tragic tales of illusory or squandered wealth. The stark political reality is 
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that resource rents in developing economies are most often generated 
and distributed in the context of highly imbalanced and noninclusive 
power structures that privilege short-term private enrichment over 
 longer-term collective welfare enhancement. 
This volume has analyzed these political economy dynamics surround-
ing the natural resource paradox with a view to enhancing the design and 
implementation of development interventions in this sector. This con-
cluding chapter sets out the key cross-cutting principles for intervention 
that carry across the natural resource management value chain, reviewing 
emerging lessons and how they can strengthen interventions in the natu-
ral resource sector. The chapter also looks at the strengths and potential 
limitations of the most common prescriptions or mechanisms for address-
ing the resource curse. Finally, the evolving landscape of development 
partner engagement is discussed, noting the importance of crowding in 
emerging stakeholders at the global and local levels in building truly col-
laborative and strategic programs of reform to promote the transforma-
tion of natural resource rents into sustainable development riches.
Principles of Intervention for Addressing 
the Resource Paradox 
The ambition of this book has been to construct a robust and compre-
hensive technical understanding of key aspects of resource-led develop-
ment set against a clear-eyed perspective on the political economy 
dynamics that shape outcomes in practice. The political economy lens 
emphasizes the importance of context in determining good fi t interven-
tions for any given country. At the same time, however, a systematic 
approach to political economy illuminates clear patterns in terms of how 
institutional frameworks shape and condition incentives and combine 
with stakeholder preferences to lead to fairly predictable outcomes. The 
case studies underpinning this work have served this dual purpose: They 
have grounded political economy analysis in fi nely grained, country-
specifi c detail about natural resource management practices across the 
value chain and articulated operational implications in each case. At the 
same time, the shared methodological prism of the value chain has led to 
generalized conclusions about the political economy of the resource 
paradox in developing countries as a group.
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Goodness of Fit and Incentive Compatibility
The typology developed in this volume illustrates how a country’s posi-
tioning along two key political-economic dimensions—the credibility of 
intertemporal commitment and the degree of political inclusiveness—
determines how stakeholder incentives and the institutional landscape 
interact with the structural characteristics of natural resources, hence, 
how a country actually experiences the resource paradox. In noninclu-
sive settings, where the credibility of intertemporal commitment is 
low, rent generation will be weak because the state will fi nd it diffi cult to 
make benefi cial extractive bargains with resource developers, and rent 
allocation will be biased toward consumption by political economic 
elites and away from saving and investment for society. Factors that make 
intertemporal commitments more credible—by lengthening time hori-
zons and strengthening institutionalization and the enforcement of 
property rights—will tend to improve a country’s performance in terms 
of rent generation by enabling governments to strike better deals, at a 
lower risk premium, with domestic and international developers and to 
set the conditions for new discovery. Factors that increase political inclu-
siveness, incorporating more political, social, and economic groups into 
decision making, will make the state more accountable to society and 
orient rent allocation toward collective welfare through the provision of 
public goods and investment for sustainable development. In other 
words, natural resource rents are most reliably transformed into sustain-
able development riches when a government can make credible inter-
temporal commitments to both extractive companies and its citizens 
and when the political regime is inclusive such that the government’s 
incentives are to use resource rents to provide public goods that enhance 
the collective welfare. 
Using a political economy framework for understanding outcomes in 
natural resource management points to two interrelated principles for 
enhancing the developmental orientation of the sector: 
(1)  Adopt a good fi t approach to natural resource management by 
 tailoring interventions to context. 
(2)  Emphasize the incentive compatibility of interventions such that 
they support and nudge stakeholders into making developmentally 
oriented decisions at each step of the value chain. 
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Orthodox approaches to natural resource management that seek to 
impose best-practice arrangements in the sector often miss the distinct 
policy priorities and reform opportunities in particular countries. A 
good fi t approach is inherently contingent on context and hinges on the 
view that building functional institutional capability matters more than 
achieving specifi c institutional forms to do so.1 And it rests on a clear 
understanding of stakeholder motivations in designing incentive-com-
patible interventions. In other words, a good fi t approach narrows the 
gap between expectation and reality with regard to interventions, aim-
ing to deliver improved outcomes through incentive-compatible entry 
points and institutional designs. 
Lengthening Time Horizons and Mobilizing Stakeholders 
From a political economy perspective, in order to be successful, develop-
ment initiatives must fi nd mechanisms to work within the constraints 
of, resonate with, and eventually transform, the underlying political and 
institutional dynamics associated with resource dependence. Resource-
dependent developing countries are likely to be embedded in patrimo-
nial, hegemonic, or clientelist political economy contexts, and they face 
core challenges with regard to intertemporal credibility and political 
inclusiveness (see table 2.2). In patrimonial settings, both credibility and 
inclusiveness are limited. This means that extractives investors will 
require high-risk premiums and will operate at dampened levels and 
that resource-related benefi ts are likely to accrue in a skewed manner in 
the host country. Hegemonic governments may be better situated to 
strike bargains with extractive operators, but, given the lack of inclusive-
ness of the regime, they may still face heightened risk and may demand 
contractual assurances and advantages to compensate. Short time hori-
zons in clientelist settings, resulting from low institutionalization and 
unpredictable electoral cycles, create pressures to revise fi scal terms and 
frontload revenues and reduce incentives to build institutional capacity. 
Broader political inclusiveness, on the other hand, provides greater space 
in these countries for supporting collective action for good governance 
and easing informational asymmetries. 
Building from the political economy typology, introduced in 
chapter 2 and discussed in technical chapters 3–5, three basic types 
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of incentive-compatible intervention are possible across the value 
chain as follows:
•  Interventions primarily aimed at extending time horizons, thereby 
enhancing intertemporal credibility, for example, emphasizing a sim-
ple, rule-based process for granting resource concessions that mini-
mizes investor uncertainty and enhances predictability.
•  Reforms that emphasize mobilizing stakeholders to cooperate on natu-
ral resource management, thereby broadening political inclusiveness; 
for example, easing information asymmetries by using model contract 
and fi scal regimes, or at least disclosing contract terms in order to 
empower third-party audit and oversight.
•  Interventions that enclave institutions and capacity in natural resource 
management so that some, albeit limited, functionality is possible, 
even when the wider political economy dynamics are perverse. 
Intelligently designed interventions along these lines can both 
strengthen salutary dynamics by tapping into incentives that push in the 
right direction as well as work with counterparts on transformative inter-
ventions that could alter the underlying political economy dynamics for 
the better. 
The technical chapters highlight how institutions, incentives, and 
stakeholders interact in resource extraction, taxation, and spending, 
and move from analysis to action in presenting options for develop-
ment interventions. Table 6.1 summarizes some of the key actionable 
principles for resource-dependent developing countries in these tech-
nical areas, mapped against the political economy settings of patrimo-
nial rule, hegemonic government, and clientelistic pluralism—namely 
those characterized by signifi cant weakness in terms of intertemporal 
credibility or political inclusiveness.2 These good-fi t interventions are 
layered against political economy contexts such that they ameliorate 
the adverse effects of weak intertemporal credibility and low political 
inclusiveness. In most cases, the interventions are elaborated as actions 
that resource-dependent governments could take, any of which could 
be bolstered and enhanced by support from donors and partnerships 




Table 6.1. “Good Fit” Arrangements for the Extractives Sector




1.  Enhance intertemporal credibility 
by lengthening time horizons and 
reducing the potential that 
contracts or fi scal regimes will be 
revised. 
2.  Support incentives to invest in 
institutional capacity across the 
value chain; facilitate the 
articulation of collective action and 
demands for good governance. 
3.  Limit rent-seeking behavior by 
minimizing points of discretion in 
decision-making processes.
•  Enclave capacity-building initiatives 
in key agencies, emphasizing the 
strengthening of core technical 
skills in contracting. Such skills may 
be contracted-in or built into 
partnership with extractive 
investors. 
•  Create simple, nondiscretionary 
legal and regulatory framework.
•  Ensure checks and balances in 
decision making over license 
allocation, minimizing discretion. 
• Ease information asymmetries 
through geological surveys, model 
contracts, and so on.
• Contract out audit capacity.
• Combine production-based 
royalties and windfall royalties.
• Design stability clauses with built-in 
regular revisions. 
• Use third-party monitoring.
• Enclave public investment capacity 
through resource-for-infrastructure 
deals, but promote transparency to 
enhance value for money as a 
“license to operate.”
• Stress predictability over volume 
for key public investment creation 
envelopes/agencies. 
• Earmark investment resources on 
balance to public asset preservation 
over creation, for example, by 
capitalizing road funds.
• Leverage narrow and organized 
constituencies (extractive 
industries, local communities) for 
asset creation and preservation .
• Tilt extractive industry infrastruc-










1.  Take advantage of longer time 
horizons and the relatively more 
conducive environment for 
contracts and investment. 
2.  Facilitate greater inclusiveness in 
decision making and broader 
benefi t sharing by supporting 
nascent civil society groups and 
empowering nonexecutive 
stakeholders with oversight 
functions.
• Enclave capacity in key agencies.
• Automate license allocation, 
minimizing discretion.
• Empower nonexecutive 
stakeholders, including legislature 
and civil society groups, with 
oversight powers.
• Emphasize checks on executive 
power to rein in rent-seeking. 
Horizontal checks can be built in by 
ensuring interagency collaboration; 
vertical checks can be instituted, 
for example, through independent 
audit agencies and the legal system.
• Enclave tax administration capacity.
• Combine production-based 
royalties with income tax and 
windfall royalties or sliding-scale 
royalties; use production sharing.
• Use stability clauses with built-in 
regular revisions.
• Proactively encourage extractive 
industry infrastructure to be of dual 
use, notably through government’s 
strategic planning of resource 
corridors.
• Support technocratic investors to 
enhance quality of investment 
spending and aligning it with 
regime priorities for key types of 
infrastructure.
• Motivate greater inclusiveness of 
investment by recourse to state 
legitimacy and crowding in demand 





1.  Enhance intertemporal credibility 
and policy stability by lengthening 
time horizons through contractual 
bargains. 
2.  Build stability through sectoral 
institutional technologies, 
emphasizing the importance of 
nondiscretionary processes.
3.  Enhance broader inclusiveness by 
easing information asymmetries 
and creating greater space for 
collective action for good 
governance. 
• Gradually expand capacity by 
building coalitions for reform and 
investments in capacity.
• Create simple, nondiscretionary 
legal and regulatory framework.
• Ensure checks and balances in 
decision making over license 
allocation.
• Create intertemporal fl exibility on 
the terms of the deal, including 
built-in regular revisions.
• Ease information asymmetries 
through contract disclosure.
• Contract out auditing in the short 
term and gradually build audit 
capacity through broader 
coalitions.
• Combine production-based 
royalties with income tax and 
windfall royalties and sliding-scale 
royalties.
• Use stability clauses with built-in 
regular revisions.
• Ease information asymmetries and 
mobilize constituencies for 
transparency in revenue collection.
• Crowd in demand side for asset 
preservation and selected asset 
creation.
• Enhance transparency with regard 
to asset creation and preservation; 
crowd in associated constituencies, 
anchored at a salient subnational 
constituency level.
• Invest in most critical and visible 
links.
• Illuminate key nodes of public 
investment management (for 
example, procurement) by 
emphasizing collective checks 
and balances.
Source: Authors.
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Strengths and Limitations of Common Prescriptions
This volume maps a practitioner’s path to natural resource management 
anchored in both technical understanding and contextual political real-
ity. Such an approach is not without its challenges. Development practi-
tioners are often, understandably, frustrated with political economy 
analysis that simply identifi es the constraints and dynamics leading to 
suboptimal outcomes without generating practicable options for action 
out of the analysis. Political dynamics may sometimes seem simply insur-
mountable in the quest for achieving the better natural resource gover-
nance to which citizens, reformers, and international development 
partners aspire. Yet simply reverting to notions of best practice in design-
ing interventions should be avoided. What should be sought, above all, is 
the diversity of institutional forms and technical solutions that can 
achieve the principles of sound natural resource governance. 
With increasing frequency over the past decade, practitioner-analysts 
have proposed mechanisms for promoting better resource management, 
particularly in settings of institutional weakness.3 This chapter will 
briefl y categorize and summarize the core prescriptions thus emerging 
and note both their strengths and their potential limitations in light of 
the previous chapters and the global study that underpins this volume. 
The intention here—moving away from the sometimes normative thrust 
associated with prescriptions to avoid the resource curse—is to pay spe-
cial attention to how proposed mechanisms interact with prevailing 
political economy and institutional endowments. In particular, interven-
tions should be geared toward lengthening time horizons to strengthen 
intertemporal credibility and toward mobilizing stakeholders to deepen 
political inclusiveness.
Core prescriptions on natural resource management cluster under 
the broad principles of enhancing transparency, using international 
norms and standards, bringing in the demand side, using the potential 
benefi ts of direct transfers, and recognizing leadership.
Transparency 
Recommendations have emerged within the international development 
community that transparency should be a precondition to addressing 
the apparent poor management of natural resources (Ascher 1999). The 
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“Publish What You Pay” movement is one notable example of an attempt 
to bring greater transparency to what extractive industries actually pay 
governments. The International Monetary Fund’s Resource Revenue 
Transparency has further provided guidance on good practice (IMF 
2007). The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) provides 
an institutionalized mechanism for reconciling and validating informa-
tion concerning the payments made by fi rms operating in the extractive 
industries and the payments governments report as received. Additional 
efforts, including those led by Revenue Watch and Oxfam International, 
have stressed the need for internationally listed companies to itemize 
their payments to countries and have focused on generating greater 
transparency regarding contracts (Rosenblum and Maples 2009). 
Providing greater transparency and revealing bad policies and prac-
tices associated with the natural resource sector is certainly an impor-
tant starting point; but special attention is required to determine when 
such initiatives promise to have the greatest traction and how they align 
with domestic actor incentives. Transparency can be a crucial tool in 
mobilizing stakeholders by empowering them with information; but 
shedding a bright light on one dimension of the value chain (revenue 
management) may be only a starting point when seen from a more sys-
tematic value chain perspective. Azerbaijan was the fi rst country to vali-
date its EITI status in 2009, but its EITI-compliant status does not imply 
that it faces no governance challenges regarding how its rents are used 
downstream. Reconciling formal payments in the context of EITI, in 
other words, will say little about whether countries are receiving a fair 
share of rents or effectively translating those rents into sustainable devel-
opment outcomes. 
International Norms and Standards
The centerpiece of EITI has been its focus on revenue transparency, but 
its most salient aspect is its institutional design. The EITI process is built 
on a multi-stakeholder platform that brings together governments, 
extractive companies, and civil society. While fundamentally domestic, 
this process has important international dimensions. Countries must 
fi rst agree to become EITI candidates and subsequently subject them-
selves to validation every fi ve years.4 Candidate status requires some 
basic standards of participation, specifi cally including civil society, as 
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monitored by an international secretariat. Validation is EITI’s quality 
assurance mechanism: it does not repeat the disclosure and reconcilia-
tion work underlying the production of EITI reports, but instead evalu-
ates EITI implementation in consultation with domestic stakeholders 
and identifi es further opportunities, as well as ensuring that the EITI 
global standard is upheld.
Supra-national processes may also support resource extraction in set-
tings with weak property rights, in particular, by lengthening time hori-
zons and thereby strengthening confi dence in contracts. For example, 
extraction contracts may include international arbitration clauses. These 
were recently invoked by a Canadian company, First Quantum, backed 
by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), in a major copper con-
tract in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). How binding and effec-
tive such international standards are in practice—and thus how able to 
change the dynamics of intertemporal commitment within a country—
remains an open question. The key is likely to be the extent to which 
developing country elites can be convinced that binding themselves to 
external enforcement mechanisms is in their longer-term interest. In the 
context of regimes with extremely weak property rights, domestic elites 
may feel that binding themselves to international norms could increase 
the longer-term “rent pool” (Frankel 2010). Angola, for example, has not 
signed up for EITI, but reputational factors such as sovereign credit rat-
ings do appear to fi gure in the regime’s decision-making calculus for the 
petroleum sector. 
Increasingly, international standards are being applied to actors out-
side sovereign governments as well, holding other stakeholders respon-
sible for their actions in the natural resource sector. A number of OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) govern-
ments have attempted to legislate mandatory payment reporting for 
listed resource extraction companies, thereby holding the fi rms operat-
ing in the extractive industries more accountable. Advocacy groups 
within OECD countries have also tried to use their home country laws to 
ensure that listed companies act responsibly with respect to the environ-
mental and social issues related to resource extraction. Finally, there is an 
increasing push to hold particular leaders liable for rent extraction into 
their own pockets. The Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) Initiative, a joint 
undertaking of the United Nations and the World Bank Group, seeks to 
uncover instances of theft of public assets and recover those assets from 
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the perpetrators. The extractive industries, because of the massive wind-
fall rents they can generate, tend to be susceptible to such forms of theft; 
hence, an initiative such as StAR can have a major impact on the political 
economy of natural resources.
Bringing in the Demand Side
A signifi cant part of the advocacy agenda in developing countries has 
focused on strengthening the role of civil society and NGOs in holding 
governments to account. Civil society groups are often critical in enforc-
ing accountability, but other stakeholders are also important, particularly 
those beyond the resource sector. For example, nonextractive private sec-
tor interests can be important advocates for better governance and eco-
nomic policies, such as in Chile, where other export sectors have been 
crucial in lobbying for better macroeconomic policy. Subnational gov-
ernments, if their relationship with the central government is structured 
so that their interests can be clearly articulated, may also serve as advo-
cates for enhancing transparency within the oil or mineral sectors. This 
point will be discussed further below.
Direct Transfers
The attractiveness of direct distribution to citizens has been advocated 
in the case of Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003) and Iraq 
(Birdsall and Subramanian 2004). To date, however, there has been lim-
ited uptake of such schemes in developing countries, with the exception 
of the Motherland Gift Fund in Mongolia, which pays dividends from 
the country’s mining revenues to its citizens. Proponents of direct trans-
fer schemes recognize that credible direct distribution to citizens requires 
more than simply distributing cash; it requires mechanisms to guarantee 
benefi ciary identifi cation and payment procedures.5 Devarajan, Le, and 
Raballand (2010) suggest that direct distribution can in turn be partially 
taxed back, buffering revenue volatility in comparison to direct taxation 
and mobilizing domestic stakeholders by strengthening the accountabil-
ity linkages between state and society. 
Recognizing Leadership
Individuals can clearly be crucial agents for better managing natural 
resources and breaking up suboptimal practices, whether they are well-
intentioned and farsighted leaders at the very top of government or 
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embedded in bureaucracy or civil society. Yet even the most well- 
intentioned leaders cannot (and ideally should not) determine by indi-
vidual fi at how resources are best used. International development part-
ners can seek to support visionary and effective leadership for better 
natural resource management.6 But leaders typically prioritize parts of 
the value chain in their strategic reform efforts. Interventions that 
enhance a shared and comprehensive understanding of the steps needed 
to bring about better developmental impact from extractive industries, 
by emphasizing collective action and coalitions, could serve as a critical 
ingredient in gaining greater traction. Global standards, including EITI 
and such emerging initiatives as the Natural Resource Charter, provide 
the opportunity to frame in-country debates and to provide committed 
leaders and champions with policy wedges and political leverage to pro-
mote better natural resource management.
Improving Engagement: Collaboration and Mobilization
Natural resources hold tremendous promise for low-income countries 
attempting to spark sustainable growth and development. As noted at 
the beginning of this volume, all countries that currently or in the 
future stand to extract signifi cant natural resource rents can be charac-
terized as being on one of several developmental trajectories: the fortu-
nate few headed toward prosperity, an unlucky group enmeshed in 
welfare-reducing resource curse dynamics, and perhaps the bulk expe-
riencing some form of low-level equilibrium trap (see fi gure 1.6 in 
chapter 1). As the frontiers of resource discovery and extraction spread 
farther across the globe, more developing countries will face the politi-
cal economy dynamics outlined in this book. They will require, more 
than ever, clear-eyed, constructive, and feasible assistance from their 
development partners, including traditional donors and NGOs, emerg-
ing development players, and specifi c public and private interests in the 
natural resource sector.
The international development community has a compelling and 
critical role to play in helping client countries to better translate natural 
resource wealth into salutary development outcomes. In addition to the 
country-level political economic dynamics upon which we have focused 
here, the broader global context surrounding the extraction and use of 
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natural resources matters a great deal. International demand for natural 
resources will continue to grow signifi cantly over the coming genera-
tion as the world’s population approaches 9 billion and developing 
economies grow more prosperous. New global players active in the 
extractive industries, in terms of both production and consumption, 
necessarily interact with the political dynamics unfolding within coun-
tries. By the same token, evolving global concerns about climate change, 
energy security, and environmental stability affect the discourse around 
natural resources, bringing mounting pressures to reduce the world’s 
dependence on fossil fuels. But the World Energy Council (2007) esti-
mates that energy demand will double by 2050, with fossil fuels continu-
ing to play the dominant role, and the World Economic Forum sees 
demand for minerals skyrocketing over the coming decade. An increas-
ingly diverse set of natural resource consumers, particularly the middle-
income BRICs (Brazil–the Russian Federation–India–China) and other 
emerging economies, have already begun emphasizing access to raw 
materials. These trends combine into an expanding push for resource 
discovery and extraction in low-income countries across the world. In 
turn, nascent producers become exposed to the economic vulnerability 
induced by global commodity prices, and the political economy dynam-
ics that often accompany the drive for resource-led development. And 
the rents and investment fl ows associated with this sector, in many cases, 
continue to simply dwarf international aid and the weight of develop-
ment  prescriptions.
Consequently, traditional and emerging development partners 
(Rowlands 2008) must fi nd common cause in seeking to leverage devel-
oping country resources for shared prosperity. Engaging in smarter, more 
collaborative ways with the growing number of developing country pro-
ducers will be a key aid effectiveness challenge in the coming decade—
and more systematic attention to political economy realities will be a key 
ingredient in enhancing the prospects of success. 
This section briefl y lays out the contours of constructive engage-
ment, including improving conventional assistance, building better 
information systems, incorporating emerging players and new engage-
ment paradigms, using international standards, breaking down silos 
and prioritizing engagement, and crowding-in stakeholders through 
cross-cutting collaboration. 
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Improving Conventional Assistance
The traditional development community (including international fi nan-
cial institutions, regional multilateral development banks, bilateral aid 
agencies, and international non-governmental organizations) has already 
initiated a signifi cant number of efforts to improve technical assistance 
for resource-dependent client countries. In terms of the principles of 
engagement, fi rst and foremost, a signifi cant and crucial shift has occurred 
toward the notion of “good enough” reforms that emphasize incentive 
compatibility and the recognition that a diversity of institutional forms 
can and do satisfy key institutional functions. The implementation of 
these good fi t recommendations, moreover, is acknowledged to be con-
tingent on a country’s positioning along its developmental trajectory. 
Examples of these principles at work at different steps in the natural 
resource management (NRM) value chain have been presented through-
out this volume, for example, Angola’s successful consolidation of human 
capacity and institutional function in Sonangol. 
Furthermore, traditional development partners have moved away 
from the conventional “supply side” approach to reforms by broadening 
coalitions and agents of reform toward the “demand side,” including civil 
society groups, local and community-level watchdogs, and so on. The 
World Bank’s country-level governance and anticorruption program 
(CGAC) aiding natural resource–led development in Mongolia is an 
important example of this more expansive strategy for donor support. 
The World Bank works with core groups in Mongolian civil society 
through capacity-building programs and sharing tools such as open 
budgeting, enabling them to hold government and developers account-
able in the process of natural resource extraction.
Better Information Systems
International development partners can be important creators of and 
conduits for the information that resource-dependent developing coun-
tries need to improve their own outcomes. The World Bank’s Wealth of 
Nations initiative, for example, provides estimates of the various sources 
of wealth for nearly 120 countries and analyzes the implications for eco-
nomic policy and development. Such a comparative compendium 
enables developing countries to assess their own prospects and chart 
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policy against the experiences of other nations. Similarly, the IMF’s 
“Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes” (ROSC) summa-
rizes the extent to which countries observe certain internationally recog-
nized standards and codes in such crucial areas as accounting, auditing, 
corporate governance, and fi scal transparency. Again, such an effort 
enables client countries to benchmark their own policies and perfor-
mance against those of others. The Natural Resource Charter proposes 
that resource-dependent countries might benefi t from following certain 
blueprints for more effective fi scal policy and public fi nancial manage-
ment related to natural resources. Similarly, international nongovern-
mental agencies like Revenue Watch and Oxfam have developed model 
resource sector contracts.
Emerging Players and New Engagement Paradigms 
A major development in the international landscape around natural 
resource extraction is the emergence of new investors, both state-owned 
and private, from middle-income countries such as China and the other 
BRICs. In the search for a medium- to long-term supply of the natural 
resources necessary for their energy, industrial, and other development 
needs, these emerging players have introduced new paradigms of 
resource discovery and extraction to quench their demand. The oft-cited 
example of a new paradigm for resource sector development is the Chi-
nese model of offering resource-backed infrastructure loans, or “bun-
dled deals,” through which Chinese companies construct roads, railways, 
irrigation systems, and even schools and health clinics in exchange for a 
supply of natural resources (Brautigam 2010).7 This type of model has 
the benefi t of short-circuiting potential problems of intertemporal cred-
ibility in a government’s own pledge to its citizens to use the proceeds 
of natural resource extraction for collective welfare-oriented public 
investment. On the other hand, it should be cautioned that domestic 
 stakeholders—including legislatures, civil society groups, the media, and 
so on—are often left out of the negotiation process and potentially mar-
ginalized from attempting to ensure fi nancial oversight if revenue fl ows 
are taken off-budget. Nevertheless, low-income, resource-dependent 
countries can surely benefi t from the recent experiences and instincts of 
these emerging development players.
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International Standards
As the natural resource sector continues to grow in importance, various 
international standards for conduct have emerged. Some of these stan-
dards hold resource-dependent countries to strict account; for example, 
the behavior of sovereign governments is now constrained by the impor-
tance of retaining strong credit ratings for fi nancing from international 
investors. Other standards are more voluntary in terms of compliance; 
for example, EITI, as discussed earlier, and the Santiago Principles, a set 
of voluntary guidelines for operation of sovereign wealth funds. Another 
standard is more implicit but still signifi cant, that is, a growing recogni-
tion on the part of international extractive industry operators that dem-
onstrating the developmental benefi ts of their projects is crucial to their 
social license to operate and long-term profi tability.
Breaking Down Silos and Prioritizing Engagement 
The analysis in this volume has highlighted the interdependencies across 
various segments of the natural resource value chain. Governments and 
industry have been subject to increasing scrutiny concerning the devel-
opmental impacts of the extractive industries, and both domestic and 
international reform champions have recognized the need to take a com-
prehensive view concerning the promotion of natural resource–led 
development. Successful reform also requires strategic prioritization of 
efforts in those areas where the greatest vulnerabilities exist, yet where 
there is also the promise of traction given the prevailing political eco-
nomic context. EITI is the most prominent example of an initiative that 
has targeted a specifi c stage in the potential transformation of rents. At 
the level of country programs, both within and across engaged public or 
private sector agents, there will be a growing need to gain knowledge of 
and learn from various initiatives across the value chain. This will require 
changing the mind-sets that tend to see natural resource–led develop-
ment in issue-based or sectoral silos, as well as building programs of 
engagement with more concerted collaboration that cuts across the links 
of the value chain.
Crowding-in Stakeholders
The political economy framework in this book articulates a set of com-
prehensive and context-specifi c perspectives for natural resource–led 
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development. A political economy lens is not a substitute for good tech-
nical engagement, but rather a necessary aid to constructively informing 
more effective engagement across these wide-ranging country settings. 
And, to be truly successful, this engagement must be predicated on 
lengthening the time-horizons and leveraging the interests and motiva-
tions of key stakeholders. Thus, in addition to the country-level possi-
bilities discussed here, champions of natural resource–led development 
must seek opportunities at the global and regional levels to crowd in 
stakeholders. Table 6.2 identifi es three key sets of actors and the possible 
leverage afforded by their typical motivations, as described in this chap-
ter. In some cases, incentives align in favor of certain strategies; in other 
cases, interests will be at loggerheads and the challenge will lie in coaxing 






International blue chips Reputational concerns, international 
regulations
Emerging internationals Reputational concerns, level access 
National mining and oil 
companies
Domestic political economy, 
international aspirations
Domestic producers Continued access to contracts
Host governments: 
seeking investment, rents, 
development
Energy, oil, and mining 
ministries
Technical reputation, bureaucratic 
power
Executive International reputation and 
linkages with country groupings 
(e.g., G-8, G-20)
Central fi nance agencies Technical reputation, bureaucratic 
power
Subnational governments (Predictable) access to rent streams, 
infrastructure development
Sector ministries Sectoral outcomes
Civil society: “a many-
splendored thing”
Legislatures Political party interests and capacity
Non-EI private tradable sector Competitiveness and linkages with 
extractive industry 
NGOs Transparency, accountability 
Local communities Voice, government responsiveness, 
accountability
Source: Authors.
Note: EI = extractive industry.
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various actors into more productive relationships to further natural 
resource–led development.8 
The past decade has seen a signifi cant shift in the global norms con-
cerning extractive industries, which have increasingly manifested them-
selves in a series of voluntary and mandatory initiatives. Supra-national 
constituencies and bodies below the global level are increasingly recog-
nizing the risks associated with allowing the resource curse to fester in 
their neighborhoods, as well as the foregone opportunities for leveraging 
benefi cial spillover effects from resource-led development. Regional 
bodies (African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and 
Organization of American States, among others) are one possible plat-
form for dialogue, while regional multilateral development banks (Afri-
can Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American 
Development Bank) can provide valuable support mechanisms.
A Normative Compass 
Resource wealth should translate into collective and sustainable develop-
ment. But, from the perspective of the public interest, many resource-
dependent developing countries pursue short-sighted and suboptimal 
policies in relation to both the extraction and capture of resource rents 
and the spending and savings from their resource endowments. In attempt-
ing to break out of this cycle, reformers in such countries, along with their 
local and global development partners , carry a normative compass pointed 
toward collective welfare enhancement along with mental maps on what 
constitutes good technical guidance for that purpose. The experience of 
countries that have attempted natural resource–led development provides 
a warning, however, that development practitioners cannot turn a blind 
eye to the fundamentally political nature of this process. 
This volume has illustrated the political economy dynamics that 
shape the incentives of the actors involved in the extractive industries 
and that underlie the typically poor outcomes across the natural resource 
management value chain. Yet, identifying these dynamics is not intended 
to imply the inevitability of the resource curse. On the contrary, adopt-
ing a political economy lens enables policy makers, along with their 
constituents and the donor community, to recognize and act on the 
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potential for pro-developmental action in the natural resource sector. 
Recast in this manner, the concept of the resource paradox challenges 
development partners to provide incentive-compatible technical guid-
ance for clients pursuing natural resource–led development. 
Ultimately, the surest trajectory of natural resource–led development 
is to engage as many global, national, and community-level stakeholders 
as possible in defi ning the public interest and in holding decision makers 
accountable for achieving that goal. This volume’s political economy 
framework demonstrates that where intertemporal credibility is weak 
and political inclusiveness low, political economic elites are able to siphon 
resource rents away from developmentally oriented outcomes. The 
implications for engagement are clear: lengthening time horizons 
enhances the ability of governments to increase potential rent genera-
tion, and improving political inclusiveness supports the orientation of 
rent distribution toward the collective good. The logic of the framework, 
along with the case material presented throughout this book, thus dem-
onstrates the potential for mediating the resource paradox through intel-
ligent and resilient institutional design. Successful development inter-
ventions must work within the constraints of, resonate with, and 
eventually shape, the underlying political and institutional dynamics 
associated with resource-dependence. Bearing that in mind, diverse 
stakeholders oriented by the normative compass of collective welfare 
enhancement can successfully transform resource rents into sustainable 
development riches.
Notes
 1. Rodrik (2007) advances this perspective more generally regarding economic 
development.
 2. Programmatic pluralist settings face less constraining political economy dynamics.
 3. See, for example, Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007) who conclude with a 
number of recommendations; and The Natural Resource Charter (2010). 
 4. To date, 11 countries have achieved full validation and thereby EITI-compliant 
status. Another 24 countries are candidates, but their validation processes have 
lagged and the bulk of candidate countries have been granted extensions.
 5. For example, technological advances that make biometric identifi cation increas-
ingly cost-effective offer potential entry points for states interested in making such 
arrangements work (see Gelb and Decker 2011).
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 6. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, for example, has developed a prize for achieve-
ments in African leadership of US$5 million, payable over 10 years. The prize rewards 
leaders who set an example by voluntarily relinquishing power.
 7. Brautigam (2010) notes that China was itself the benefi ciary of such a strategy 
earlier in its developmental trajectory, when Japan fi nanced a major set of infra-
structure projects in China in exchange for shipments of Chinese oil and coal in the 
early 1980s.
 8. For example, McFerson (2010) highlights a number of key international initia-
tives (including EITI) and assesses their potential impact, notably for Africa. She 
underscores that success will ultimately depend on domestic constituencies and 
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Algeria 34.4 2,382 4,460 2,112 98.5 68.6 98.5 68.6 .. .. n.a. Yes No No
Angola 18 1,247 3,960 3,138 95.6 83.6 95.6 83.6 — — 2.4 No No No
Azerbaijan 8.7 87 5,180 3,661 94.7 53.4 94.7 53.4 .. .. 3.1 Yes Compl. No
Bahrain 0.8 1 25,420 11,408 79.8 85.5 79.8 85.5 .. .. n.a. No No No
Bolivia 9.7 1,099 1,790 607 63.5 70.0 44.4 26.0 19.1 44.0 3.3 Yes No No
Botswana 1.9 582 6,890 362 64.2 13.9 .. .. 64.2 13.9 n.a. No No No
Brunei Darussalam 0.4 6 31,180 23,436 97.2 60.0 97.2 60.0 .. .. n.a. No No No
Cameroon 18.9 475 1,160 153 33.3 38.2 33.3 38.2 .. .. 2.9 Yes Yes No
Chad 11.1 1,284 600 392 84.3 57.1 84.3 57.1 .. .. 2.2 Yes No No
Chile 16.8 757 9,940 2,151 55.7 22.7 .. 55.7 22.7 n.a. Yes No Yes
Colombia 44.5 1,142 5,510 695 23.9 — 23.9 — — — n.a. Yes No Yes
Congo, Dem. Rep. 64.2 2,345 180 14 94.6 — 25.0 69.6 .. 2.2 Yes Yes No
Congo, Rep. 3.6 342 2,310 2,261 87.7 86.0 87.7 86.0 .. .. 2.6 Yes Yes No
Ecuador 13.5 284 4,510 1,268  49.0 49.0 .. .. n.a. Yes No Yes
Equatorial Guinea 0.7 28 14,680 17,386 98.9 93.5 98.9 93.5 .. .. n.a. Yes Yes No
Gabon 1.5 268 7,760 4,727 77.3 65.7 77.3 65.7 .. .. n.a. No Yes No
Ghana 23.4 239 1,240 61 65.4 — — — 65.4 .. 3.7 Yes Compl. No
Guinea 9.8 246 380 29 89.9 24.5 89.9 24.5 .. .. 2.6 No Yes No
Indonesia 228.3 1,905 2,580 364 22.7 29.3 22.7 29.3 .. .. n.a. Yes No No
Iran, Islamic Rep. 72 1,745 4,530 2,351 75.8 69.2 75.8 69.2 .. .. n.a. Yes No Yes
Iraq 31.2 438 2,320 2,468 97.5 81.0 97.5 81.0 .. .. n.a. Yes No No
Kazakhstan 15.7 2,725 7,440 3,871 54.3 44.6 54.3 44.6 .. .. n.a. Yes Yes No
Kuwait 2.7 18 43,920 35,227 94.4 72.1 94.4 72.1 .. .. n.a. Yes No Yes
Kyrgyz Republic 5.3 200 880 14 59.0 — .. .. 59.0 .... 3 No Yes No
Lao PDR 6.2 237 1,000 — 50.4 — .. .. 50.4 .. 3.1 No No No
Libya 6.3 1,760 12,020 9,232 97.5 89.7 97.5 89.7 .. .. n.a. No No No
Malaysia 27 330 7,900 1,593 47.0 13.0 47.0 13.0 .. .. n.a. Yes No No
Mauritania 3.2 1,031 1,060 451 34.7 11.0 11.0 34.7 .. 3 No Yes No
Mexico 106.4 1,964 9,330 1,068 15.8 35.6 15.8 35.6 .. .. n.a. Yes Yes
Mongolia 2.6 1,567 1,890 178 58.6 28.9 .. .. 58.6 28.9 3.4 No Compl. No
Namibia 2.1 824 4,650 136 58.8 6.3 .. .. 58.8 6.3 n.a. No No No
Niger 14.7 1,267 360 — 91.5 42.0 .. .. 91.5 42.0 3.2 Yes Yes No
Nigeria 151.3 924 1,180 492 97.5 83.7 97.5 83.7 — — 2.9 Yes Yes Yes
Norway 4.8 324 85,380 19,904 49.8 39.1 49.8 39.1 .. .. n.a. Yes Yes Yes
Oman 2.8 310 17,890 11,122 81.0 86.3 81.0 86.3 .. .. n.a. No No Yes
Papua New Guinea 6.5 463 1,300 431 80.6 34.3 .. .. 80.6 34.3 2.9 No No Yes
Peru 28.8 1,285 4,710 532 32.9 25.0 .. .. 32.9 25.0 n.a. Yes Yes No
Qatar 1.3 11 43,485 88.9 64.5 88.9 64.5 .. .. n.a. Yes No No
Russian Federation 141.8 17,098 9,910 3,826 65.8 32.8 65.8 32.8 — — n.a. Yes Yes Yes
São Tomè and Príncipe 1,200 — — — — — .. .. 3.1 No No No
Saudi Arabia 24.7 2,150 17,200 13,445 89.7 89.3 89.7 89.3 .. .. n.a. Yes No No
Sierra Leone 5.6 72 340 3 90.3 — .. .. 90.3 .. 3 No Yes No
(continued next page)
South Africa 48.7 1,219 6,100 679 6.0 2.0 .. .. 6.0 2.0 n.a. Yes No No
Sudan 41.4 2,506 1,270 371 90.2 55.7 90.2 55.7 .. .. 2.2 Yes No No
Syrian Arab Republic 21.2 185 2,640 660 39.7 29.6 39.7 29.6 .. .. n.a. Yes No No
Timor-Leste 1.1 15 2,220 — 97.3 98.2 97.3 98.2 .. .. 2.7 No Yes Yes
Trinidad and Tobago 1.3 5 15,380 11,484 87.0 57.8 87.0 57.8 .. .. n.a. Yes No No
Turkmenistan 5 488 3,700 5,556 77.3 — 77.3 — .. .. n.a. No No No
United Arab Emirates 4.5 84 21,717 43.3 70.2 43.3 70.2 .. .. n.a. Yes No Yes
Uzbekistan 27.3 447 1,280 824 36.9 17.2 22.7 — 14.3 17.2 2.8 Yes No No
Venezuela, R.B. 27.9 912 11,590 3,471 81.2 46.3 81.2 46.3 .. .. n.a. Yes No Yes
Vietnam 86.2 329 1,100 187 17.5 31.0 17.5 31.0 .. .. 3.6 Yes No No
Yemen, Rep. 23.1 528 1,060 375 98.9 68.1 98.9 68.1 .. .. 2.9 No Yes No
Zambia 12.6 753 1,070 222 66.7 — .. — 66.7 — 3.1 No Yes No
Total 1473.02 Average 7,952.9 5,392.0 69.4 50.6 70.1 58.0 54.0 23.6 2.9
Source: Authors’ compilation: population, area GDP (World Bank Indicators 2010); EI rents per capita (Wealth of Nations Initiative Database 2010); EI share of total exports, EI revenue share of total 
public revenues, oil and gas share of total exports, oil and gas revenue share of total public revenues, mining share of total exports, mining revenue share of total public revenues (IMF Article IV 
Consultations 2007–09); CPIA public sector and institutions average (World Bank CPIA Database 2010); Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI website); National Oil/Mining Company, and 
Stabilization Fund (case studies).
Note: a. CPIA = Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, Public Sector Management and Institutions (Indicators 12-16: Property Rights and Rule-based Government Quality of Budget and Financial 
Management; Effi ciency of Revenue Mobilization; Quality of Public Administration; Transparency; Accountability; and Corruption in the Public Sector)
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Rents to Riches? focuses on the political economy of the detailed decisions that governments make at each step of the natural resource management (nrm) value chain. Many resource-dependent developing countries pursue seemingly shortsighted and suboptimal policies when extracting, taxing, and 
investing resource rents. Th e book contextualizes these micro-level outcomes with an emphasis 
on two central political economy dimensions: the degree to which governments can make 
credible intertemporal commitments to both resource developers and citizens, and the degree to 
which governments are inclusive and inclined to turn resource rents into public goods.
Almost 1.5 billion people live in the more than 50 World Bank client countries classifi ed as 
resource-dependent. A detailed understanding of the way political economy characteristics 
aff ect the nrm decisions made in these countries by governments, extractive developers, 
and society can improve the design of interventions to support welfare-enhancing policy 
making and governance in the natural resource sectors. Featuring case study work from Africa 
(Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria), East Asia and Pacifi c 
(the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Timor-Leste), and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago), the book provides guidance 
for government clients, domestic stakeholders, and development partners committed to 
transforming natural resource rents into sustainable development riches. 
Governments are oft en advised to manage their mineral wealth in accordance with international 
“best practice.” Yet the authors of this insightful book point out that there are no “one-size-fi ts-
all” solutions to the dilemmas created by resource wealth: policies that work in some countries 
may not be appropriate, or feasible, for others. Rents to Riches? argues that we must account for 
a country’s political and economic realities, and devise incentive-compatible reforms that can 
help nations turn their resource wealth into sustainable gains in people’s everyday lives. Th is 
book is unique, essential, and fi lled with invaluable and practical ideas.
  —MICHAEL L. ROSS, Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
For many poor and fragile countries, reserves of oil, gas, and minerals may seem to promise 
unlimited economic development. Rents to Riches? is an important, timely, cautionary guide to 
the governments of those countries as well as international policy makers, beginning with its 
reminder that governments manage natural resources in trust for citizens, who are the actual 
owners. No less vital is the authors’ emphasis on transparency as an essential ingredient of good 
governance at every stage of the value chain. Th ere are fresh, valuable lessons in every chapter. 
  —KARIN LISSAKERS, Director, The Revenue Watch Institute, New York
